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The greater centrality of the European Parliament (EP) within the EU’s 
institutional structure has increased the importance of voting behaviour of its 
members (MEPs), thus making it more important to fully understand the logic 
they follow. A consolidated stream of literature has treated the political groups 
of the European Parliament (EPGs) as cohesive actors, influenced mainly by 
the classical dimension of left-right politics, with nationality playing a 
marginal role; a second, anti-/pro-EU dimension exists, but it is orthogonal to 
the main one and explains a fewer share of votes. In this perspective, MEPs 
from the same political group are likely to vote together (just like any 
democratic parliament), no matter which country they come from. However, 
other scholars suggest that the methods used to reach these findings are biased. 
I add new elements to this discussion, analysing: (I) the cases when EPGs are 
exceptionally low cohesive; (II) the different dynamics of various EP’s 
legislative committees; (III) the possible contrast between EPGs and national 
delegations; (IV) the relationship between MEPs’ exogenous policy preferences 
and their revealed voting behaviour. Theoretically, I originally define MEPs’ 
voting behaviour as a refinement of existing theories both at a macro-level (EU 
party system, party group cohesion) and a micro-level (MEPs’ 
representativeness, principal-agent theory). I firstly affirm that the current 
knowledge about the high cohesiveness of EPGs is a consequence, although 
correct, of a quantitative approach that “dilutes” the variance by looking at the 
aggregate scores of indexes of cohesion (such as the Agreement Index, AI); 
secondly, that voting behaviour of MEPs in the various committees of the 
European Parliament has different dynamics, following the indication of many 
scholars that knowledge of the internal dynamics of committees in the EP is 
still blurry; thirdly, that national affiliation, yet emerging only in a small 
minority of votes, is crucial and has some specific characteristics that can be 
isolated; fourthly, that MEPs’ preferences and behaviour differ more than 
expected along partisan (EPG) lines than national lines. Empirically I then 
test these hypotheses on the 6th EP legislature (2004-2009) and partially on 
the 7th (2009-2013) with a combination of quantitative and qualitative 
methodological tools: a critical use of the AI; the results of an original survey 
submitted to MEPs’ assistants; descriptive and inferential statistical 
techniques; a combination of survey preferences and behavioural data (roll-call 
votes). Finally, I add some qualitative insights in order to reinforce my 
findings. My results show that the oft-repeated claims about the resemblance 
of the European Parliament to a classical democratic parliament should be 
taken more carefully: usually political groups are highly cohesive, but when 
controversies arise (because the outcome of the vote may impact member 
states’ interests) national affiliation plays a greater role than the one usually 









“Over the last twenty years, the European Parliament (EP) has experienced a 
greater amount of change than any other major EU institution. […] For much 
of its life, the EP could have been justly labelled a ‘multi-lingual talking shop’. 
This is no longer the case: the EP is now one of the most powerful legislatures 
in the world” 




1.1. Introduction and research question 
Within the framework of the European construction, the European 
Parliament has been the institution with the most interesting path due 
to the constant changes that it has gone through over the course of the 
years. In its sixty-year history the European Parliament (EP) has 
evolved from a mere consultative body into a full-fledged legislative 
chamber: “from fig-leaf to co-legislator” (Corbett et al. 2011: 3). Ergo, 
this increase of power makes it increasingly important to know how 
Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) vote. 
The interest for the general question “how do MEPs vote?” attracted 
increasing academic attention since the early 1980s, in the aftermath of 
the newly direct-elected European assembly in 1979; from that point 
on, a consolidated stream of literature, relying mainly on quantitative 
analyses of roll-call votes, has treated the political groups of the 
European Parliament (EPGs) as highly internally cohesive actors, 
influenced mainly by the classical dimension of left-right politics, with 
nationality playing a marginal role. In this perspective, MEPs from the 
same political group are likely to vote together (just like any western 
democracy parliament), no matter which country they come from. The 
“national factor” of the logic of voting behaviour, therefore, has been 
dismissed as secondary. However, other scholars suggest that the 
methods used to reach these findings are biased, because roll-call votes 
are only a (non-representative) portion of the whole universe of votes 
cast, and in general the question of MEPs’ voting behaviour is still at 
the centre of a heated academic debate. Thus, the relevance of this topic 
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is twofold: on the one hand, it stems from the importance, per se, of 
deepening the knowledge of how the members of such a crucial 
supranational assembly vote, especially after the Lisbon Treaty that put 
the EP on an equal position to that of the Council. On the other hand, it 
depends on the possibility for original results, due to the lack of a 
straightforward and universally accepted answer to the question “how 
MEPs vote?”. 
In terms of specific focus of the research, this dissertation tackles 
exactly the point raised above: the controversial relationship between 
party group membership and national affiliation in shaping MEPs’ 
votes. In the majority of cases, votes fall along the left-right cleavage, 
with party groups playing a cohesive role: this is true. However, the 
motivation for studying more carefully the “national alignments” that, 
from time to time, emerge in the EP is legitimate: what if this national 
element, latent in most votes, appears only when it really matters, as 
some Brussels “insiders” – such as the one quoted below – openly 
recognize? 
“Usually MEPs stick to the national line in the important cases, while for 
minor issues they tend to vote in group line not to cause too much internal 
debate” (Anonymous German ALDE member’s assistant – July 18th, 2012) 
From a broader viewpoint, contemporary studies on the EP can be 
classified into four interrelated areas, according to the taxonomy 
provided by Hix et al. (2003a: 193), according to the object under 
scrutiny: 
a. Works on the general development and functioning of the European 
Parliament, focusing especially on the institutional change provided by 
the entry into force of the new Treaties; 
b. Research on political behaviour of the citizens/voters and European 
elections; 
c. Research on the internal politics and organization of the EP; 
d. Examinations of inter-institutional bargaining between Parliament, 
Council and Commission. 
This dissertation, analysing the logic that lies behind MEPs’ voting 
behaviour, falls under the third category. More specifically, I 
investigate the internal dynamics of the EP following the 
aforementioned central research question: how do party group 
membership and national affiliation influence the outcome of members 
of the European Parliament’s vote? This central, necessarily broad 
question then can be disaggregated in a variety of sub-questions: can 
MEPs’ legislative behaviour be theorized in a satisfactory framework 
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that takes into account these two factors? Are these two factors 
competing in defining the logic of voting behaviour? If yes, why 
sometimes MEPs decide to disregard the party group line to form a 
“national alignment”? And when these alignments emerge, can we 
isolate some key features of the vote – first of all, the presence of a 
national interest? Do they surface more in regards to specific areas of 
legislation? Finally, in light of all these elements, can we compare the 
European Parliament to its national correspondents? A systematic and 
structured answer to these questions could improve our understanding 
of legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. 
 
1.2. The approach: theory, methodology and data 
In order to address any research question, the starting point must be 
the theory. In this perspective, the approach used is to first define 
MEPs’ voting behaviour as a combination of existing theories both at a 
macro-level (EU party system, party group cohesion) and a micro-level 
(MEPs’ representativeness, principal-agent theory). The 
methodological approach relies on mixed, quantitative and qualitative, 
research strategies.  The data employed to conduct this research is 
essentially threefold: firstly, the available dataset of roll-call votes. 
Secondly, survey data from MEPs’ questionnaires already published by 
other scholars. Finally, additional data from an original survey 
submitted to EP “experts”, namely parliamentary assistants. The time 
span considered is, whenever possible, the last two European 
legislatures (EP6, 2004-2009 and EP7, 2009-current); in case of lack of 
fresh data, the analysis has been limited to EP6. 
 
1.3. Brief outline of the chapters 
In chapter 2 I briefly analyse the state of the art of the literature on the 
Euro party system, party group cohesiveness and MEPs’ voting 
behaviour. Then, I build my theory as a refinement of different 
conceptual approaches. In chapter 3 the cases when EPGs are 
exceptionally divided are analysed, with the help of simple descriptive 
statistics – yet, reaching interesting and partially counter-intuitive 
results. In chapter 4 I investigate the different rationales of various EP’s 
legislative committees, with a specific focus on party membership 
versus country affiliation (related to the emergence of national interests 
at stake), also relying on the original data from the expert survey. In 
chapter 5 I empirically operationalize the concept of “national 
alignment”, and discuss the possible contrast between EPGs and 
national delegations. In chapter 6 I analyse the relationship between 
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MEPs’ exogenous policy preferences and their revealed voting 
behaviour using an original methodology that combines exogenous 
policy preferences to revealed behavioural data. In chapter 7 I exploit 
again the information provided by the original survey with a 
qualitative analysis that corroborates my previous empirical results. 
Finally, in chapter 8 I conclude by summarizing the main findings and 
contributions of the dissertation and pinpointing the possible venues 




Theoretical framework: party politics, representation and 
voting behaviour in the European Parliament 
 
 
“Despite the fact that there is no real process of political representation at this 
level, in that there are no European parties competing for the votes of a 
European electorate, the aggregation of the outcomes of national processes still 
leads to a reasonable congruence between the European electorate and the 
European Parliament” 





When approaching a topic such as MEPs’ voting behaviour, the 
necessary focus of the analysis is on the outcome of the whole 
legislative process: the vote, and how it relates to the main dimensions 
of this work, i.e. party groups and national affiliation. Before the 
formulation of a theory (yet, like the one presented here, only 
marginally different from the different conceptual frameworks it is 
based on), there is the need to look at the object under scrutiny from a 
broader perspective. In this light, first some general notions on the 
national and supranational dimensions of the EU, thus leading to 
different approaches, are presented. Then I briefly examine the 
evolution of the EP party system and how it can be observed using the 
lenses of Katz and Mair’s “three faces of party organization”. Thirdly, 
party cohesion in the EP is analysed, showing how different scholars 
attribute this it to different explanatory factors. Then, I move on to 
focus on the individual level of members of the European Parliament, 
first by assessing their representativeness towards the European 
electorate, and then by analysing their effective voting behaviour in 
relation to the principal-agent theory. Afterwards, I present my 
theoretical refinement as a combination of these different approaches, 
focusing on the oft-overlooked broader element of national affiliation 




2.2. National and supranational dimensions of the EU 
Any EU study, hence also the present dissertation that focuses on a 
specific aspect of behaviour of the components of one of its main 
institutions, must start from the general theoretical discussion on the 
nature of the EU. EU studies have been long at the centre of a debate 
between two approaches: the International Relations and the 
Comparative Politics approach. Scholarly interest on the development 
and the role of the European Parliament have increased after the first 
direct elections in 1979, apart from some pioneering (empirical, yet 
with a strong normative feature) studies prior to that moment 
(Marquand 1979). After the ‘80s decade, dominated by more empirical 
approaches (Bulmer 1983; Taylor 1983; Putnam 1988) that failed to 
ignite a proper theoretical debate, in the early ‘90s this dichotomy 
became evident, especially thanks to the contributions of two scholars 
presenting diametrically opposed views (Moravcsik 1993; Hix 1994). 
Other scholars tried, in fact, to reconcile these two positions (Majone 
1996; Marks 1996) proposing a “third way” that combines them or 
alternative approaches; however, here only the main two are briefly 
discussed.  
In sum, the International Relations approach considers the EU as an 
international organization (or at best an international regime) that 
evolved thanks to a series of successful international bargains. Thus, it 
privileges the study of national actors’ behaviour, and is especially 
successful in indicating and explaining the evolution of the EU system, 
included that of the European Parliament. Nevertheless, it cannot 
provide satisfactory explanations for the internal evolution of the EU 
and its institutional components, since these dynamics often took place 
without the direct control of member states. The Comparative Politics 
approach, on the other hand, identifies the EU as a developing 
domestic political system: its functions, further development and 
overall performing, thus, can be compared to those of a nation state. 
This approach is needed to observe and understand the evolutionary, 
slow changes that take place in the EU without the necessity of a new 
treaty or an intergovernmental decision (Bardi 2002: 294). One of these 
changes is, unquestionably, the evolution of parties and party system at 
the EU level. 
 
2.3. Parties and party system at the EU level 
Political parties are present at the EU level in two types of European 
structures: EP party groups (parliamentary groups, as those that exist 
in regular national parliaments) and extra-parliamentary organizations 
(the so-called “Europarties”). EP party groups became a relevant and 
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crucial actor right after the first EP elections; they organize MEPs 
belonging to the same party families, or to ideologically compatible 
national parties (Bardi 2002: 295). On the other hand, extra-
parliamentary organizations can either take the form of transnational 
federations (EPP, Socialists, Liberals) or of less formally structured 
organizations of international cooperation. National parties, finally, are 
also relevant in this picture since they directly engage in EU politics, 
but above all because they constitute the primary link between 
Europarties and civil society1. 
These three types of structure can be seen as analogous to the “three 
faces” of party organization, the conceptual approach that has probably 
influenced the most the debate on political parties’ functioning since 
the mid ‘90s (Katz and Mair 1993). National parties are the equivalent 
to the “party on the ground”; Europarties (albeit still substantially 
powerless) represent a sort of “party in central office”, and finally EP 
party groups correspond to the “party in public office”. Scholars 
interested in the organizational evolution of EU party system advocate 
for an integration of these three faces as a necessary step for a full-
fledged Europarty development (Bardi 2002; Bardi et al. 2010). Here, 
this theoretical framework is useful to analyse how MEPs’ voting 
behaviour may be shaped by the influence of a combination of such 
faces, without taking into account its possible organizational evolution. 
 
2.3.1 Party cohesion 
First of all, since most of the work focuses on the concept of cohesion 
(either by political group or nationality) it is useful to define this 
concept. Cohesion (or cohesiveness2) in studies of legislative assemblies 
simply refers to the internal coherence of a political actor. When 
discussing voting behaviour and party groups vis-à-vis national 
delegations, cohesion corresponds to the capacity of such actors of 
voting cohesively, namely expressing the same ballot preference 
among the options available. 
                                                
1 Ideally, this function should be performed by Europarties; however, their weakness has 
insofar not allowed them to replace national parties. 
2 Although a slight theoretical distinction between cohesion and cohesiveness could be 
legitimately provided (“cohesion” refers to the characteristic itself of an actor of being 
cohesive, while “cohesiveness” implies that this actor is able to exert a unifying force on 
its internal component, in order to act as an integrated and unitary system), in this 
dissertation the two terms will be used as synonyms. 
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Why do we observe party cohesion in legislatures? Theories of party 
cohesion can be divided in two groups. According to the first group of 
theories, voting cohesion stems from the ideological homogeneity of 
the members of a certain group “or, in a more sociological reading, 
from learned norms of collective behaviour” (Bressanelli 2012: 187). In 
this sense, cohesion of a group is high because its members share the 
same ideological or policy preferences. A second group of theories 
instead focuses more on institutional or organizational incentives. 
Cohesiveness, in this sense overlapping with the concept of 
“discipline” (Bowler and Farrell 1995), is the product of the use of 
sanctions and rewards by the party leadership. 
From an institutional perspective, instead, organizational strength and 
voting cohesion of legislative parties is explained by two types of 
institutions: external ones (the structure of relations between the 
parliament and the executive) and internal ones (the structure of 
incentives inside the legislature). The literature usually differentiates 
between parliamentary systems and presidential systems. In the 
former, legislative parties are usually more cohesive, because the 
executive is “fused” to a parliamentary majority, and governments can 
reward loyal backbenchers with ministerial seats. On the external side, 
legislative parties are more cohesive in parliamentary than in 
presidential systems (Tsebelis 2002; Huber 1996; Shugart and Carey 
1992; Bowler and Farrell 1995).  In addition, governing parties can call a 
vote-of-confidence motion, which confronts their parliamentarians 
with the risk of not being re-elected if parliament is dissolved 
(Diermeier and Feddersen 1998: 611-621). In presidential systems, by 
contrast, parties in government are less able to enforce a strong party 
discipline amongst their supporters in the parliament: “loyalty to the 
party line is less important, since lack of discipline does not threaten 
survival of the executive” (Hix et al. 2005: 212). 
The short theoretical framework described above is deliberately 
general, and can fit any political system. Using the approach of 
Comparative Politics, described at the beginning of the chapter, we 
“transpose” this theory of party cohesion to the EU level3. But the case 
of the European Union is peculiar and not ascribable to any of the 
classical forms of government present in standard Constitutionalism. 
From the mere perspective of institutional functioning, the EU can be 
classified as a separated-powers system, where the Executive (the 
European Commission) does not require the direct support of a 
                                                
3 Similarly to what has been done before for the three faces of party organization, from 
the national context to the EU level. 
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majority in the EP to govern. Moreover, the Commission cannot 
introduce a vote-of-confidence motion in the EP or dissolve it, calling 
for new parliamentary elections: although there has been some 
movement towards the parliamentary model, the relationship between 
the Commission and Parliament is far removed from a parliamentary 
system or a system of party government. The main differences are that 
a parliamentary majority cannot “hire and fire” the executive at will 
(Hix et al. 2007: 13) and that there is no direct relationship between the 
outcome of the elections for the European Parliament and the 
composition of the Commission. So, party cohesion could be lower 
than in other political systems. However, despite this peculiar 
institutional structure, it is still reasonable to expect that the structure 
of incentives inside the EU legislature can lead to well-structured 
legislative party organization. Legislators who expect to have similar 
voting preferences on a range of future policy issues can reduce the 
transaction costs of coalition-formation by establishing a party 
organization on the basis of a division-of-labour agreement4. On the 
other hand, the benefits associated to group membership also entail 
costs. In some cases, a party takes decisions that may be unpopular 
with specific constituencies, or ideologically distant from a legislator’s 
preference space. In these situations, he/she may either vote against 
the party, to show his/her disappointment but with the associated risk 
of a political defeat, or may adhere to the official line and vote 
cohesively with the party group (Hix et al. 2005: 213-214).  
Therefore, party groups’ cohesiveness in the European Parliament can 
be ascribed either to preference homogeneity of members of EPGs or to 
the capacity of its leadership to successfully “whip” them. Scholars 
reached different findings in regards. Westlake (1994a) and Raunio 
(1999) conclude that discipline enforced by the Euro-leadership must 
be low, because ultimately who controls for MEPs’ re-election is the 
national leadership. Kreppel (2002) further refines this point. Focusing 
on the role of the group leadership in the allocation of committee 
chairmanships and rapporteurships, she concludes that party groups 
have high levels of cohesion not because MEPs fear the sanctions of 
group leadership if they vote against the party line, but because they 
generally share similar values and ideas. Also McElroy (2006: 12) 
agrees on this point. Other scholars, however, reached different 
conclusions. It is the case of Hix and colleagues: despite describing in a 
first moment the discipline of Euro-party groups as a “weak 
sanctioning mechanism” (Hix and Lord 1997: 147), they later rectified 
                                                
4 Party members provide labour and capital – such as information gathering and policy 
expertise – while leaders distribute committee and party offices. 
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this position, rejecting the theory of cohesion based on preferences 
alone. In this respect, they analysed the variance of patterns of cohesion 
over time and showed that, despite a growing internal ideological 
diversity primarily caused by the subsequent enlargements, cohesion 
has actually increased. In their perspective, EPGs’ increase of cohesion 
in spite of their growing internal heterogeneity, that ideally would lead 
to different policy preferences and – thus – different voting behaviour, 
can be explained only by taking into account the presence of a certain 
level of party discipline (Hix et al. 2007: 87-104). 
 
2.3.2. Systemness and inclusiveness 
Cohesion of Euro-party groups is one of the most relevant element that 
allows to study MEPs’ voting behaviour, but it is also an indicator of 
the development of the EU party system as a consequence of EP party 
group institutionalization. Bardi, starting from the concept of 
institutionalization in the definition of Huntington, i.e. “the process by 
which organizations acquire value and stability” (Huntington 1968: 12), 
identifies three indicators to measure EP party system’s 
institutionalization: cohesiveness, inclusiveness and systemness (Bardi 
2002: 302-303). The former has already been discussed; as theoretically 
defined in the previous paragraph, cohesiveness is not the only 
relevant element of the voting dynamics European Parliament, 
although it is the only one directly related to MEPs’ voting behaviour. 
The two latter indicators, albeit not directly connected to the research 
question of this work, are nonetheless useful for a complete 
comprehension of European Parliament’s internal functioning. They 
are discussed below. 
Inclusiveness refers to the capacity of EPGs to include members 
coming from different member states; in other words, this indicator “is 
designed to reveal the ‘Europeanness’ of Europarties” (Bardi 2002: 304). 
“One-country EPGs”, although very rare throughout EP’s history5, 
represent the extreme case of a completely secluded political entity. 
Conversely, a parliamentary group that comprises MEPs’ from all 
member state is the most inclusive possible. Since the very beginning of 
EP’s history, keeping the first direct election as the starting point of the 
“modern” European Parliament, party groups in the EP have been 
highly inclusive. In 1979 the three main EPGs were composed of 
                                                
5 For instance, the parliamentary group “Forza Europa” was formed by solely Italian 
centre-right MEPs after 1994 European elections; however, it was a short-lived experience 
(in 1995 most of their member merged in the Liberal group, with the exception of a few 
members merging in People’s party group). 
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deputies marked by a fairly differentiated national background: the 
People’s Party group included MEPs from seven member states; the 
Socialists from all and the Liberals from eight member states. This 
trend has remained consistent, despite the subsequent enlargements of 
the EU. Neither has the last “injection” of heterogeneity due to the 
Eastern enlargement in 2004 and 2007 substantially reduced EP’s 
inclusiveness. After an “external shock” such as the one caused by the 
eastwards mega-enlargement, almost doubling the number of member 
states, new political entities could have originated according to 
regional cleavages (a party group of Eastern members, for instance). 
However, it was not the case. This proves the high absorption potential 
of the EPGs in relation to the European dynamics (Bardi 1996, 2002: 
304), and corroborates Hix et al.’s argument concerning party 
formation at the European level according to political, not territorial 
cleavages (Hix et al. 2007: 54-55). 
Finally, systemness in an indicator of institutionalization as it captures 
the degree of stability and the achievement of an equilibrium by a 
certain (party) system - or, as Mair puts it, the predictability of it (Mair 
2001: 34). This concept originally is intended to measure national 
(mass) party systems, and does not fit “terribly well” (Bardi 2002: 305) 
the European arena. However, considering the number of groups, their 
size, the percentage of members in transnational groups and the 
number of “one-party groups” it is reasonable to conclude that the EU 
party system shows a notable degree of systemness. In particular, the 
current number of EPGs equals the number of EPGs in the parliament 
of 1979. During the years the number of party groups increased and 
then decreased again; especially today, in a post-enlargement EP the 
growing heterogeneity of political families inside the EP seems to have 
been overshadowed by a highly systemic environment6. 
 
2.4. MEPs’ political representation 
The European party system is a structured system in terms of party 
cohesion, inclusiveness and systemness. But is it also representative of 
the European electorate? Again, before discussing how representative 
                                                
6 On the other hand, following the increase of EU membership, the number of EPGs 
formed by only one national party has fallen dramatically and completely disappeared as 
the creation of one-nation groups has been explicitly forbidden. A specific EP Rule of 
Procedure (Rule 30, “formation of political groups”) states that a political group shall 
consist of deputies from a specific number of member states. Following the 2004 and 2009 
enlargements, the threshold is set to one-fourth of the member states. 
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is the EU party system, it is convenient to define the object under 
scrutiny: the concept of political representation. 
“Representation is one of the most central, fundamental, and important 
of political concepts. It is not, however, one of the simplest” (Farrell 
and Scully 2010: 37). On the contrary, the implication of some of the 
best scholarly studies of the concept has been to affirm its complexity, 
instead of to simplify it by giving a unique definition (Pitkin 1967, 1969; 
Mansbridge 2003). Representation can legitimately be conceptualised in 
a range of different ways and studied from a number of alternative 
angles, and practices of representation can reasonably be evaluated 
according to varying criteria. From the point of view of the history of 
political thought, it has long been accepted that representation is about 
more than simply a “match” between people and politicians (or the 
policies that politicians pursue); it is a multidimensional, dynamic 
process (Pitkin 1967). As Bardi rightfully notes, “The concept's 
multidimensionality is certainly due to the complexity of the 
relationship between represented and representatives, one that 
involves different actors (represented citizens, elected or non-elected 
representatives), conduits (parliaments, interest groups, parties, 
bureaucracies), foci (individuals, geographic or socio-political 
constituencies, the nation), styles (trustee, delegate, and various 
combinations of the two)” (Bardi 2009: 4). Consequently, if we want to 
reach a clear-cut definition of representation, then it necessary has to be 
a minimal one: “[...] political representation is the activity of making 
citizens' voices, opinions, and perspectives ‘present’ in the public 
policy making processes” (Pitkin 1967). And to understand the crucial 
aspects of this process, we need to move from a macro perspective on 
institutions and aggregate outcomes towards a more micro-level 
analysis of individuals. We need to consider how those elected 
interpret and seek to carry out their role as representatives. Much work 
in this vein has explored the policy responsiveness of individual 
representatives: the extent to which they view their role as being to act 
as “delegates”, in place to loyally represent the (perceived) views of the 
represented, or as “trustees” with a mandate to pursue their own 
vision of the best interests of those whom they represent – even to the 
extent of directly opposing the immediate views of the majority of such 
people (Wahlke et. al. 1962). 
The most common representation styles in the literature remain these 
two, or, as some scholars pointed out, a mixture of them (Pitkin 1967). 
On the one hand, while the trustee, leveraging on the concept of trust, 
implies that there is a certain independence between the representative 
and the represented (since only the former knows what is exactly the 
vague national interest to be pursued, and has to do it without 
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constraints), the delegate is linked to the concept of a specific mandate 
(so there is a bigger dependence of the representative towards those 
who he/she represents). The concept of “politico”, on the other hand, 
defines a representative who is able to alternate these two styles in 
response to the political situation: as the issue changes, whether it is 
more “high or low” politics, this representative changes his style, from 
trustee to delegate and vice-versa. 
 
2.4.1. Representation and (Euro) political parties 
One common aspect, that links together all these definitions even if 
sometimes it is not stated openly because the focus is on the 
representative as an individual, is the presence of political parties: 
whether they act as trustee, delegates or any other style, they do it 
because they sit in a Parliament. The centrality of political parties 
cannot be denied: in modern politics, if a deputy occupies a seat in a 
representative assembly, it means that there was an electoral moment 
before, and the actors aggregating “offer and supply” in the political 
arena in that peculiar moment are necessarily the political parties – 
even if for the EU context this is problematic, because it is still the 
national party that act as gatekeeper for MEPs’ election in the European 
Parliament7. Without political parties, “modern democracies would 
exist tenuously, if at all” (Schattschneider 1942: 1); parties organize 
legislatures (Cox and McCubbins 1994), articulate choices, aggregate 
preferences, and, above all, “supply labels under which candidates vie 
for public office” (Epstein and Leon 1967: 9). This, to a certain degree, 
remains valid also at the European level. 
Bardi has analysed extensively this topic since his seminal work on 
representation in the European Parliament (1987). The starting point of 
this and subsequent works (1996, 2006, 2009) is the concept of dyadic 
representation, namely ”the Burkean, territorially based, 
representational model based on the relationship between pairings 
(dyads) of individual representatives and their constituents” (Bardi 
2009: 8). In the original meaning this refers to the geographical 
dimension (Weissberg 1978); Dalton (1985, 1988) extended the notion of 
dyadic representation beyond the territorial dimension to include 
                                                
7 Most of the discussion about the so-called “democratic deficit” revolves around this 
point: the lack of a truly European elections where citizens vote on the basis of European-
wide issues, instead of a many “second-order national elections”. However, a full 
dissertation of this long-lasting debate would shift the theoretical discussion to a domain 
that does not concern directly this work’s research question. Hence, it necessarily has to 
be left aside. 
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relationships between representatives and other political and socio-
economic groups and so started and inspired a number of empirical 
representation studies that privileged non-territorial constituencies. 
Bardi’s originality consists in exploiting this concept at the European 
level, taking as empirical indicator of the congruence between “Euro-
dyads” (MEPs and citizens) their survey-revealed preferences. 
Elaborating on Burke's argument, often referred to, perhaps too 
reductively, as the delegate-trustee dilemma, he argues: “elected 
parliamentarians may believe their job is to represent either 
constituencies or national interests. In the former case they are likely to 
feel obliged to closely follow their constituents' instructions and 
therefore act as delegates. In the latter, they can use Burke's ‘unbiased 
opinion’ and ‘mature judgement’ only to decide as trustees what they 
perceive to be the superior national interest” (Bardi 2009: 6). The 
empirical studies of representation in the EP have contributed to the 
affirmation of this interpretation of Burkean principles by stressing the 
importance of the levels of representation, as opposed to the styles of 
representation. The various waves of EP election candidate and MEP 
surveys have tried to address the question of MEPs’ representational 
attitudes. All have tried to determine whether Euro-representatives’ 
attitudes were revealing of commitments towards the representation of 
broad European, as opposed to national or even sub-national, 
constituencies’ aspirations or interests, rather than their propensities to 
act as trustees or delegates (Bardi 2009: 7). The analysis was also 
addressed beyond the territorial dimension to include relationships 
between representatives and other political and socio-economic 
groups. This required an assessment of whether MEPs felt that their 
responsibilities as representatives were towards party, interest or 
territorial constituencies. 
The results of the first MEP survey data revealed that over 60% of the 
respondents indicated European level commitments as those they 
considered most important, as opposed to about 22% and almost 14% 
that respectively privileged national and sub-national commitments. 
This finding is in contrast with MEP perceptions of their electors’ 
wishes, which they saw as prevalently nationally or sub-nationally 
oriented. In conclusion, this observation allows also to infer, as a by-
product of the analysis, that MEPs tended to see themselves “more as 
(Europe-oriented) trustees rather than as delegates” (Bardi 2009:8). In 
sum, as also noted by Thomassen, parties at the European level seem to 
function quite effectively as the representatives of Europe’s citizens 
(Thomassen 2009). 
To conclude, although there is no real process of political 
representation at European level, the aggregation of the outcomes of 
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national processes nevertheless leads to a reasonable congruence 
between the preferences of the European electorate and those of MEPs. 
The “only” (yet fundamental) difference is on the institutional side (the 
structure of relationship between “executive” and “legislative” at the 
European level, especially the lack of a governing function of Euro-
parties). However, Mair and Thomassen (2010) argue that this 
difference between the European Parliament and national parliaments 
is not necessary negative: parties in the national polities are already 
finding it increasingly difficult to combine their representative and 
governing functions, with the result that the mainstream parties often 
lack legitimacy and find themselves subject to the constant challenge of 
populist outbidding; to attempt to effect a similar combination of 
functions at the European level may provoke even more difficulties. To 
advocate a fusion of representation and government at the European 
level may not only fail to solve Europe’s problems, it may also 
compound what are already substantial legitimacy problems in the 
domestic politics of the member states: “the effectiveness of political 
representation at the European level owes much, in fact, to the absence 
of party government” (Mair and Thomassen 2010: 30).  
 
2.5. MEPs as parliamentary agents with two principals 
So far, the EU party system and the concept of party cohesion has been 
briefly analysed, observing the object of research from a broad, macro-
level perspective, i.e. looking at the aggregate phenomenon: EU parties 
and Euro-party groups, and the three indicators that assess its 
institutionalization as a party system. Then, the discussion has 
narrowed to analyse the individual, dyadic relationship that exists 
between (European) representatives and represented. What is still 
missing is a theory of voting in the EP that accounts for the micro-level 
of MEPs’ voting behaviour. 
The first quantitative studies on MEPs’ voting behaviour (Attinà 1990; 
Raunio 1996; Hix and Lord 1997), based on roll-call votes – i.e., on how 
actually each MEPs votes – reach two the main findings. First, as 
partially discussed in paragraph 2.4.2, EPGs show high cohesion. 
Secondly, according to the patterns showed by this type of vote, the 
classical political cleavages exist also in the EP: votes tend to fall along 
the left-right divide. Despite the first critical studies warning against 
the possible methodological problems related to RCVs (Carrubba and 
Gabel 1999; Carrubba et al. 2004, 2008, 2009)8, Hix later applies Poole 
                                                
8 An extensive discussion of the reliability of roll-call votes can be found in chapter 7. 
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and Rosenthal’s method of creating spatial maps to the EP context (Hix 
2001). He did it first only for the 1999-2004 Parliament, then together 
with Noury and Roland for all the legislatures since 1979, after having 
processed and systematically collected all the RCVs held in the EP (Hix 
et al. 2005, 2007). The creation of a such comprehensive (yet biased?) 
dataset has proved to be functional not only to the spatial 
representation of the legislative dynamics of the EP, but also to many 
other quantitative analysis of MEPs’ voting behaviour: in the early 
2000s this field of research has witnessed a conspicuous flourishing of 
RCVs-based studies. Many other papers have been published on the 
topic, all of them agreeing on some main findings. First, EPGs show 
high intra-party cohesion and inter-party competition. Second, voting 
patterns fall mainly along the traditional left-right cleavage, and only 
partially along an orthogonal pro/anti-European continuum. Third, 
national affiliation is a weak predictor of vote; and consequently, the 
EP works surprisingly like most of domestic parliaments in Western 
democracies (Hix 2002; Hix et al. 2003b, 2005, 2006, 2007; Farrell et al. 
2006; Hix and Noury 2009).  
In terms of individual voting behaviour, the theory on which the 
aforementioned studies base their assumptions on is the one proposed 
by Hix (2002: 696) of MEPs as “parliamentary agents with two 
principals”. According to this theory, the main factor behind voting in 
the EP is the policy position of national parties. Hix draws on the 
classical economic theory based on the principal-agent dilemma, and 
refines it for the different context of the European Parliament, arguing 
that MEPs respond to two, (rarely) competing, principals. One is the 
European group MEPS belong to; the other is the national party who is 
responsible for their election. Despite the fact that the parliamentary 
principals in the EP control important benefits – such as committee 
assignment and speaking time – it is the principals that control 
candidate selection (the national parties) who ultimately determine 
how MEPs behave. “When deciding how to vote, MEPs must respond 
to two different ‘principals’: national parties, who control the selection 
of candidates in EP elections, and the political groups in the EP, who 
control a variety of private goods in the EP, such as leadership 
positions, committee assignments, speaking time, and the legislative 
agenda” (Hix 2002: 688) When the national parties in the same 
parliamentary group decide to vote together, the EP parties look highly 
cohesive. And this is what happens in the vast majority of cases. But 
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when these parties take opposing policy position, the cohesion of EP 
party groups break down9.  
This peculiar theoretical framework seems to fit particularly well the 
reality of the European Parliament; moreover, it is simple, clear-cut and 
apparently unproblematic. However, potential contrasts may arise 
between the two principals – and the explanation that simply one 
prevails over the other, as provided by Hix, may prove insufficient. 
This is the view of Katz, for instance, arguing that “no man can serve 
two masters (Katz 2013), even if this argument is illustrated by the 
author in regards to a completely different scenario – the European 
party system and the transformation of mass parties (national 
representatives), not the European Parliament and the EU party system 
(European representatives).  
 
2.6. A “new” theory of MEPs’ voting behaviour 
The original theorization of MEPs’ behaviour used in this work to 
define how they vote, as stated before, has not a single theory of 
reference. It draws from the various conceptual contributions 
presented in the previous paragraphs, slightly modifying some critical 
aspects.  
As we have partially seen, the dynamics of the European Parliament, 
hence behaviour of its members, is the object of an extremely rich 
literature. This work does not have the pretence to set aside what 
scholars have acknowledged in order to present a completely new, full-
fledged theoretical approach that innovates this field of research. 
Rather, it builds on what has already been said (and empirically 
proved), refining one crucial element: in Hix’s words, the “national 
principal”. In this perspective, first of all I consider MEPs to be 
satisfactorily representative parliamentarians, according to Bardi’s 
dyadic élites-citizens analysis. I recognize the centrality of Mair and 
Thomassen’s argument on “political representation without party 
government” that revolves around the function at large of the 
European Parliament in the EU structure. I consider voting behaviour 
as a product of the juxtaposition between legislator’s preferences and 
                                                
9 This theory and the empirical result are functional also to Hix’s claims about a possible 
EU reform He argues that “to break national party control, EP elections would have to be 
held under a system which limited the power of national parties to control candidate 
selection […]. This would dramatically increase the authority of the party leaders in the 
EP, who would become key actors in the European Union policy process (2002: 697). 
However, as stated before, the debate about EU’s democratic deficit is not addressed 
here. 
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group discipline, partially taking the side of those scholars that 
consider cohesion as a consequence of apriori homogeneous preferences 
rather than party discipline (Raunio 1999; Westlake 1994a; Kreppel 
2002) and partially recognizing that EPGs may exert a certain “whip” 
(Hix et al. 2007)10, but only to the extent that there is no “greater 
(national) good” to defend. Finally I accept the theory of “MEPs as 
parliamentary agents with two principals”; however, keeping in mind 
Katz’ critic of the principal-agent economic theory, I slightly modify the 
elements in play: if supporters of this theory identify “only” the 
national party as the competing principal of EPGs, I broaden the scope 
and consider national affiliation, at large, as the competing force that 
makes MEPs deviate from the party line.  
I define MEPs as “strongly ideological regional legislators”. They are 
politically oriented, representative, European-wide cohesive 
parliamentarians, but what ultimately matters – and matters the most – 
is not to go against the “reason of state”. From this original theoretical 
refinement, hence, the real logic that drives MEPs’ voting behaviour 
includes this key element that all the previous literature has too often 
overlooked: the question of national interests. MEPs operate in a 
legislative environment that, due to its institutional constraints, 
privileges their representative function in respect to the governing one 
(Mair and Thomassen 2010). And this genuine representativeness 
makes collectively “members of the European Parliament pretty much 
in touch with the concerns of the European people” (Bardi 2009: 18). 
Finally, they vote in a generally cohesive way with the EPG they 
belong to, even though their real principal is the national party that 
(re)-elected them (Hix et al. 2002). All these conceptualizations, related 
to different “levels”, do not stride with the element that I add to the 
framework, national interests at large – not dependent solely on the 
national party. This means that, on overall, they tend to tow the party 
line, making the EPG system result as a cohesive one; so, very generally 
– for instance – the Italian members of the Socialist group tend to vote 
together with the members, from other countries, of the same group, 
but only inasmuch as there’s no national interest at stake (and that’s the 
majority of the cases). In this majority of cases their votes fall along 
ideological left-right lines. But when they decide not to follow this line, 
it is certainly because their well-known “other principal”, the national 
party, takes an opposing line. But this is only a by-product of a bigger 
phenomenon: the majority MEPs from the same country voting 
together. Just like members of regional parties with a strong, political 
connotation: all together in parliamentary groups formed along the 
                                                
10 Chapter 6 analyses the relationship between MEPs’ preferences and behaviour. 
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left-right cleavage, the majority of their votes depend on ideological 
position. They generally have similar policy preferences that make 
them genuinely cohesive – and only partially “whip-induced” cohesive 
(Raunio 1999; Westlake 1994a; Kreppel 2002). However, if a certain 
legislation under scrutiny may endanger their closest constituency, 
then they split along lines that have nothing to do with the left-right 
cleavage. 
In this sense, to use the words of Moravcsik (1993, 1998), I argue that 
the EP is still more “intergovernmentalist” than generally 
acknowledged by the mainstream literature: as Hix et al. state (2007: 
181), “national interests, independent of national party positions, have 
very little systematic influence on voting in the European Parliament. 
This finding is surprising from the perspective of some of the “state-
interest” based theories of EU politics (e.g. Moravcsik 1998)”. I argue 
that, in fact, nationality independent of party position is actually 
crucial, even though it does not have a “systematic effect11”. The main 
reason why sometimes MEPs break the EPG lines is because there is a 
general national interest at stake, so they vote in order to protect it – 
and they do it together with all MEPs from their member state, not only 
those of their national party. Just like what happens with an ideological 
regional party in a national parliament. This is the element that has 
been overlooked by the literature. Not only it has to be noted that 
sometimes EPG fail to discipline their MEPs; the crucial element in 
these case is that MEPs from different the groups vote together with 
only one key element in common: being part of the same country (or 
countries) whose interests were touched by the European legislation. 
In sum, The real discriminant when MEPs act as “rebel” against the 
EPG line is not being part of a certain national party, as already 
acknowledged by the literature (Raunio 2003; Hix 2002; Hix et al. 2005, 
2007; Coman 2009) but being part of the state – at large – where that 
party comes from. Moreover, and partially as a consequence of what 
said before, I argue also that many of the claims about the resemblance 
of the EP to a classical democratic parliament are misplaced. Not only 
because of the aforementioned “national alignments” that prevail over 
the EPG line, but also because of the multi-dimensionality of it. Just like 
a Parliament that is composed by regional parties that, despite being 
solidly anchored on the left-right spectrum, have all some “regional 
specificities”, the EP has still (and probably will always have) a variety 
of dimensions along which votes can fall, consistently to the specific 
interests of each member state (or a combination of them). Not only 
                                                
11 Due to, primarily, methodological reasons that will be analysed in the next chapters. 
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left-right and pro-/anti-EU dimensions (Hix et al. 2007) do exist, and 
have a substantial effect, in the EP. 
 
2.6.1. Associated hypotheses 
The associated hypotheses are the following. For each main hypothesis 
I explain how it fits to the theoretical framework presented above.  
H1: Party group discipline in the EP explains most of the votes but when the 
issue concerns a national, direct interest MEPs will protect them 
H1a: MEPs vote according to their interests, creating a national 
alignment, even if this means being rebel to their political group (thus 
voting against it or abstaining) 
H1b: National alignments emerge on more important issues 
H1c: Conversely, less important issues show higher group cohesion 
This main hypothesis is consistent to the “core” of my theory of MEPs 
as ideological members of a regional party: the baseline of their 
parliamentary behaviour is defined by left-right policy preferences, but 
when controversies arise, the defence of their closest constituency is the 
element that prevails in the logic of voting behaviour. If a national 
interest shows up, MEPs will disregard their EPG (even if this happens 
only in a minority of cases). And the potential for such undermine of a 
national interest is clearly related to the legislative nature of the vote: if 
the decision has no substantial effect, MEPs do not “need” to act united 
as “regional parliamentarians” to defend their homeland. 
H2: Groups’ cohesion in RCVs is generally high, but every group show 
consistent and often deviation from this trend. 
The rationale behind the second hypothesis is also correlated to the 
theoretical approach presented before. In addition to this, it takes 
account of the fact that this generally high cohesion may stem from the 
“symbolic – rather than potentially concrete – significance of most EP 
decisions” (Bardi 2002: 303). 
H3: MEPs’ voting behaviour and consequently group cohesion differs in 
various committees 
H3a: National alignments emerge in committees that are generally 
perceived as more important 
H3b: Party groups are more cohesive in less important committees 
The starting point is again that not all the decisions taken in the EP 
have the same impact, and this disparity is partially reflected by the 
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committee system of the EP: some are powerful and take high-level 
decisions, others are (still useful) “talking shops”. I argue that votes 
concerning decisions that may have concrete consequences in member 
states (taken in some specific committees) are more likely to see the 
emergence of these nationality-oriented votes. Conversely, more 
symbolic, non-binding decisions will show higher group cohesion, 
because no direct interest is at stake (and they concentrate in other 
committees). 
H4: MEPs vote following different rationales if the vote is secret rather than a 
public roll-call (RCVs) 
H4a: national affiliation is a stronger determinant of votes in non-
RCVs rather than in RCVs 
H4b: conversely, EPGs are less cohesive in non-RCVs 
Partially related to the theoretical framework and partially to the 
methodological debate around the reliability of roll-call votes, I argue 
that these controversial votes are more likely to emerge when votes are 
secret, non-RCVs. 
H5: regional dimensions other than left/right cleavage and anti-/pro-EU do 
exist and exert a significant effect in the EP 
H6: MEPs’ nationality influences how he/she deals with classical political 
issues that refer to the L/R cleavage 
H6a: Major social, economic, cultural or regulatory differences of 
MEPs’ opinion may determine deviations from party group line 
The last two hypotheses are related to the aspects that, I argue 
accordingly to my theory, make the EP still significantly different from 
a regular democratic parliament. These hypotheses are strongly 
influenced by the literature, extensively discussed, inferring that the 
prevalence of left/right oriented votes makes the EP look like “a 
normal democratic Parliament” (Hix 2002, Noury et al. 2002, Hix et al. 
2005, 2006, 2007)12. 
These hypotheses are tested with different methodological approach 
(quantitative, qualitative and a combination of the two) in the empirical 
part of this dissertation (From chapter 3 to 6), in order to see if the 
                                                
12 This may actually prove to be a problematic point: when inferring that the EP looks like 
a normal parliament, what do we mean by “normal”? Also national parliament, 
especially of federal states, may show a regional multi-dimensionality, yet not as marked 
as the EP (from the national perspective). Thus, the validity of this hypothesis is 
specifically constrained to the relevant literature. 
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empirical reality of the EP fits the theory I presented. Finally, chapter 7 
is dedicated to a brief qualitative in-deep elaboration of the results 
obtained in the previous empirical part, to further corroborate or 




Analysis of outliers: when party group lines break down 
 
 
“The cohesion of the party groups has increased over time as the main party 
groups have gained in size and as the powers of the parliament have increased. 
This increase in cohesion has occurred despite an increase in the internal 
national fractionalization of the party groups” 





As discussed extensively in the previous chapter, we know that EPGs 
are, in general, highly cohesive – despite giving slightly different 
explanations to this cohesion. This means, in short, that MEPs from the 
same political group are likely to vote together, no matter which 
country they come from: a French socialist, for instance, is more likely 
to vote together with a German Socialist than with a French green or 
liberal (or belonging to any other group). At the same time, the 
literature has also recognized that, under certain conditions, party 
cohesion can break down (for instance Hix and Lord 1995; Gabel and 
Hix 1997; Brzinski et al., 1998). Other studies focused on specific key, 
controversial votes, alternatively arguing that despite the presence of 
national interests at stake ideology remained the most important 
element in defining MEPs’ voting behaviour (Hix et al. 2006, 2007; Hix 
and Noury 2009) or that country-based logics prevailed over party 
group cohesion (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Hall and Soskice 2001; Callaghan 
and Höpner 2004; Ringe 2005)13. 
However, when discussing party group cohesion in the European 
Parliament, the literature usually looks at indexes of cohesion (the most 
common is the “Agreement Index”, explained in paragraph 3.3) and 
presents the scores calculated not for the single vote, but aggregated for 
                                                
13 This topic is deliberately treated without an in-deep discussion: for an extensive 
dissertation of national alignments versus party cohesion and the presence of crucial 
national interests in EP’s votes see chapter 5 and 7. 
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a certain time span. This may lead to some misrepresentation (or, at 
least, misunderstanding) of EP’s internal dynamics. Thus, looking at 
party group cohesion outliers, namely those cases where EPGs are 
exceptionally divided, may help shed light on some meaningful 
dynamics of EP’s legislative life. As a preliminary note of caution, it is 
worth stressing that the results presented in this chapter has a merely 
descriptive valence; no causal-effect arguments are made. The purpose 
of this analysis of roll-call votes is “simply” to show how a large-N, 
quantitative approach relying on aggregated indexes may overlook 
certain aspects that, nevertheless, are important and meaningful. The 
analysed time span corresponds to the latest two European legislatures: 
EP6 (2004-2009) and the current seventh European Parliament, elected 
in 2009 and to be renewed in spring 2014. 
 
3.2. The data: roll call votes 
The analysis of this chapter is performed on roll-call votes. These are 
the votes that are officially recorded, in the form of minutes drafted by 
the Parliament’s offices. The records track how each MEP voted or 
abstained. Commonly, this voting procedure is called “public vote”, 
because a member of a parliament has no means of keeping the vote 
secret. In the American, British and in few other parliaments all the 
votes are roll-calls; however, in many other cases such as Italy, France, 
Germany, Belgium, Argentina, and Brazil some votes are public and 
recorded, while others are secret (Hug 2006: 24-33).  
In the European Parliament the choice of voting procedure is defined 
by the EP Rules of Procedure, which states that only certain votes are 
required to be taken by roll-call14. However, a political group or at least 
32 MEPs can request any vote to be taken by roll-call. Before the start of 
the current, 7th European legislature it was also provided that it is 
compulsory to have RCVs for all the final legislative votes, as stated in 
the new Rule 16615. In addition to RCVs, two other voting procedures 
are possible: the “raise of hands” and “voice” vote where it is recorded 
only if the bill passes or not, and another type of electronic vote that 
records the aggregate number of yea/nay, but no information about the 
single vote. Roll-call votes represent slightly more than 30% of the 
whole universe of votes cast in the EP, thus potentially leading to 
                                                
14 Namely, Rule 106(5), which relates to the vote on the election of the Commission; and 
Rule 107(5), which relates to a motion of censure in the Commission. 
15 “When voting on any proposal for a legislative act, whether by way of a single and/or 
final vote, Parliament shall vote by roll call using the electronic voting system” (Hix et al. 
2013: 15). 
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selection bias, as anticipated in the previous chapter. Therefore, at this 
point it is necessary to discuss how the academic debate over the 
reliability of such dataset has evolved in the years. 
 
3.2.1. Are roll-call votes a reliable source of information? 
From the early ‘90s scholars of MEPs’ voting behaviour started to focus 
almost exclusively on roll-call votes (Attinà 1990; Hix and Lord 1997; 
Raunio 1996; Hix 1999), as already discussed in chapter 2 and in the 
previous paragraphs. In response to these studies, Carrubba and Gabel 
(1999) were the first to draw attention on the potential selection bias in 
using RCVs to study MEPs’ voting behaviour. First of all, it has to be 
clarified that it is impossible to empirically analyse the votes falling 
under the other voting procedures, because there are no records of 
those vote. In other words, voting behaviour in non-RCVs is, simply, 
not directly observable and analysable with the quantitative approach 
usually employed for RCVs. However, RCVs are a small subset of the 
whole universe of votes cast (roughly ⅓). Thus, only if RCVs represent 
a random sample of the whole universe of votes cast, then the causal 
inferences based on RCVs can be generalized as a reflection of MEPs’ 
voting behaviour. If a dependent variable of a research (e.g. intra-party 
cohesion, inter-party competition) is related16 to the rationale behind 
the RCV request, endogeneity problems are expected to emerge. In the 
light of this it may be assumed that RCVs are requested by EPGs for 
strategic reasons. 
However, the extreme usefulness (yet unpaired by an equal reliability 
and completeness of information provided) of roll-call datasets is 
indisputable. Their popularity has increased over time, and “in recent 
years, statistical analysis of roll call votes (RCVs) has become the bread 
and butter of empirical research on legislative behaviour in 
democracies” (Hix et al. 2013: 2). From the early ‘2000s almost every 
student of EP legislative behaviour has faced, somehow, RCVs analysis 
– or their potential shortcomings. Those who employ RCVs usually 
base their analysis on the following assumptions: RCVs and votes 
falling under a different voting procedure do not vary in terms of 
importance; both are cast on the same policy issues, so no issue is voted 
too often with a certain type of vote; and finally, all the EPGs are 
equally likely to request RCVs, so no group requests them 
                                                
16 Either positively, negatively or both - but in a way such as the two effects do not cancel 
out each other. 
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disproportionally more often than the other groups (Hix and Noury 
2002, Hix et al. 2007) 
Meanwhile, an increasing number of critical scholars (Carrubba et al. 
2003, 2004, 2008, 2009; Thiem 2006; Hug 2006, 2009) claim to have 
concrete evidence to confute the assumptions made by scholars that 
use them to analyse legislative behaviour. First of all, according to 
them the majority of non-RCVs are cast on legislative voting (the most 
important votes), while most of the RCVs are cast on resolution and 
consultation votes (less important). Second, RCVs are cast 
disproportionally on specific issues. Finally, some EPG requests them 
more often than other groups. Consequently, inferences based on RCVs 
only, may be misleading and it seems necessary to look somewhere 
else to fully understand the dynamics of voting behaviour within the 
EP. Later, these authors rephrased their criticisms in clearer terms, 
pointing out not only the problems of endogeneity in party cohesion, 
but also the possibly misleading way scholars pooled data together to 
create the dataset (Carrubba et al. 2003: 6-9). Consequently, these 
authors switched their research focus from voting behaviour to the 
reasons why RCVs are requested. Some scholars have tried to provide 
an explanation to the real reasons behind a RCV request, relying 
mostly on theory, while others have applied methods based on game 
theory to model this kind of situation. Carrubba et al. (2008: 570-572) 
consider the RCV requests a consequence of high party cohesion. On 
the other hand, Thiem (2006: 17) see these requests as signalling 
strategies either for a group to highlight their pre-existing unity or 
another group’s coordination failure. In other words, cohesion – or lack 
of it – increases the likelihood of a RCV request. 
Nevertheless, this debate is far from being settled, as demonstrated by 
the latest working paper written on the topic. Again, Hix et al. (2013) 
try to confute these critical scholars’ argument by suggesting that, 
according to the original methodology proposed (a comparison 
between final votes in the sixth and seventh EP, exploiting the new 
provision according to which all final legislative votes have to be 
publicly recorded), selection biases in roll call votes due to strategic 
choices are at best negligible17. 
 
 
                                                
17 Convincing arguments have been presented on both sides of this academic debate; 
however, no matter how refined may be the model employed to prove that voting 
behaviour bears no difference in both types of vote, the central doubt remains: how can a 
non-random, non-representative sample lead to unbiased results? 
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3.3. Hypotheses verification 
As already stressed in the introduction, this chapter does not have the 
presumption of explaining the causal effect that lies behind the 
decision of MEPs to vote divided from their party colleagues from 
other countries, thus resulting in a vote where party groups show low 
cohesion. However, even a simple analysis of the Agreement Index 
outliers in roll-call votes can help in making some general inferences 
about hypotheses H2 and H5, as formulated in chapter 2: 
H2: Groups’ cohesion in RCVs is generally high, but every group show 
consistent and often deviation from this trend. 
H5: regional dimensions other than left/right cleavage and anti-/pro-EU do 
exist and exert a significant effect in the EP. 
 
3.4. Measures of cohesiveness 
What exactly does “cohesive” mean? As defined in chapter 2, 
cohesiveness (concerning parliamentary groups) simply refers to the 
fact that their members vote united in the same way, or divided in 
different ways. But if the concept is relatively straightforward, the 
operationalization needed to make cohesion empirically measurable 
may be more problematic, as it often happens (Marradi 1981). 
A variety of indices of party cohesion are used in the literature on 
voting behaviour. The “Index of voting likeness” (Rice 1925) represents 
one of the first attempts. It consists of the absolute difference between 
yes and no votes of the members of a party, divided by the sum of yes 
and no votes. The main asset of this index is represented by its 
simplicity; however, it presents the major shortcoming of not including 
abstentions in the calculation18. Attinà (1990) in one of the first 
quantitative studies of MEPs’ voting behaviour proposed a slight 
modification of this index in order to include the possibility of 
abstention. However, the index created by Attinà can result in a 
negative number, making it harder to use it for descriptive analysis and 
statistical purposes. For instance, if a party group is split equally 
between all three voting options the Attinà index produces a cohesion 
score of roughly -0.3. Hix et al. (2005) introduced the “Agreement 
                                                
18 Paradoxically then, in a group where half of the deputies abstain and the other half 
votes yes (or no), this index would give the result 1, the highest level of cohesion 
possible. This is the reason why this index does not provide an accurate picture of party 
cohesion. 
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Index” (AI), which is now considered the standard index to measure 
group cohesion. It is calculated as follows: 
 
Yi denotes the number of Yes votes expressed by group i on a given 
vote, Ni the number of No votes and Ai the number of Abstain votes. 
As a result, the AI equals 1 when all the members of a party vote 
together and equals 0 when the members of a party are equally divided 
between all three of the voting options (vote in favour, vote against, 
and abstain). AI scores give us a first impression of how cohesive the 
groups in the EP are. For the first four Parliaments (1979-1999), the 
cohesion scores are taken directly from Hix et al. (2005: 218). For the 
fifth and sixth legislature (1999-2009), the source is again Hix et al. 
(2009). With respect to the current legislature (2009-2014), the source of 
the data is www.votewatch.eu, and the cohesion scores are calculated 
for roughly ¾ of the legislature (RCVs cast from July 2009 to September 
2013). If we consider all the votes cast in the EP the results are pretty 
straightforward. The EPGs show very high cohesiveness, starting from 
the very beginning. Looking at the current EP, many EPGs show very 
high cohesiveness (four groups’ AI score 0.9 or higher: S&D, European 
People’s Party, Liberals and Nordic Green Left), and all the groups 
show high cohesiveness (over 0.8), with the only exception of the non-
attached members and of the Eurosceptic group of Europe of Freedom 
and Democracy (EFD). From a diachronic perspective (1979-2009), all 
the groups increased their cohesiveness, with the exception of the 
Euro-sceptics, falling from 0.83 in 1989 to 0.49 in 2009.  The AI scores 











Table 1. EPGs’ cohesiveness in RCVs, 1979-2013. 
 
 
Source: Hix et al. (2005) for EP1 to EP5, author’s own calculation based on Hix et al.’s 
dataset (2009) for EP6, author’s own calculation based on data from www.votewatch.eu 
for EP7. Party group labels: PES: Party of European Socialists (SOC, PES), then 
Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D, after 2009 elections to include the 
Italian PD, Partito Democratico). EPP: European People’s party - Christian Democrats & 
Conservatives (EPP, ED) and Italian Conservatives (FE), then EPP alone (after 2009 
elections). ELDR: European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELD, ELDR groups), 
then Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE, after 2004 elections). LEFT: 
Radical Left (COM, LU, EUL/NGL) and Italian Communists & allies (EUL). GAUL: 
Gaullists & allies (EPD, EDA, UFE, UEN), then European Conservatives and Reformists 
(ECR, after 2009 elections). GRN: Greens & allies (RBW(84), G, G/EFA). CON: British 
Conservatives & allies (ED). RIGHT: Extreme Right (ER). ANTI: Anti-Europeans (EN, I-
EN, EDD, IND/DEM after 2004 elections, then EFD after 2009 elections). REG: 
Regionalists & allies (RBW(89), ERA). IND: Independents (TCDI, TGI; group dismantled 
in October 2001). NA: Non-attached members. 
 
The three main EP groups – Socialists, Christian Democrats/People’s 
Party, and Liberals – present a relatively high level of cohesiveness 
starting from the first direct election (respectively 0.76, 0.90, 0.58). Since 
the first election the trend has constantly increased positively. Today, 
the three main EPGs score respectively 0.93, 0.93 and 0.90. Looking at 
EP6, we see that two EPGs (Socialists and Greens) score more than 0.90; 
the three other bigger groups (the Christian-democrat group, Liberals 
and the radical left) score between 0.85 and 0.88. The only exceptions to 
this trend are the national conservatives (Union for Europe of Nations) 
and the anti-European (Independence/Democracy), both Euro-sceptic 
EP1 (79-84) EP2 (84-89) EP3 (89-94) EP4 (94-99) EP5 (99-04) EP6 (04-09) EP7 (09-13)
PES 0.76 0.87 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.93
EPP 0.90 0.93 0.91 0.90 0.87 0.88 0.93
ELDR 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.86 0.88 0.89 0.90
LEFT 0.81 0.87 0.86 0.80 0.80 0.85 0.83
GAUL 0.80 0.84 0.85 0.79 0.75 0.76 0.88
GRN  0.81 0.85 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.96
CON 0.89 0.92 0.89     
RIGHT  0.93 0.88     
ANTI   0.83 0.67 0.5 0.47 0.49
REG   0.87 0.91    
IND 0.78    0.64   
NA 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.63 0.44 0.44 0.42
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groups, even if to a very different degree19: the former has an AI equal 
to 0.73, the latter 0.46. For a party group that define itself as anti-
European, though, a lack of discipline in performing its European 
function should not surprise.  
Finally, it has to be noted that the group of non-attached MEPs’ 
cohesion fell drastically over time. This is consistent with the fact that 
the threshold to form a group used to was lower, so the non-attached 
group was smaller and more “homogeneous”. Since the 1990s, the non-
attached group has constantly grown bigger and politically more 
heterogeneous, even though it remained numerically dominated by far-
right wing members. Thus, it is reasonable to expect its cohesiveness to 
decrease. To sum up, in the light of the results of all RCVs one may 
conclude that the EP has been “increasingly marked by high 
cohesiveness” (Hix et al. 2005: 231). 
 
3.5. Trends in party groups’ Agreement Index outliers 
However, as anticipated in the introduction, looking only at the 
aggregated scores for each EPG in a whole European legislature may 
be misleading, because all the variance between the AI scores of each 
vote gets “diluted”. In other terms, we only look at the “general trend”, 
given by the statistical average, of five years of votes; but we don’t 
exactly know what happens in each of these votes. What can help, at 
least to give a brief idea of how actually more complex and 
multifaceted is voting behaviour of MEPs, is to look at the statistical 
outliers of EPGs’ cohesiveness. 
In statistics, an outlier is an observation that is numerically distant 
from the rest of the data; since the unit of observation is the single RCV 
each MEP casts, these data were aggregated for each group. So each 
outlier means a single vote where one of the groups is highly divided – 
despite on average these groups are quite cohesive. If the EP resembles 
so much “all other democracy parliaments” (Hix et al. 2006: 509), these 
deviant votes should be present, but truly exceptional: a reiteration of 
such cases could endanger the political unity of a political group, 
ultimately leading to fission. But if we look at figure 1, a classical “box-
                                                
19 IND/DEM was a full-fledged anti-European party; after the 2009 European Election 
was renamed EFD, Europe of Freedom and Democracy. By contrast, The UEN group 
consisted more of conservative nationalist, “Euro-realists”, highly influenced by the 
tradition of the French right wing Gaullism. Founded in 1994, in 2009 merged in the 
newly established ECR Group, European Conservatives and Reformists, except for some 
more Euro-sceptic MEPs who joined the other new group, EFD. 
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and-whiskers-plot” that shows AI values of each political group in the 
6th European Parliament, we see a different picture. The descriptive 
statistics concerning EP6 are calculated over the whole universe of roll-
call votes20 cast in the relevant time span (2004-2009), 6200 votes. 
 











Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
First of all, we can notice that a clear-cut division between two groups 
of EPGs exists: on the one hand, the majority of generally pro-EU, 
bigger groups (Socialists, people’s party, liberals, greens and radical 
left), on the other, the two euro-sceptic groups and the non-attached 
members. The former shows some characteristics in common: first of 
all, as expected they are all negatively skewed. The median is very 
high, generally over 0.9, and the upper and the lower quartile are 
comprised between 1 (the maximum score possible, which means 
complete cohesion – all MEPs voting together) and 0.8. Upper 
                                                
20 It is worth stressing again that RCVs represent roughly ⅓ of all votes cast in the 
European Parliament, thus no quantitative analysis based on this sample can be 
completely unbiased. An extensive discussion of the methodological debate over the 




“whiskers21” are either very small (People’s party group, radical left) or 
even absent, which means that they overlap with the third quartile. 
Since the lower part of the box is generally around 0.8 (0.9 for the 
Greens), we can fairly say that in 75% of roll-call votes the main EPGs 
are extremely cohesive. By contrast, lower whiskers are quite long and 
end approximately at the value of 0.5/0.6 (excluding the greens, which 
show higher value, roughly 0.8). So, even the minimum value of these 
EPGs is actually quite high. But what really strikes is the number of 
outliers: all these groups show plenty of votes where they are 
profoundly divided, and so much more divided than the median that 
statistically can be considered outliers. 
As for euro-sceptics and non-attached, the situation is completely 
different: IND/DEM and non-attached show an identical, positively 
skewed distribution. The median is close to 0.4, the first and third 
percentile are roughly set at 0.25 and 0.6, and the whiskers range from 
the minimum value (0.0, which means complete division of the group) 
to 1 (complete cohesion). And, most importantly, they show no outliers 
at all. UEN group, despite having no outliers, shows some 
characteristics similar to the first group of EPGs: the median is high 
(0.8), and the distance between the upper quartile and the maximum 
value is small, while the distance between the lower quartile and the 
minimum value is more substantive. In other words, UEN is negatively 
skewed like the first group of EPGs but shows no outliers like the 
second one. 
Moving on to the subsequent, current 7th European parliament, we see 
how the general picture remains the same, despite the minor party 
group reshuffling between the two legislatures. The same box-and-
whiskers graph is employed, as shown in table 2. Here, The descriptive 
statistics are calculated on a dataset that comprises roll-call votes cast 
between the beginning of the legislature (spring 2009) and September 
2013 (2004-2009), roughly 4600 votes22.  
 
 
                                                
21 The upper “whiskers” show graphically the range of values that are comprised 
between the third quartile (Q3) and the most extreme value within 1.5 standard deviation 
from the 75th percentile; conversely, the lower whiskers identify the observation between 
the first quartile (Q1) and the most extreme values calculated in the same way (1.5 
standard deviation from the 25th percentile): in mathematical terms, respectively 
Q3+1.5*(Q3-Q1) and Q1-1.5*(Q3-Q1). 
22 Precisely, 4684 votes. This dataset is available for download from the website 
www.votewatch.eu. 
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Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
In comparison to the previous legislature, the liberals and the radical 
left EUL/NGL show an exactly identical outlier trend. The Socialists, 
despite the “label change” towards S&D due to the inclusion of the 
Italian delegation of PD (Partito Democratico) do not change their 
behaviour substantially, at least in terms of outliers. This is largely 
expected, as this “new” delegation was present, although under a 
different party name and without the more centrist parliamentarians, 
also in the previous legislature. However, the small number of such 
members and the substantial ideological homogeneity had no effect on 
the Socialist group. People’s party, conversely, slightly benefitted from 
the exclusion of the British conservatives that formed the ED subgroup 
until 2009. As we can see, in EP7 the EPP group is even more 
negatively skewed, and the (small) upper whisker present in EP6 
almost disappears. A similar thing happens for the greens: the third 
quartile coincides with the maximum values of cohesiveness, making it 
an even more cohesive group (as confirmed by the data in table 1: AI 
average AI scores for this group grow from 0.91 to 0.96). Non-attached 
members become even less cohesive – actually, their only (few) outliers 
are upper outliers. Euro-sceptics, despite the change of name from 
IND/DEM to EFD and a partial group reshuffling, keep showing the 
same trend: slightly positively skewed, median close to 0.4, no outliers 
at all. The newly established conservative and reformists group (ECR), 
as expected because of its high internal political homogeneity, shows a 
similar trend to what I called in the previous section the “first group” 
of EPGs (highly cohesive, but presenting a substantial set of outliers). 
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Thus, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions from these 
graphs. Considering the last decade of legislative life of the European 
Parliament (2004-2013), Euro-sceptics and non-attached members are 
generally quite divided EPGs, still with their differences (especially 
between IND/DEM and UEN), while the other, bigger and generally 
more pro-EU groups tend to be much more cohesive, as most of the 
literature acknowledges (Hix et al. 2005, 2006, 2007; Kreppel 2002). In 
the 7th EP this is partially disconfirmed by ECR, that despites their 
“euro-realism” show a highly cohesive parliamentary behaviour. What 
this literature overlooks is the fact that even if this high cohesion is 
composed by a great majority of votes where these groups are 
completely cohesive (because all of their MEPs vote in the same way), 
there’s a significant minority of votes where they are completely 
divided, showing AI scores close to 0. This pattern strikes as quite 
surprising: even the mainstream, more organized, pro-EU political 
groups can bluntly fail to discipline their members, letting them vote in 
a way that makes the group perfectly divided. So, it can be misleading 
to only look at the mean cohesion of EPGs (Hix et al. 2005, 2006, 2007), 
because it does not illustrate the distribution or the standard deviation, 
thus giving the impression that all the votes have AI scores close to this 
value, without substantial variance23. By contrast, to have a more 
comprehensive knowledge of MEPs’ voting behaviour it is important 
to bear in mind that EPGs’ high cohesiveness is the result of almost all 
votes where EPGs are voting harmoniously together, but a few where 
they completely fail to be cohesive. 
This picture is further reinforced by figure 2, which shows the tendency 









                                                
23 Not all the literature, as stressed in the introduction, completely ignores these recurrent 
lacks of cohesion; however, specific studies on EPGs failing to enforce cohesion are 
missing. 
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Mild outliers: values lower than             
1.5 standard deviation (light dot) 
Severe outliers: values lower than             
3 standard deviation (thick dot) 




The x-axis represents roll-call votes, from no.1 (September 2004) to no. 
6200 (May 2009); the y-axis represents values of the Agreement Index. 
Separate graphs are presented for each of the main political groups 
(excluding non-attached members, IND/DEM and UEN which – as 
discussed before – present lower cohesiveness, thus showing no 
outliers). The blue line represents the trend of AI in time, while the dots 
represent the outliers. Here, a further distinction is added (see figure 1).  
“Mild outliers” identify values lower than one and a half standard 
deviation from the mean AI of the group; “severe outliers” identify 
values three times lower than the standard deviation (Ruan et al. 2005: 
318). 
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The impression that can be elicited from these graphs is quite 
straightforward: even considering only the severe outliers (represented 
by thicker dots, while smaller dots represent mild outliers) it is clear 
that the occasions where EPGs are extremely divided are not so rare 
and exceptional. They are, more likely, something that happens 
constantly over time (as demonstrated by the fact that the red dots are 
homogenously distributed in the graph) but get statistically 
“swallowed” and diluted, becoming invisible, by the high number of 
votes cast and the often complete cohesiveness of groups. The only 
exception seems to be the People’s party group (EPP-ED), that right at 
the beginning of the European legislature shows a concentrated 
number of outliers, while roughly after vote 2000 seems to be more 
cohesive for some time, showing no severe outliers at all (even though 
it continues to present mild outliers). 
Figure 4 shows the same tendency of cohesion for the 7th European 
Parliament24. Here, the x-axis represents roll-call votes, from no.1 
(September 2009) to no. 4684 (September 2013); the y-axis represents 
values of the Agreement Index. Separate graphs are presented for each 
of the main political groups, including the newly established ECR (so, 













                                                
24 Again, for EP7 the choice of a subset of the whole universe of votes cast in the current 
European legislature (roughly ⅔ of the votes cast in the previous one), due to an 
inevitable time constraint, does not represent a methodological problem. 
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Source: author’s own compilation. Mild and severe outliers as defined in figure 3. 
 
The general trend for EP7 remains the same as the previous EP6 for 
most of the groups, but some interesting exceptions show up. 
European People’s party, after the scission from the ED component of 
the party group, displays a higher average cohesion (from 0.87 to o.93). 
Thus, more outliers emerge, but the general trend remains the same. 
No “interruption” of severe outliers, however, can be seen, differently 
from EP6. Greens and EUL/NGL show no substantive difference with 
the previous legislature. The new actor in the arena of party groups, 
ECR, shows a slightly different pattern. Despite being not as highly 
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lower than – for instance – S&D, EPP and Liberals) they show a higher 
number of (at least severe) outliers. This may point out that this group 
either is very cohesive, or very divided. 
Socialists and Democrats (S&D), Liberals and EUL/NGL, however, 
show some noteworthy results. Despite their outliers trend, in general, 
mirrors the one of the previous legislature, for all the three groups a 
negative peak of the Agreement Index can be spotted around vote 3900. 
This peak lasts for a short period of time/votes, and after vote 4000 the 
cohesion scores go back to “normality”. The interesting thing is that all 
three groups share the same lack of cohesion at the same time, leading 
alternatively to an abnormal rise of mild outliers (EUL/NGL and 
liberals, as demonstrated by a denser concentration of lighter dots in 
correspondence of the abovementioned votes) or severe outliers (S&D, 
showing a denser concentration of thicker dots). An in-deep analysis of 
these votes show that all these uncommonly dividing votes refer to the 
same policy area: Agriculture. Starting from vote 3745 (concerning 
interinstitutional negotiations on the issue of direct payments to 
farmers within the framework of the CAP) and finishing with vote 3938 
(concerning interinstitutional negotiations on the issue of financing, 
management and monitoring of the CAP), all these votes have in 
common the same object, the Common Agriculture Policy reform25. It is 
interesting to note that this is a topic on which often, as already widely 
recognized by EU practitioners and expert, albeit less by the academic  
literature (Roederer-Rynning 2003), different voting patterns than those 
defined by the left-right cleavage emerge. Here, national oriented votes 
are more likely to have a substantial effect, considering the economic 
interests at stake. This apparently trivial result has been often 
overlooked (or completely ignored) by some literature on the topic. For 
instance, 2013’s Votewatch report on “ten votes that shaped the 7th 
European Parliament” considers only one vote on CAP reform, the 
final vote in the plenary session of March 201326. Here, among the three 
EPGs that in my analysis show such an uncommon behaviour only the 
S&D are slightly divided (with 56 MEPs voting against the group line). 
The Liberals are sufficiently united voting yes and EUL/NGL 
completely united voting no. So, this analysis concludes that even on a 
controversial topic such as CAP reform, no substantive departure from 
                                                
25 Including the common organisation of the markets in agricultural products (Single 
CMO Regulation), the reform of the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD) and other crucial topics, all attributable to the bigger “umbrella” of CAP 
reform. 
26 “Final decision on the opening of, and mandate for, interinstitutional negotiations on 
financing, management and monitoring of the CAP”, final vote, March 2013 EP plenary 
session. 
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the widely accepted claim of MEPs voting primarily according to 
ideological position of can be acknowledged. This confirms my 
methodological argument according to which the consideration of the 
single vote leaves out a meaningful part of the story. To have a clear 
picture of these legislative dynamics, especially to see if party cohesion 
is as strong as usually described and if national interests emerge, 
shaping voting behaviour, it is helpful to consider the trend of multiple 
votes. 
Finally, table 2 quantifies the recurrence of this lack of cohesion, 
showing the effective number of outliers by group for the two 
considered European legislatures, EP6 and EP7. 
 
Table 2. Mild and severe AI outliers by EPG, 2004-2009 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
The importance of the number of outliers comparatively between 
groups should not be overstated, but even if we focus only on the 
aggregate numbers some meaningful indications can be elaborated. In 
the whole EP6, EPGs have been “mildly non-cohesive” 1518 times, and 
“severely non-cohesive” 549 times. In total, 2067 times a party group 
has displayed a voting behaviour that departs from the trend of 
extremely high cohesion It is worth noting, however, that these 
numbers refer to the actual party groups that my analysis pinpointed 
as outliers; so, considering that in some votes more than one EPG was 
divided, it would be incorrect to say that cohesion outliers emerged in 
2067 votes. The actual number of votes is smaller, as it can be seen in 
the last row of table 2. Anyway, this picture still remains surprising, 
considering the usual conclusions on party group cohesion of the 
relevant literature: in 1623 votes at least one of the main party group 
Mild Severe All Mild Severe All 
ALDE 324 125 449 ALDE 217 70 287
EPP-ED 227 100 327 EPP 185 138 323
EUL/NGL 414 54 468 EUL/NGL 217 70 287
G/EFA 231 163 394 G_EFA 164 95 259
SOC 322 107 429 S&D 192 137 329
ECR 353 141 494
Total EPGs 1518 549 2067 Total EPGs 1328 651 1979
Total votes 1125 498 1623 Total votes 884 549 1433
EP6 (2004-2009) EP7 (2009-2013)
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has been divided, either mildly or severely (respectively, 1125 and 
498)27. Knowing that in the five years of the 6th European legislature 
6200 roll-call votes have been cast, we can fairly affirm that (on 
average) roughly every 3.8 votes cast, there’s one vote where at least 
one EPG is divided, either mildly or severely. 
In the subsequent EP7, EPGs have been “mildly non-cohesive” 1328 
times, and “severely non-cohesive” 651 times. In total, 1979 times a 
party group has displayed an uncommonly low AI score. The outlying, 
single votes have been 1433, divided between 884 (mild) and 549 
(severe). In the four years (2009-2013) of the 7th European legislature 
taken into consideration 4684 roll-call votes have been cast; so, on 
average every 3.2 cast, there’s one vote where at least one EPG is 
divided, either mildly or severely. Considering the myriad of votes cast 
in a single plenary session (Corbett et al. 2011: 200), this means that 
there is no plenary where all EPGs are cohesive on every vote. Is such 
pattern of vote something that happens in a “normal democratic 
parliament”, as part of the literature envisages? 
 
3.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter, after a short introduction and the statement of the 
hypotheses under verification, I described of the most common indexes 
of voting cohesion of parliamentary actors. Then, the cohesion of EP 
party groups from 1979 has been presented together with the most 
common claims of the literature in regards. Then, after a look at a 
simple “box-and-whiskers” graph of EPGs’ voting cohesion in the last 
two European legislature (EP6 and EP7), I turned my attention to the 
analysis of the statistical outliers. Here I demonstrated, albeit with a 
simple presentation of the presence of statistical outliers and without a 
proper cause-effect argument, that party group cohesion has to be 
treated cautiously. Both for EP6 and EP7, party groups are usually 
completely united in voting, but there is a substantial number of cases 
when this cohesion breaks down in a surprising fashion. For EP7, for 
instance, this emerges clearly for the votes concerning the CAP reform. 
Every three and a half votes, on average, in the last ten years there’s 
been a vote where EPGs fail to discipline their members in voting 
according to the party lines.  
                                                
27 It is worth remembering that Euro-sceptics and non-attached members are excluded 
from the analysis, due to their absence of outliers. Including them in the analysis would 
lead to an even less rosy picture. 
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This picture plainly contrasts with the oft-repeated claim according to 
which the “the European Parliament is surprisingly like all other 
democratic parliaments” (Hix et al. 2005: 509): who could imagine a 
German Bundestag, an Italian Camera dei Deputati or a French Assemblée 
nationale where the marginal party groups are always highly divided 
(UEN, IND/DEN and non attached members) while the more 
institutionalised ones are highly cohesive in the majority of votes, but 
every now and then fail completely to discipline their members 
resulting in a complete division?  The explanation of this dynamics is 
strictly related to the peculiar institutional arrangement of the 
European Union: the EP, lacking the classical government-opposition 
dynamics of democratic politics (Mair and Thomassen 2010: 21), can 
somehow “afford” to have these divisions. There is no executive that 
governs, depending on a majority in the parliament; so even if 
sometimes these groups lack cohesion, no government can fall – and 
more importantly, no group has incentives to split. 
EPGs are certainly the “internal political engine” of the Parliament, and 
most of its daily work revolves around them. The importance of 
political groups has emerged since the very beginning, when in 1952 
the at the time appointed MEPs decided to sit according to their 
political family instead of nationality (Bardi and Ignazi 2004; Corbett et 
al. 2011: 78), so their centrality has not to be dismissed. But this does 
not mean that their members cannot decide, from time to time, to vote 
along patterns that completely break (because a national interest is at 
stake, such as outcomes of CAP reforms) their unity as political groups. 
And since, as scholars acknowledge (Raunio 1999: 193; Westlake 1994a; 
Kreppel 2002), EPGs or even more European parties have very little 
power to “whip” them, their election being ultimately in the hand of 
the national parties, no consequences arise from these “rebellious 
votes”. The reason of such understatement, as stated before, is based on 
a perspective that looks only at the mathematic mean of EPG 
cohesiveness over five years, but does not deepen the analysis to what 







Legislative behaviour and EP committees: a critical 
analysis of roll-call votes 
 
 
“If the political groups are the Parliament’s life blood, then its nineteen 
committees and four sub-committees are its legislative backbone” 





As previously demonstrated, when discussing voting behaviour and 
specifically party group cohesion it may be misleading to consider 
indexes broadly calculated by EPG membership and country of origin. 
The purpose of this chapter is to deepen the research question (how 
these two elements concur to define MEPs’ legislative activity) by 
taking into account the role of legislative committees. As Strøm pointed 
out, “committees are, by broad consensus, among the most significant 
internal organisational feature of modern parliaments” (1998: 55). The 
European Parliament bears no exception, as demonstrated by the 
number of studies in regards (see Whitaker 2011 for an extensive 
discussion of such area of research). 
This chapter is structured as follows: after a presentation of the basic 
functioning of the EP committee system and a brief literature review, 
relevant information from an original survey submitted to MEPs’ 
assistants in July 2012 are presented and discussed. Then part of these 
data are combined with roll-call votes from the sixth European 
parliament (2004-2009), showing consistent results with my theory 
according to which national affiliation is more likely to emerge when 
crucial issues are at stake, at least for some committees. 
 
4.1.1 The European Parliament committee system 
The committees of the European Parliament have three main functions: 
to draw up, amend and adopt both legislative proposals and own-
initiative reports. They consider Commission and Council proposals 
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and, where necessary, draw up reports to be presented to the plenary 
assembly. Thus, committees are designed not only to aid the European 
Commission in initiating legislation, but to draft the actual 
parliamentary amendments on the basis of Commission proposals. 
Standing committees are made up of MEPs, and each committee has a 
Chairman and four Vice-Chairmen, along with numerous committee 
members; each committee also has substitute members. There are 
currently 20 standing committees28, plus a special committee on 
Organised Crime, Corruption and Money Laundering (appointed 
before the Summer 2012), covering all the areas of legislation. Two 
other special committees (Financial, Economic and Social Crisis, and 
Policy Challenges) completed their works between June and July 2011 
and were dismantled. Reports are usually compiled by a rapporteur, 
who is appointed by the chairman of the Committee, selected from 
amongst the Members or permanent substitutes. This process of 
selection is not an autonomous decision of the chairman: rather, it 
represents a complex selection by party groups after an intricate 
process of inter-group bidding for reports, as shown by the literature 
(Kaeding 2004, Yoshinaka et al. 2010, Yordanova 2011). 
In the process of proposing and drafting legislation, the European 
Commission consults the various Standing Committees during the 
standard legislative procedure, and these committees advise the 
Commission by producing reports, proposing amendments to the draft 
legislation, and providing, if necessary, a drafted legislative resolution. 
Committees are also able to produce non-legislative reports. The 
appointed rapporteur is responsible for preparing the report, and 
presenting it to Parliament on the Committee’s behalf. These reports 
must include a motion for a resolution, an explanatory statement, and 
must also outline financial implications. Committees can also produce 
reports relevant to their competence, without having to be consulted. 
These are called “Own-Initiative Reports”, and are used to submit a 
motion for a resolution. When drawing up a report, a Committee may 
ask the opinion of another Committee on the matter, particularly if it is 
felt that a proposed amendment would fall into the interests of another 
                                                
28 Foreign Affairs; Development; International Trade; Budgets; Budgetary Control; 
Economic and Monetary Affairs; Employment and Social Affairs; Environment; Public 
Health and Food Safety; Industry, Research and Energy; Internal Market and Consumer 
Protection; Transport and Tourism; Regional Development; Agriculture and Rural 
Development; Fisheries; Culture and Education; Legal Affairs; Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs; Constitutional Affairs; Women's Rights and Gender Equality; Petitions. 
Human Rights and Security and Defence are two sub-committees of the standing 
committee Foreign Affairs. 
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Committee. The Committees are based in Brussels, where together with 
the Political Groups lies the real “political core” of the European 
Parliament. 
 
4.2. Brief literature review 
Concerning the role of the committees of the European Parliament – as 
pointed out in the introduction – the existing literature is in a relatively 
florid state. However, some aspects of it have been analysed more 
extensively than others.  
While there is, in fact, a body of work on the role of EP committees in 
the legislative process (Neuhold 2001), which includes case studies of 
the Environment (Judge 1992; Collins et. al. 1998) and more recent 
work on the EP amendments in plenary sessions (Yordanova 2010), 
most of the research is focused on the topic of membership of EP 
committees, starting from the earliest work of Hagger and Wing (1979) 
in the aftermath of the first direct elections of the EP. Westlake (1994b) 
examined British MEPs’ movements within the committee system. 
Bowler and Farrell (1995) empirically analysed the assignment of 
committee leadership positions, and were among the first scholar to 
study from a broader perspective the internal organization of the EP, 
(committees and party groups), arguing that from an organizational 
point of view the EP resembles a normal legislature, “opening the 
path” to what Hix et al. later would have argued looking at MEPs’ 
voting behaviour. 
McElroy (2001) showed how transnational party groups reward MEPs 
who toe the party line, promoting them in the EP’s committee system; 
later, a series of journal articles has examined the role of rapporteurs 
and the distribution of rapporteurships at the party and individual 
level in the EP (e.g. Benedetto 2005; Høyland 2006; Mamadouh and 
Raunio 2003). Settembri and Neuhold (2009) examine the role of the 
standing committees in building consensus within the European 
Parliament, finding that committees generally work very consensually, 
regardless of the issue at stake and the procedure applied. But, except 
for some very recent works (Costello and Thomsen 2010, Whitaker 
2011) that try to demonstrate the extent to which national parties use 
the committee system to further their policy goals, the question of the 
relationship between national parties and Euro-party groups as not 
received satisfactory scholarly attention; in particular, how voting 
behaviour is significantly shaped by the links between European 
parties and national parties has to be investigated more carefully, as 
stated by Whitaker (2011: 3). However, if this topic has been already 
studied but still needs research, what has received very little attention 
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is how MEPs actually vote in the various committee in relation to the 
central research question of this thesis, namely national affiliation at 
large, independent of national parties, vis-à-vis party group 
membership of MEPs.  
 
4.3. Hypotheses verification 
Considering the various committees as a sort of “proxies” for the 
importance of the vote, depending also on the fact that the committee 
under scrutiny deals or not with legislative issues, the empirical part of 
this chapter can be considered to verify the first hypothesis formulated 
in chapter 2 and its correlated hypotheses: 
H1: Party group discipline in the EP explains most of the votes but when the 
issue concerns a direct interest MEPs will protect them 
H1a: MEPs will vote according to their interests, creating a national 
alignment, even if this means being rebel to their political group (thus 
voting against it or abstaining) 
H1b: National alignments will emerge on more important, legislative 
issues 
H1c: Conversely, less important, non-legislative issues will show 
higher group cohesion 
However, the central focus of this chapter is on hypothesis 3, that refers 
explicitly to the different logics of voting behaviour of EP’s committees: 
H3: MEPs’ voting behaviour and consequently party group cohesion differs in 
various committees 
H3a: National alignments will emerge in committees that are 
generally perceived as more important 
 
4.4. European Parliament available surveys 
Surveys are a useful tool to explore the preferences of the members of 
elected assemblies. To date, each direct-elected EP has been surveyed 
by scholars: the first four by different research groups, while in the last 
fifteen years there has been only one research group responsible for the 
survey. The 1979-84 Parliament was investigated with a survey 
prepared by Reif and Wildenman (Bardi, 1989; Westlake, 1994a). In the 
1984-89 parliament there was a survey conducted by Hrbek and 
Schweitzer (1989). In the 1989-94, the survey was organised by Bowler 
and Farrell (1993). In the 1994-99 parliament, Wessels led the research 
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group on the MEPs, while doing a parallel study on members of 
national parliaments in 11 EU member states (Katz and Wessels, 1999; 
Schmitt and Thomassen 1999).The remaining three legislature (fifth, 
sixth and seven) were investigated by three waves of surveys (1999, 
2006, 2010) prepared by the European Parliament Research Group 
(EPRG), led by Farrell et al. However, only minor changes were made 
to this survey during the years, confirming the goodness of the original 
model and allowing students of EP to make diachronic comparative 
analyses. 
The survey includes personal questions, questions about the attitudes 
towards representation and general political attitudes, and on further 
EU institutional reform. Even though the basic structure of the survey 
remained mainly unchanged during the year, as noted previously, 
some questions were added and some methodological refinements 
were implemented29. The percentage of respondents has increased 
overtime: in 1999 only 192 MEPs participated to the survey, while in 
2010 the number of participating MEPs equalled 272 (Hix et al. 2011).  
But these already available surveys do not include specific question on 
the basic research question of this paper – the intertwining between 
national affiliation and EPG membership in shaping the outcome of the 
vote – and on the role of committees in the EP’s legislative process. So, 
a new survey had to be created. 
 
4.5 MEPs’ assistant survey 
The survey30 consists of 24 questions, covering four main topics: the 
role of lobbies in the EP; the role of committees in the legislative 
process; the possible contrast between national affiliation and EPG 
membership; and finally, some information on RCVs vis-à-vis the other 
types of votes in the EP. For the purpose of this work, information from 
all sections except the first one were employed. However, the full 
survey can be found in the appendix section. 
The target of the new survey, MEPs’ assistants instead of European 
parliamentarians themselves, was decided for a twofold reason: on the 
one hand, MEPs have usually little time, so choosing their (usually 
                                                
29 For instance, some answers were operationalized using different scales, leading to 
possible methodological problems in case of a comparative effort. See chapter 6 for a 
more extensive discussion of this point. 
30 The survey was submitted online, using the platform surveymonkey. This eased the 
logistic aspects of the survey and, at the cost – probably – of some recipients ignoring the 
request, it made the collection possible for a single researcher. 
 48 
numerous) staff instead of them makes the response rate higher; 
secondly, assistants help the work of their MEP on a daily basis, often 
doing the “hard work” of following the committees, reading, writing 
and correcting the amendments, preparing reports, and most of all 
drafting the vote list of a specific group; so to a certain extent they not 
only are a reliable source of information, but in some cases may know 
better than their “bosses”. Two versions of the survey were created – 
one in Italian, the other in English. Both were submitted to all MEPs’ 
assistants using the official mail of an Italian MEP, Mrs. Rita Borsellino, 
in mid-July 2012. The last collection of answers was set on late August 
2012. 
Roughly half of the question were structured as closed-questions where 
the respondent could pick among a range of possible answers; more or 
less the other half were questions where it was asked to pick the level 
of agreement or disagreement with a certain statement (the widely 
accepted 1-to-5 range: strongly agree, agree, neither agree or disagree, 
disagree, strongly disagree). In some open-ended question it was asked 
to list a certain set of answers. All the questions presented the 
possibility to add some generic “additional information”, in case the 
respondent wanted to deepen a certain aspect of the question. The final 
response rate was 188, resulting in the 24.9% of the 754 MEPs that 
compose the EP31. All EPGs and almost all member states (23 out of 
2732) are included in this sample: no assistant from Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia replied. A slight over-representation 
of the Italian population (54 responses) and for the S&D group (63, 
compared with the “only” 40 responses from EPP group) has to be 
noted, probably a consequence of the fact that the request to fill the 
questionnaire came from the email address of an S&D Italian MEP. 
However, since the object of the research question is not correlated to 
                                                
31 There is no fixed rule on the dimension of each MEPs’ staff (usually they have two 
assistants; in some cases one or three; rarely more than three), but in the request for the 
compilation of the survey it was explicitly asked that for each office only one assistant 
should fill out the survey. So, it can be expected that each response actually coincides 
with one – and only one – MEP. In terms of response rate (188), this number can be 
considered acceptable, especially if we keep in mind that the last official MEPs’ survey, 
held in 2009 using the professional agency Ipsos-MORI and available in 23 different 
languages (Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, 
Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, 
Romanian, Spanish, Slovak, Slovene and Swedish) had 270 responses, only ⅓ more than 
this survey. 
32 No assistant from Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia replied. To be noted a 
slight over-representation of the Italian population (54 responses) and for the S&D group 
(63, compared with the “only” 40 responses from EPP group), probably due to the fact 
that the request to fill the questionnaire came from the email address of an S&D Italian 
MEP. 
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the slightly over-represented sample, no selection bias problems are 
expected to arise. 
4.5.1. Survey items relevant to the research question 
In question 11 MEPs’ assistants were asked the following question: 
“Do you believe that some committees can be considered more 
important than others?” 
The answers show a clear uniformity of views. MEPs’ assistants almost 
unanimously convened that actually not all the votes cast in the EP are 
of the same importance (86.9% yes, 13.1% no). In the following, open 
question (question 12) they were asked to simply list the committees 
that they consider more important, with no limit of number of answers 
that they could give, in order not to “constrain” their opinion, that can 
be variously in-depth according on many factors (including their 
seniority: some assistants have been working in the EP for more than a 
decade, following different parliamentarians that were members of 
different committees; others are at their first experience as legislative 
assistants). The results are showed in table 3. 
 
Table 3. Questions 12: importance of EP committees, MEPs’ assistant survey 2012 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Committee n %
Industry, Transport and Research - ITRE 57 16%
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety - ENVI 48 14%
Economic and Monetary Affairs - ECON 46 13%
Internal Market and Consumer Protection - IMCO 39 11%
Agriculture and Rural Development - AGRI 34 10%
Budgets - BUDG 26 7%
Civil liberties, Justice and Home Affairs - LIBE 22 6%
Transport and Tourism - TRAN 19 5%
Legal Affairs - JURI 14 4%
International Trade - INTA 13 4%
Foreign Affairs - AFET 11 3%
Regional Development - REGI 11 3%
Budgetary Control - CONT 3 0,9%
Fisheries - PECH 3 0,9%
Constitutional Affairs - AFCO 2 0,6%
Employment and Social Affairs - EMPL 1 0,3%
Financial, Economic and Social Crisis - CRIS 1 0,3%
All others (DROI, SEDE, DEVE, CULT, FEMM, PETI, CRIM, SURE) 0 0,0%
350 100%
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On average, each respondent chose roughly two committees. Many 
committees were completely ignored (eight committees received no 
mention at all); on the contrary, there is a discrete separation between 
the top five committees and the rest. As presented graphically in figure 
3, the first five committees together (Industry, Transport and research; 
Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; Economic and Monetary 
Affairs; Internal Market and Competition; Agriculture and Rural 
Develppment)33 represent roughly ⅔ of all the answers. ITRE, the first, 
had the 16% of answers; the fifth, AGRI, received 10% of answers. All 
the other 20 committees together correspond approximately to the 
remaining ⅓: currently, as pointed out before, there are 20 standing 
committees, two sub-committees and one newly established special 
committee (CRIM). In the survey also the recently dismantled two 
special committees (CRIS and SURE) were included, resulting in 25 
possible answers. 
 
Figure 5. Pie chart of EP committees’ importance, MEPs’ assistant survey 2012 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
This is consistent to certain set of consideration: first of all, not all the 
committees deal with legislative issues. Some of them have their 
competence limited to the production of non-binding resolutions. 
Secondly, some issues can be considered, per se, more important than 
others (for instance, building a transnational railway or setting food 
standards versus promoting European-wide petitions or approving a 
symbolic text on gender equality). Finally, some issues are certainly 
salient and crucial but the EU has not (yet?) gained a direct influence 
on them, while on others the EU is the main policy-maker (for instance, 
                                                















foreign policy – certainly fundamental, but still completely in the hands 
of the national governments versus agriculture, fisheries or the common 
monetary policy). Committees are, as acknowledged by the literature, 
the “political backbone” of the European Parliament (Westlake 1994a: 
191; Neuhold 2001), but to different degrees.  It sounds reasonable to 
argue that non all the votes cast in the EP are of the same importance. 
The following question (question 13) is formulated as follows: 
“Do you think that the logics of how MEPs vote vary between the 
different committees?” 
76.7% of the respondents agreed, while only 23.3% disagreed. This is a 
broad question; so, the subsequent questions (question 14 and 15) are 
formulated in order to refine this information: 
“More specifically, do you believe that in some committees the political 
groups are more cohesive while in other committees MEPs vote more 
often together with their countrymen (even if they belong to different 
groups)?” 
Again, 68.6% of MEPs’ assistants agreed and 31.4% did not. Then, in 
question 15 and 16 they were asked to list the committees where 
political groups are more cohesive, and committees where MEPs vote 
















Table 4. Party group and national cohesion, MEPs’ assistant survey 2012 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
The number of each committee corresponds to the number of 
respondent picking that specific committee. As in question 11, MEPs’ 
assistant had free choice to enlist either one or more committees (or 
none, if they didn’t have an opinion). The fact that the question about 
the sheer importance of committees received more answers34 shouldn’t 
be surprising or worrisome: people working in the EP have a clear idea 
of where the real importance of the legislative process lies (even if they 
work for MEPs members of different committees); on the contrary, to 
know what competing rationales do these committees follow, they 
necessarily have to be aware of its internal dynamics, either working 
there or having a close relation to some of the staff/some MEPs 
involved in their works. Thus, on average each respondent “weighted” 
his or her answer, limiting it to one or two committees they know 
better (or even refraining from a response). 
 
                                                
34 On overall, 350 compared to 86 for question 14 and 84 for question 15. 
AFET 12 AGRI 17
LIBE 8 ITRE 10
FEMM 8 ENVI 8
DEVE 6 REGI 7
DROI 6 PECH 7
EMPL 5 AFET 6
ENVI 5 LIBE 6
BUDG 4 IMCO 5
ECON 4 ECON 4
TRAN 4 BUDG 3
AGRI 4 TRAN 3
CULT 4 INTA 2
ITRE 3 EMPL 2
JURI 3 PETI 2
INTA 2 CULT 1
CONT 2 AFCO 1




All others (5) 0
Total 86 Total 84
EP committees: national cohesionEP committees: party group cohesion
 53 
4.5.2. Party group cohesion or national cohesion? 
According to MEPs’ assistants, the five committees mostly 
characterized by high political groups’ cohesiveness are: Foreign 
Affairs; Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs; Women’s Rights and 
Gender Equality; Development; Human Rights. All prominent issues, 
but on which the EU has less say from a merely legislative point of 
view. On the contrary, the five mostly State-driven committees are the 
following: Agriculture and Rural Development; Industry, Transport 
and Research; Environment, Public Health and Food Safety; Regional 
Development; Fisheries. Just by simple eyeballing the data presented in 
table 3 and 4, it emerges clearly that three out of five of them are also 
on the list of the most important committees, and that the most 
important committees and those more “nationality-oriented” seem 
correlated; on the contrary, the most important committees and the 
more “group-oriented” seem not35. Table 6 shows the correlation 
between these three groups; then, a simple regression is run to see if 
there is a substantial statistical significance in this relation (table 5, 
figure 4). 
 
Table 5 (left). OLS regression 
Figure 6 (right). Twoway with fitted values (DV and significant IV) 
   
 
                                                
35 The descriptive statistics of the simple dataset built from these three questions can be 
found in the appendix, table a2. 
Model 1. Model 2. Model 3.
DV: Committee importance
EPG 0.873 0.258   
Cohesive -1.229 (0.947)   
Nationality 2.891*** 2.862***
Cohesive (0.660) (0.682)   
Cons 11.00* 4.288 3.497
-5.549 -3.481 -4.589
r2 0.0215 0.455 0.457   
chi2
F 0.505 19.20 9.252
N 25 25 25
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 6. Variables correlation 
 
Source: author’s own compilation (all three). 
 
First of all, as we can see, cohesiveness by EPG and by member state 
are typical of two substantively different groups of committees (low 
correlation: roughly 0.15), trivially confirming that these two dynamics 
are clearly competing. This is banal and does not certainly need any 
empirical confirmation, but it can work as a proof that the choice of 
MEPs’ assistants as well-informed recipients of a survey about voting 
behaviour in the EP is successful. Secondly, correlation between 
importance of a committee and predominance of EPG cohesion in its 
internal dynamics is, again, quite low (0.14). This is certainly a more 
interesting result, which partially points towards a more careful 
consideration of the concept, at large, of aggregated EPGs cohesion. But 
what’s really surprising is the correlation of committee importance and 
nationality-oriented patterns of vote: according to our recipients, there 
is a substantially high correlation (almost 0.7). Put all together, these 
information can be summarized as follows: some committees deal with 
less important issues, and usually in these committees votes are 
defined by group affiliation – thus, as scholars (Noury et al. 2002; Hix 
et al. 2006: 495, 2009) have extensively proved, falling along the 
traditional left-right cleavage. But in most important committees, the 
competing logic of voting according to national affiliation is much 
stronger. 
The OLS statistical regression confirms this argument, adding 
statistical significance to it. The dependent variable36 is “committee 
importance”, while obviously the two independent variables are “EPG 
cohesion” and “nationality cohesion”. Three models are run separately: 
the first two with one independent variable, the third with both. 
Consistently with our argument, EPG cohesiveness is never statistically 
significant, while nationality always is (and within a 99% confidence 
                                                
36 Here, the goal is not to establish a true cause-effect relationship between the variables: 
of course, we are not implying that it is one of the two competing logic that actually 
causes the importance of a committee. Rather, since the model is simple and has only one 
(or two) independent variables, this regression is a test of significance of the correlation, 
following the indication of King et al. (1994).  
Committee 
Importance EPG cohesive Nationality cohesive
Importance 1.000
EPG cohesive 0.1466 1.000
Nationality cohesive 0.6745 0.1547 1.000
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interval). Moreover, if we look at the R2 we see how the model with 
nationality cohesiveness, in terms of goodness of fit, expectedly 
explains much more of the variation than model 1. The twoway graph 
shown in figure 4, in addition to a visual representation of this 
relationship, helps us isolating some deviant cases, which we can 
divide in two categories. On the one hand – above the regression line – 
the group of committees where nationality is highly cohesive, but their 
importance is not as high (PECH, REGI, AFET, AGRI). 
The Agriculture committee, in particular, strikes as a real outlier. 
Despite being one of the crucial committees of the EP, partially 
responsible for the outcome of EU’s Common Agricultural Policy that 
represents almost one third of the whole EU budget, as proved by the 
fact that some academic works are dedicated to it alone (Roederer-
Rynning 2003) and MEPs’ assistant placed it the 5th position of the most 
important committees, its cohesiveness by nationality is so distant even 
from the second place that it is placed well outside the regression line37. 
On the other hand, those committees that tend not to be dominated by 
a country-based rationale, but nonetheless are considered relatively 
important are JURI, BUDG and ECON. 
 
4.6. RCVs analysis of the main committees 
In the previous chapter five committees have been identified as the 
most important, and this distinction (least/most important) partially 
correlates with the least/most nationality-oriented ones. Therefore, this 
finding is based solely on information from MEPs’ assistants; here the 
focus is on actual voting behaviour, using Hix et al.’s RCVs dataset 
(EP6, 2004-2009). In this analysis, differently from chapter 3 and 6 (that 
look at data aggregated by party group or member state), we must 
limit our investigation to the sixth European Parliament, the latest 
dataset available with information at MEP level. 
Again, the starting point is that EPGs are on overall, without 
disaggregating for each committee, highly cohesive. However, if we 
look only at the votes cast in the five “main” committees the pictures 
slightly changes, as showed in table 7. 
 
 
                                                
37 AGRI committee received 17 mentions as the most country-oriented committee; ITRE 
committee, the second most “national” committee according to MEPs’ assistant, almost 
half of it. 
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Table 7. AI cohesiveness scores (overall and disaggregated by committee), EP6 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
The average AI for these five committees is marginally lower (by 
roughly one point, from 0.85 to 0.84); in particular, amongst the three 
main groups Liberals and Socialists see their cohesiveness decrease by 
two/three points (respectively, from 0.88 to 0.86 and from 0.91 to 0.88), 
while the Christian-democrats remain stable. IND/DEM’s cohesiveness 
decreases, while UEN actually become more cohesive (two points 
increase); all the other groups show the same level of cohesiveness. 
Thus, the aggregated data for all these five committees show some 
difference, however on overall this variation does not seem substantial. 
But if we disaggregate the votes for each committee, the variation 
becomes slightly bigger. The average cohesiveness of two committees 
(IMCO and ITRE) is in line with the average of the whole EP (0.85), 
though it is a bit higher than the average of the five committees 
together. The ENVI committee, on the contrary, shows a similar 
cohesiveness to the five committees we are interested in (0.84), but 
lower than the EP6 average. The remaining two committees show 
diverging results. While the ECON committee shows a higher EPGs 
cohesiveness (0.86), the AGRI committee conversely shows a 
conspicuously lower cohesion: on average, EPGs are six percentage 
points less cohesive than the whole EP6 (0.79 instead of 0.85). Looking 
at the three main groups, the Socialists’ cohesion falls from 0.91 to 0.82, 
the Christian-democrats’ from 0.87 to 0.80, the Liberals’ from 0.88 to 
0.84. Also all the other groups see their AI scores decrease, except for 
the Conservatives. 
One last thing that has to be noted is that, separately for each 
committee, EPGs are generally less cohesive, but with substantial 
variation – for instance, in the ENVI committee the “radical” EPGs (far 
left and greens) are much more cohesive (more than 0.90), which is 
consistent to their political tradition. Thus, dynamics inside the EP 
Whole EP6 All five AGRI ECON ENVI IMCO ITRE
ALDE 0.88 0.87 0.85 0.91 0.86 0.83 0.88
EPP-ED 0.87 0.87 0.80 0.91 0.87 0.90 0.89
EUL/NGL 0.85 0.86 0.76 0.83 0.92 0.94 0.76
G/EFA 0.91 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.93 0.94 0.91
IND/DEM 0.46 0.43 0.38 0.53 0.40 0.45 0.41
SOC 0.91 0.88 0.82 0.90 0.90 0.89 0.90
UEN 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.69 0.73 0.78 0.78
na 0.45 0.44 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.41 0.43
Average 0.85 0.84 0.79 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.85
Committee
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seem to be slightly more complex and differentiated in respect to what 
the mainstream literature usually acknowledges. 
However, it is quite evident how these variations, except for the AGRI 
committee, are substantially very small. The analysis of party group 
cohesion using solely the Agreement Index on roll-call votes cannot let 
us generalise that EPGs are less cohesive for all the most important 
committees; for the Agriculture committee alone, instead, this can be 
partially argued. 
 
4.6.1 A simple OLS statistical model for the main five committees 
If the Agreement Index is not giving satisfying results, then a more 
refined approach is needed. Following the same methodology used in a 
previous work on MEPs’ voting behaviour by Noury et al. (2002), the 
“approach to studying individual voting patterns is to use statistical 
tools to disentangle the impact of party affiliation and nationality on 
voting behaviour. In particular, we try to explain how the probability 
that a given legislator will vote ‘Yes’ depends upon the share of his/her 
party group that votes ‘Yes’ and the share of his/her national 
delegation that votes ‘yes’” (Noury et al 2002: 300). 
First of all, using EP6’s dataset of roll-call votes, a dummy variable for 
Yes votes is created. Then two variables are created: the first one as the 
number party colleagues voting “yes”, divided by the number of party 
colleagues present at that vote; the second one as the number of 
country fellowmen voting “yes”, divided by the number of fellow 
countrymen voting “yes”. These variables are called “share”. The 
estimates presented in table 8 are from the following equation: 
 
 
Where Vj is the dummy variable indicating the “yes” vote of legislator j, 
Partyj (Countryj) is the proportion of MEP j’s party (country) members 
voting “yes”, and εj is the error term. The regression used is a linear 
OLS regression. “It is well known that the estimates of Vj by linear 
probability model may not belong to the admissible range [0, 1]. This, 
however, is not a major concern here given that we are primarily 
interested in the relative importance of party versus country on voting 




Table 8. OLS estimates of voting patterns based on party and country affiliation, EP6. 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
First of all, in respect to Noury et al.’s analysis on the third and fourth 
Parliament, party influence has declined while national influence has 
increased. The coefficients they find for the third parliament are 0.84 
for party and 0.17 for country; for the fourth parliament, 0.97 for party 
and a marginal 0.01 for country. My coefficients are much similar to 
what they find for the third parliament: so, after a period of lower 
national influence, MEPs seem to be returned to a bigger influence by 
their member state38. However, for the whole EP6, despite the 
substantial difference with Noury et al.’s findings, still party group 
membership is much more important in estimating voting patterns 
than national affiliation (0.86 versus 0.26).  
Secondly, if we run the same statistical regression for each of the five 
main committees, separately, three important findings can be observed. 
First, ENVI, ITRE and IMCO do not substantially deviate from the 
coefficient of the whole EP6: MEPs vote in those committee slightly 
differently, but substantially this difference is marginal. Second, in 
ECON committee voting patterns are slightly more defined by party 
membership than national affiliation (0.90 party, 0.22 country). This 
goes against my argument according to which in the most important 
committees these two competing explanatory variables are more 
oriented towards the national element; but again, the substantial effect 
                                                
38 The same statistical analysis for the fifth parliament has not been performed. 
-1 -2 -3 -4 -5 -6
DV: vote_dic Overall AGRI ECON ENVI ITRE IMCO
epg_yes_share 0.858*** 0.708*** 0.906*** 0.871*** 0.867*** 0.840***
(0.000416) (0.00229) (0.00146) (0.00118) (0.00196) (0.00204)   
country_yes_share 0.264*** 0.477*** 0.223*** 0.267*** 0.247*** 0.300***
(0.000525) (0.00251) (0.00208) (0.00155) (0.00249) (0.00255)   
_cons -0.0715*** -0.110*** -0.0714*** -0.0786*** -0.0701*** -0.0811***
(0.000262) (0.00133) (0.00106) (0.000787) (0.00127) (0.00129)   
r2 0.745 0.657 0.772 0.734 0.738 0.749   
chi2
F 5508480.5 192181.1 373100.9 623345.0 250334.2 223715.5   
N 3761021 200475 220580 452491 177355 150113
Standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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is extremely small (roughly 0.05). Third, the AGRI committee shows 
more substantially consistent coefficients that corroborate my 
argument (0.70 and 0.47): in this crucial committee votes fall along 
national lines much more than acknowledged by the general literature 
on MEPs’ voting behaviour. 
 
4.7. Conclusions 
Committees are the “legislative backbone” of the European Parliament. 
Not all are of the same importance: some work on mainly legislative 
bills and vote amendments on proposals that are likely to influence the 
life of more that three hundred million European citizens; some others 
simply don’t. I argue that, consistently to my theory, the national 
element is more likely to have a substantial effect on most important 
committees, while party groups, vice-versa, are more cohesive when 
there is less at stake. 
This is empirically confirmed by the elaboration of the results from the 
original survey submitted to MEPs’ assistant, while RCVs analysis 
partially confirms it only for the AGRI committee: for the ECON 
committee, on the contrary, results were against my expectations. 
Dynamics in votes concerning the AGRI committee are substantially 
different than the others, and national affiliation plays a greater role 
than the one usually envisaged by the mainstream literature (Hix 2002; 
Hix et al 2003; Hix et al 2005; 2006; 2007). These results are especially 
meaningful if we consider the importance of this committee in terms of 
sheer economic numbers – roughly half of the EU budget, excluded the 
bureaucratic expenses to keep running the Brussels and Strasbourg 
machines, is allocated to the Common Agriculture Policy39. Findings 
that corroborate my argument can be found in the literature, albeit 
focusing on research questions other than the specific relationship 
between party and national affiliation. For instance Bardi, when 
investigating the concept of dyadic representation and specifically the 
political congruence between citizens and European representatives, 
finds that this committee, since the very beginning of the history of the 
European Parliament, has always been one of the most aspired (Bardi 
1989). 
The average EP vote may be driven, statistically, by political 
membership; the ideological dimension of the EP may be, as a whole, 
more relevant than the national affiliation of MEPs, but if we “filter” 
                                                
39 Roughly ⅓ of the whole EU budget is allocated to the Common Agriculture Policy 
(Morlino 2010). 
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these votes in a critical way, nationality (the reader has to be careful on 
this point: nationality at large, not membership of a national party) 
suddenly becomes something different than the “weak predictor of 






When nationality prevails: explaining MEPs’ loyalty and 
rebelliousness towards party group 
 
 
“In general, political behaviour and policy outcomes in the European 
Parliament are determined more by European party positions and left-right 
preferences than national interests.” 
(Hix et al. 2007: 201) 
 
“[…] Splits within groups do occur, however, when issues of national interest 
are at stake.” 




5.1. Introduction and a brief reference to the relevant literature 
Empirical findings from previous chapters have already demonstrated 
how the concept of intra-party cohesion needs to be handled with 
extreme caution; however, the specific question of national alignments 
(i.e. groups of MEPs coming from the same country voting together, 
despite different – often opposed and contrasting – political 
orientations) has not been addressed yet. Thus, this chapter turns its 
empirical focus on the cases when MEPs actually choose to follow their 
fellow countrymen instead of their political group colleagues. In order 
to pursue this analysis, first the basic statistics disaggregated by EPG, 
country and committee are presented, then a statistical model is built 
using a logistic regression. 
The literature pushing forward the idea of the EP as a “regular 
parliament” where the lines of conflict tend to replicate those of a 
national parliament (left-right, although with a second orthogonal 
dimension, pro-/anti-EU) do acknowledge, of course, the possibility of 
these national alignments (Faas 2003, Noury et al. 2002, Hix 2002, Hix 
et al. 2005, 2006, 2007). Despite the variety of approaches and 
methodological tools, however, they have in common the same 
explanatory variable for these deviations from the party group line: 
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MEPs’ national party. Hix et al.’s theorization of MEPs as “agents with 
two principals” excellently sums up this argument: “it is the principals 
that control candidate selection (the national parties) who ultimately 
determine how MEPs behave. When the national parties in the same 
parliamentary group decide to vote together, the EP parties look highly 
cohesive. But when these parties take opposing policy positions, the 
cohesion of the EP parties break down” (Hix 2002: 696). This, in sum, is 
what makes Hix et al. argue that national affiliation, independent of 
national party position, is a weak predictor of vote (Noury et al. 2002; 
Hix et al. 2007). Faas goes forward by arguing that, indeed, party 
groups may only be cohesive as a by-product of the cohesion of 
national party delegations (Faas 2003). 
Here, however, the argument is different. Consistently to my theory of 
MEPs as “strongly ideological regional parliamentarians” I am 
interested in national affiliation, at large, defining MEPs’ voting 
behaviour. I do not look at national parties: I argue, in contrast to this 
perspective, that national affiliation – independent of party position – 
has been overlooked and constitutes a substantial element of EP’s 
legislative dynamics. The data on which this analysis is performed is 
the dataset of roll-call votes, and the considered time span is 2004-2009, 
the sixth European Parliament40. 
 
5.2. Hypotheses verification 
The first hypothesis under scrutiny here is the main hypothesis of the 
work, which links national alignments to deviation from European 
party group lines. Since in the dataset no proxy can be operationalized 
to pinpoint each state’s interest in a specific legislation, only the three 
sub-hypotheses can be tested; however, H1 has already been (partially) 
confirmed by the committee analysis in chapter 4, and will be further 
corroborated by a brief in-depth analysis of case studies in chapter 7. 
H1: Party group discipline in the EP explains most of the votes but when the 
issue concerns a direct interest MEPs will protect them 
H1a: MEPs will vote according to their interests, creating a national 
alignment, even if this means being rebel to their political group (thus 
voting against it or abstaining) 
                                                
40 Here, like in chapter 4, the need of MEP-level disaggregated data necessarily 
constraints the analysis to EP6 only, without the possibility of a helpful comparison with 
EP7. For the on-going legislature, it is worth reminding, only party group-aggregated 
data are available via votewatch.eu. 
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H1b: National alignments will emerge on more important, legislative 
issues 
H1c: Conversely, less important, non-legislative issues will show 
higher group cohesion 
The descriptive statistics of national alignments are disaggregated also 
for committee, and the logistic regression presented in paragraph 5.5 
takes into account with an independent variable the emergence of 
national alignments in the main committees. Thus, this analysis serves 
also as a (partial) test for hypothesis 3. 
H3: MEPs’ voting behaviour and consequently group cohesion differs in 
various committees 
H3a: National alignments will emerge in committees that are 
generally perceived as more important 
Finally, by looking at national alignments from the perspective of the 
various member states, this analysis allows to verify hypothesis 5. 
H5: regional dimensions other than left/right cleavage and anti-/pro-EU do 
exist and exert a significant effect in the EP 
 
5.3. Defining party and country loyalty and rebelliousness 
First of all, the concepts of loyalty and rebelliousness need a clear-cut 
definition. I have defined the political line of either a European political 
group or a national delegation as the position adopted by the plurality 
of MEPs within that group or delegation41. In cases where an equal 
number of MEPs vote "Yes" and "No" in a party group or in a national 
delegation, the conclusion is that "there is no political line" or “there is 
no national line” and the statistics for MEPs in that European political 
groups and the national party delegations are treated accordingly. 
Then, I proceed to operationalize loyalty and rebelliousness of MEPs 
from these information: an MEP is considered 'loyal' to his/her 
European political group or national delegation if his/her voting 
option is identical to the political line of the political group or national 
delegation, respectively42. Here the same caveat made by Hix et al. 
                                                
41 For instance: if 40 MEPs from the ALDE group vote "Yes", 25 MEPs vote "No" and other 
27 MEPs abstain, the political line of ALDE to this vote is "Yes". In the same way, if 50 
Italian MEPs vote “Yes”, 15 “No” and 13 abstaine, the Italian national delegation line is 
“Yes”. 
42 For instance: if an Italian MEP from the Socialist group votes "Yes" and the political line 
of the Socialist group to that vote (defined by the plurality of its members) is also "Yes", 
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(2007) is valid: the use of the terms “loyal” and “rebel” does not imply 
a value judgment as to whether MEPs were “right” or “wrong” to vote 
they way they did; the terminology is merely designed to straight-
forwardly define how MEPs behave. Considering these assumptions, 
five options are possible for a MEP in each vote: 
a. EPG and national delegation line coincide. This means that both the 
plurality of members of the group the MEP belongs to and the plurality 
of members coming from his/her country voted in the same way: for 
instance, “Yes”. In this case the MEP can be: 
 a1. Loyal to both (he/she votes “Yes”) 
a2. Rebel to both (he/she votes “No”, or abstains). This 
happens rarely. 
b. EPG and national delegation line diverge. This, of course, happens 
more often: for instance, the plurality of members of the group the 
MEP belongs to voted “Yes”, while the plurality of members coming 
from his/her country voted “No”. In this case the MEP can be: 
 b1. Loyal to his/her EPG but rebel to his/her national 
delegation (voting “Yes”) 
b2. Conversely, loyal to the national delegation but rebel to the 
EPG (voting “No”) 
b3. Rebel to both (in this example, by abstaining). 
Clearly, what is analysed in this chapter (the concept of nationality 
prevailing over party group unity) refers to option b2. Before 
discussing the descriptive statistics of loyalty and rebelliousness, 
however, a note of caution has to be made. In terms of sheer numbers, 
the votes identified by this particular condition actually represent a 
very small portion of the votes cast in the analysed time span, 2004-
2009: only in 4,33%43. But two things have to be considered in this 
regard: firstly, here we consider only the public, RCVs; in secret votes 
these national alignments can emerge more freely, because there is no 
“whip effect” (for how weak it can be, as part of the literature argues) 
from the EPG. Secondly, they do not include the cases when MEPs’ 
accordance with their EPG is accidental, because it happens by chance 
                                                                                                       
then he is loyal to his political group. On the contrary, if he/she votes "No" or abstains, 
he is considered as “rebel”. Then, the same calculation is made for his national affiliation: 
if the line of Italian MEPs is also “Yes” (calculated in the same way: how the plurality of 
Italian MEPs vote), he is also considered “loyal” to his national delegation. So, in this case 
he is loyal to both his political group and country.  
43 Precisely 162,921 votes over 3,761,021 total votes cast. 
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that the EPG line is the same as that of their country of origin (which is 
the real reason why the MEP voted in a certain way). An example helps 
clarifying. Let’s consider a piece of controversial legislation that may be 
harmful for a certain country. On this bill, as the European Parliament 
is increasingly inter-party competitive and the “grand coalition” 
between Socialists and People’s party is less and less likely (Hix et al. 
2003, 2005, 2007), the Socialist have a party line of voting “No” while 
the People’s Party have the opposing line, voting “Yes”. All MEPs of 
the country whose interests are at risk vote compact against the bill, 
“No”. In this case the socialist MEPs from that country do not emerge 
as party rebellious; however, their real reason of vote was not towing 
the party line, but protecting the homeland. Paraphrasing Faas (2003), 
EPG loyalty is a by-product of national loyalty (and not national party 
loyalty). 
In order to further elaborate this point, it is useful to look at the basic 
descriptive statistics of the aforementioned cases a1 (MEP is loyal to 
both national delegation and EPG) and b1 (MEP is loyal to his/her to 
EPG, but rebel to his/her national delegation). This information can be 
found in table 10, a box showing the taxonomy of loyalty and 
rebelliousness of MEPs according to the two “dimensions” identified 
here, EPG and national delegation44. A similar table can be found in 
Hix et al. (2007: 137) for the fifth EP; but consistently to their argument, 
there what is analysed is the voting with/against EPG and national 
parties; here, EPG and national delegation at large. 
 
Table 10. Taxonomy of MEPs’ loyalty / rebelliousness to national delegation 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
It is quite evident how the small percentage discussed before (4.33%) 
acquires a new value if compared to the opposite case (“EPG loyal / 
                                                
44 For simplicity, in table 9 cases a2 and b3 are considered as the same item 
(rebelliousness to both EPG and national delegation), without distinguishing if EPG line 
and country majority were actually coinciding. Such distinction, in effect, is not relevant 








national rebel”): 15.16%, only roughly three times. This means that the 
cases where, in order to follow their political colleagues, an MEP has to 
vote against the national majority are relatively rare45. But most of all, 
what strikes is the overarching majority of cases when both EPGs lines 
and national majority line actually coincide (73.34%): this means that 
most of the times MEPs vote according to both their party line and 
national line. So, further national alignments may be “hidden” by this 
recurring EPG/nationality harmony, as I argued before: when both 
loyalties emerge it is not possible to pinpoint, if not with an in-deep 
analysis of each vote, what came first – EPG membership or national 
affiliation46. 
In other words, my empirical operationalization of the concept of 
“nationality prevails” is extremely strict. This comes at the cost of 
leaving some cases out, but with the advantage of identifying a 
rigorous and unbiased sample of cases where, without any doubt, 
national affiliation prevails over partisan lines. Finally, even if it is out 
of the scope of the discussion here, it is worth noting that the “rebel / 
rebel” percentage should not be surprising, since it includes all the 
cases when an MEP votes against his EPG but together with his national 
party delegation (not the national delegation, at large, discussed here), 
MEPs’ “main principal” according to EP students that investigated this 
aspect of voting behaviour (Raunio 2000; Hix et al. 2002, 2007; Coman 
2009). 
 
5.4. Descriptive statistics of nationality prevailing over party groups 
Before proceeding to describe the variables used in the regression it is 
useful to compare these cases of nationality prevailing over EPG line 
after having disaggregated them by party group, nationality and finally 
by committee. Table 10 and Figure 5 show how many times in each 




                                                
45 This, of course, depends also on the fact that sometimes, especially for the smaller 
countries, the national line is actually defined by the two bigger EPGs (and still many 
vote, notwithstanding in a decreasing fashion, are based on a “grand coalition” between 
People’s party and Socialists). 
46 Also Hix et al. (2007) find similar disproportional results. Their original table showing 
loyalty and rebelliousness by EPG and national party can be found in the appendix, in 
table a5. 
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Table 11. Number and percentage of national prevailing by EPG, EP6 (2004-2009) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation (both). 
 
The “relative” data refers to the percentage of times a certain EPG 
witnesses one of his members voting in such rebellious way. Not 
surprisingly, the three groups where this happens most often are the 
two euro-sceptic groups and the non-attached members; however, the 
true interruption is, similarly to what happened when looking at AI 
outliers (see chapter 3), between the first two groups (IND/DEM and 
non attached) and the other groups47. It is worth noting that the two 
main groups are quite distant from each other. EPP-ED is the first of 
the big groups (2.89%), while the Socialists are on the opposite situation 
(1.94%). Socialists are second only to the Greens, the group that shows 
                                                
47 From almost 8% of non-attached members to 3.8% of UEN. 
EPP-ED 60357 IND/DEM 8.40%
SOC 31675 na 7.78%
na 18811 UEN 3.81%
ALDE 16373 EPP-ED 2.89%
IND/DEM 14054 ALDE 2.10%
UEN 12287 EUL/NGL 2.04%
EUL/NGL 5955 SOC 1.94%
G/EFA 3336 G/EFA 1.22%































































the lowest percentage of national alignments (only 1.22%). Liberals and 
radical left show very similar percentages (2.1% and 2.04%), 
What is also interesting, though, is to look at the absolute numbers of 
this phenomenon: when it comes to voting it is the actual numbers that 
count. Clearly, bigger groups have more chances to influence (in this 
case, with their national-oriented votes) the result, changing the 
outcome of the vote from “approve” to “reject” (or vice-versa). The 
percentages shown before “weight” differently each group according 
to its size: in other words, they show how often, in relation to the 
number of votes cast within the group, such national alignment 
emerges. On the other hand, in terms of sheer numbers it is the two 
biggest groups (EPP-ED, SOC) that, not surprisingly, cast the highest 
number of these rebellious votes. In particular, EPP/ED has almost the 
double of national-prevailing votes than the Socialists, despite having 
only 68 MEPs more than the Socialist group48. This is certainly a 
consequence of the co-existence of the two different souls, People’s 
Party and European Democrats, and in particular of the behaviour of 
the “usual suspect” UK delegation (Faas 2003: 850). G/EFA group 
remains in the last place, confirming that it happens rarely that its 
members vote against the party line. 
Interesting insights can be elicited also from the distribution of national 
alignments according to MEPs’ country of origin, of course. First this is 
shown in absolute values, also differentiating by EPG (table 11, figure 











                                                
48 Precisely 268 EPP-ED members, in comparison to 200 Socialists. 
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Table 12. Number of national prevailing by EPG and country, EP6 (2004-2009) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Clearly, also here the countries that show the highest number of 
national alignments are the bigger countries that elect more MEPs. UK 
are, again, the champion of nationality prevailing over EPG: more than 
31,000 times in the five years of the 6th EP a British MEP has voted in 
such way. UK’s overall number is almost two times the second country, 
France (roughly 16,000). Then we find Poland, again a quite big 
member state in terms of EP representation (50 MEPs in the sixth 
legislature). A striking exception seems to be Czech Republic, a 
historically euro-sceptic country: despite having only 24 MEPs in the 
considered time span, the phenomenon of national alignment has 
happened more than 10,000 times: a value close to – for instance – that 
of Italy (roughly 13,000), a country that has more than three times the 
number of MEPs (precisely 78). As for UK, these alignments come from 
members of the Czech Civic Democratic Party, forming together with 
the British conservatives the sub-group ED. Germany, on the other 
hand, despite its large delegation is way beyond these five countries: 
“only” roughly 8,000 alignments of such.  
To see how these trends change by country and by EPG, figure 8 shows 
graphically, in each country, how many MEPs for each groups form a 
ALDE EPP-ED EUL/NGL G/EFA IND/DEM SOC UEN na Total
Austria 389 1068 0 140 0 959 0 1781 4337
Belgium 819 1517 0 172 0 603 0 1033 4144
Bulgaria 174 107 0 0 0 222 0 719 1222
Cyprus 173 389 211 0 0 0 0 0 773
Czech Republic 0 7312 1131 0 726 139 0 1554 10862
Denmark 475 432 201 93 1286 1616 691 0 4794
Estonia 84 45 0 0 0 419 0 0 548
Finland 574 807 207 55 0 243 0 0 1886
France 3566 3505 231 268 862 7901 0 622 16955
Germany 1426 3130 995 612 0 2368 0 0 8531
Greece 0 4426 603 0 854 1328 0 0 7211
Hungary 101 2584 0 0 0 886 0 0 3571
Ireland 262 849 91 0 1116 25 2225 0 4568
Italy 2776 2272 652 130 0 1680 3736 2200 13446
Latvia 139 304 0 154 0 0 1572 0 2169
Lithuania 834 149 0 0 0 122 563 0 1668
Luxembourg 113 310 0 60 0 247 0 0 730
Malta 0 325 0 0 0 687 0 0 1012
Netherlands 669 1063 413 190 2929 1075 0 0 6339
Poland 1804 2336 0 0 3342 1684 3500 1266 13932
Portugal 0 1130 263 0 0 577 0 0 1970
Romania 135 415 0 240 0 241 0 670 1701
Slovakia 0 492 0 0 0 202 0 3126 3820
Slovenia 95 175 0 0 0 47 0 0 317
Spain 279 2870 31 161 0 2206 0 0 5547
Sweden 576 3629 759 308 1735 2005 0 0 9012
UK 910 18716 167 753 1204 4193 0 5840 31783
Total 16373 60357 5955 3336 14054 31675 12287 18811 162848
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national alignment. For simplicity only the first 16 countries are 
presented49. 
 
Figure 8. Number of national prevailing by EPG, EP6 (2004-2009) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
This information is not insightful only for the mere point of view of 
which country has more national-oriented votes, since as noted before 
this it is dependent o the country delegation size. What can be telling is 
                                                
49 Latvia, Portugal, Finland, Romania, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, 


























































































































to see, within a country, which EPGs are more touched by this 
phenomenon. 
As already shown in the previous table, UK is the champion of 
nationality prevailing over EPG, as partially recognized by the 
literature (Hix et al. 2007; Faas 2003); what strikes is that the sole votes 
cast by EPP-ED members are enough to outnumber the second country, 
France. This confirms the heterogeneity of UK national delegation in 
this group: no surprise, for the subsequent legislature (7th EP) the EP 
has reverted to a “pure” People’s Party group, the British MEPs 
merging with other conservatives in the ECR group, born in 2009. Also 
many British non-attached members voted in a national prevailing 
fashion, while the remaining groups (IND/DEM, ALDE, F/EFA) less. 
Also the British Socialists show a pretty disciplined voting behaviour, 
considering the size of the delegation. France, on the other hand, has 
many national prevailing votes primarily due to its Socialist delegation. 
This is a unique phenomenon in the 6th Parliament: in no other country 
so many Socialist MEPs form national alignments. Poland and Italy 
show a similar picture: national alignments are almost homogeneously 
distributed amongst all groups50, but the most consistent are he euro-
sceptic groups (UEN for Poland, UEN and IND/DEM for Italy). France 
and Italy, actually, have also a substantial number of ALDE members 
voting in such way, a characteristic that they share only with another 
country, Germany. As already discussed before, the Czech EPP-ED 
delegation that is responsible for most of the national alignments in 
that country. No surprise, most of MEPs from the Civic Democratic 
Party later left the People’s Party to join the ECR group in the following 
European legislature. Greece shows a similar trend, though its EPP-ED 
members remained in the group after 2009. Spain has these alignments 
split almost equally between the two main groups. Netherlands and 
Ireland’s alignment depend mostly on UEN for the former, IND/DEM 
for the latter. Slovakia, finally, shows a curious pattern: almost all these 
votes are due to the non-attached members51. All the other countries 
show no peculiar trends. 
Figure 9, as opposed to the data presented before, shows the percentage 
of nationality prevailing for each country, calculated over the number 
                                                
50 Except IND/DEM (Italy) and EUL/NGL and G/EFA (Poland), groups for which they 
elect do not elect any MEP, as shown in table 6. 
51 Considering that Slovakia in 2004 elected only three n/a MEPs and in five years (6,200 
roll-call votes) this alignment emerged roughly 3,000 times, these three MEPs voted half 
of the time in this way. But, as noted extensively, the voting pattern of non-attached 
members is not particularly significant. 
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of votes cast (thus controlling for the size), thus representing a sort of 
map of Europe’s national alignments. 
 
Figure 9. Map of national prevailing (percentage) by country, EP6 (2004-2009) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Most of the big states that in absolute terms showed a high number of 
national alignments score actually quite low in percentage terms (Italy, 
France, especially Germany). Poland, on the contrary, remains in the 
higher part of this list (3.7%). UK is not the country with the highest 
score anymore: Czech Republic and Sweden, two traditionally euro-
sceptic countries, have the highest percentages (7.3% and 6.6% 
respectively). Then, after the UK, Slovakia and Denmark can be found. 
In general, except for the exploratory meaning of this map, the 
inference than can be drawn from this list and the previous data is the 































where nationality prevails over EPG group52. This is further reinforced 
by the results of next paragraph’s statistic analysis. 
Finally, these results are disaggregated according to the committee. 
Figure 8 shows how many national alignments actually occurred in 
each of EP6’s 25 committees. 
 
Figure 8. Number of national prevailing by committee, EP6 (2004-2009) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
As it can be easily seen, the committees where the phenomenon under 
scrutiny emerges the most are consistent with what has been proved in 
chapter 4 using MEPs’ assistant survey data: nationality-oriented votes 
correlate with crucial, legislative committees. The five most important 
committees can be all found in the first nine committees where 
nationality prevails the most: ENVI, AGRI, AFET, TRAN, LIBE, ECON, 
AFCO, IMCO, ITRE. The only (relatively) surprising result is the 
presence of the Foreign Affairs committee in such a high position 
(third). In fact, other scholars have found interestingly counter-intuitive 
findings about this committee. For instance, Whitaker (2011) has found 
                                                
52 Here, of course, no argument can be made about the question of national interests at 




































































an intuitive correlation between the legislative power of a committee 
and the probability of MEPs not changing committee: clearly, MEPs 
seek to work in a committee that counts. However, AFET committee, 
“despite its legislative weakness, was also associated with 
comparatively high probability of MEPs remaining on it across half-
term” (Whitaker 2011: 49). 
In my analysis, the presence on national alignments in AFET can be 
due to the fact that this committee, despite having almost no real 
power, is nonetheless perceived as crucial because of the symbolic 
value of its resolutions. Thus its members often vote in open contrast to 
the EPG line and forming a national alignment, even though no actual 
legislative and binding decision is at stake. An example of this 
possibility is proposed in chapter 7. 
 
5.5. Logistic regression: modelling EPG rebellious behaviour 
The goal of the statistical model is twofold. On the one hand, it is to 
assess if being part of a certain country and of a certain EPG has a 
statistical influence on the probability that a MEP disregards his/her 
EPG to vote accordingly to his/her fellow countrymen. Again, the 
dataset used is the totality of RCVs cast in the 6th European Parliament, 
2004-2009. My unit of analysis is the single vote; considering that 6,200 
RCVs have been cast in the 5-years legislature and multiplying this 
number for each MEP present at that vote, I have more than 3 million 
observation (exactly 3,332,882). 
 
5.5.1. Variables and expectations 
After having defined loyalty and rebelliousness of each MEP in each 
vote, the dependent variable is created: a dummy variable called 
“nationality prevails”. This corresponds to case b2 (as defined in 
paragraph 5.3), namely those cases when there is a clear contrast 
between the political group line and the national delegation line and 
the MEP decides to follow their countrymen, even if this means 
neglecting the European group line. 
The independent variables are created on the basis of the information 
provided by Hix et al.’s dataset. EPGs are included as a sort of control 
variables, since it is already well known which groups are cohesive and 
which are not. The non-attached members are excluded from the 
regression, following the indication of Kreppel (2013). Nationality is 
expected to give original results, since except for the generic AI scores 
that can be calculated via the online platform www.votewatch.eu and 
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presented in various works (Hix et al. 2007 for the first 5 European 
legislatures; Hix 2009 for the 6th EP; Votewatch 2013 report for some 
crucial votes cast in the current, 7th EP) no study has actually analysed 
with more refined statistical tools which countries are more or less 
cohesive in terms of nationality prevailing over European party 
membership. On the other hand, the goal is to assess if also some 
specific characteristics of the MEP (size of country delegation to the EP, 
origin from EU15 or the recently eastern-enlarged countries) and of the 
vote (legislative vote, budget vote, result of the vote, margin, vote in 
the most important committees) have significant influence.  
The expectations about the main independent variables (nationality, 
EPG membership) have already been discussed. As far as the other 
variables, firstly I expect “legislative” (dummy variable: 0 = not 
legislative, 1 = legislative vote) to have a positive effect on the 
likelihood of the occurrence of a national prevailing: according to my 
theory, if the vote is not legislative, countries are less likely to have a 
national interest at stake, thus are more incline to tow the EPG line. 
“Rule” (dummy variable: 0 = simple majority; 1 = qualified majority) 
follows the same logic: when the vote is more important, there’s a 
higher chance that country-based votes emerge. “Budget” (again a 
dummy variable), considering that “the European Parliament as a 
whole [is] more cohesive on budgetary issues” (Hix and Noury 2009: 
164), is expected to be negatively correlated with the DV: if all EPGs 
tend to be consensual rather than competitive in these votes, then 
national alignments are less likely to arise. “Top 5 committees” is a 
dummy variables coded 1 if the vote is relative to one of the five most 
important committees pinpointed by MEPs’ assistant in the July 2012 
survey: ECON, ITRE, ENVI, IMCO, AGRI. My expectation is that this 
variable is not only statistically significant, but it also has a substantial 
effect on the dependent variable53. This would represent also a 
confirmation that the information provided by MEPs’ assistants is 
reliable. Result (0 = rejected, 1 = approved) is included simply as a 
control variable. “Margin” is expected to have a negative effect on 
nationality prevails: the rationale is that the smaller the margin 
between “Yes” and “No” in a certain vote, the more contested the vote 
is, and I expect national alignments to be more likely to emerge when 
                                                
53 Actually, the committees in the 6th and 7th European Parliament were not exactly the 
same: two temporary committees (SURE and CRIS) were dismantled at the beginning of 
the current legislature, as noted before, and a new committee (CRIM) was established in 
2012. But none of these committees was mentioned by MEPs’ assistants as the most 
important ones, which constitutes the rationale of the variable. Thus, it is not problematic 
to “retroactively” extend some information drawn from the 7th EP to a statistical analysis 
performed on RCVs cast in the previous European legislature. 
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votes are controversial. “Size” is included to control for the fact that 
bigger member states may be more likely to show a statistical influence 
on the dependent variable simply because they elect more MEPs.  
Finally, a variable called “enlargement” (dummy: 0 = EU15, 1 = eastern 
countries + Malta, Cyprus) is included to see if the 12 countries that 
recently joined the EU show different parliamentary behaviour in 
respect to the EU15 countries. The literature on voting behaviour before 
and after the eastern enlargement argues, in short, either that these new 
member states are not yet completely “socialized” to the dynamics of 
the EP, thus their MEPs are slightly less prone to follow the EPG but 
this variance is practically negligible (Hix and Noury 2009) or that the 
enlargement had no effect at all in terms of legislators’ policy 
preferences and their revealed behaviour (Bressanelli 2012; Costello et 
al. 2012; McElroy and Benoit 2012). In light of this, I expect this variable 
to have a consistent effect to these assumptions: either being non 
significant, or having a slight positive effect. 
Two variables are categorical (Euro country, euro group), so they are 
transformed into dummies with the appropriate STATA command; 
two are continuous (margin, size); all others are dummy variables. The 
basic statistics of these variables are presented in the appendix in table 
a5. Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable, a logistic 
regression is run. Three different models are tested separately; after 
running the regression, the margins are further elaborated to have 
substantially comparable coefficients54. Results of the logistic regression 











                                                
54 The STATA command used is the following: margins, dyd(*) 
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Table 13. When nationality prevails, 2004-2009: logistic regression. 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Slovenia -1.480*** -1.444***
DV: nationality prevails (0.0596) (0.0595)
Italy . . Luxembourg-0.351*** -0.421***
. . (0.0401) (0.0399)
Germany -0.728*** -0.806*** Finland -0.264*** -0.389***
(0.0157) (0.0153) (0.0270) (0.0268)
Sweden 0.932*** 0.979*** Estonia -0.625*** -0.756***
(0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0464) (0.0463)
Greece 0.546*** 0.561*** EPP-ED . .
(0.0169) (0.0165) . .
Portugal -0.757*** -0.857*** SOC -0.421*** -0.424***
(0.0266) (0.0263) (0.00774) (0.00750)   
UK 0.719*** 0.774*** ALDE -0.306*** -0.250***
(0.0128) (0.0122) (0.0100) (0.00950)   
France 0.337*** 0.235*** UEN 0.256*** 0.400***
(0.0137) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.0112)   
Spain -0.460*** -0.532*** G/EFA -1.115*** -1.128***
(0.0177) (0.0173) (0.0190) (0.0188)   
Romania -1.224*** -1.251*** EUL/NGL -0.570*** -0.409***
(0.0338) (0.0336) (0.0151) (0.0147)   
Hungary -0.191*** -0.171*** IND/DEM 0.820*** 1.295***
(0.0206) (0.0203) (0.0113) (0.0108)   
Slovakia -1.232*** -1.157*** Budget -0.0694*** -0.0687*** -0.0570***
(0.0411) (0.0409) (0.0180) (0.0179) (0.0179)   
Belgium -0.101*** -0.239*** Legislative 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.238***
(0.0220) (0.0218) (0.00647) (0.00644) (0.00643)   
Cyprus -0.236*** -0.307*** Rule 0.0700*** 0.0715*** 0.0741***
(0.0413) (0.0411) (0.0104) (0.0104) (0.0104)   
Latvia 0.109*** 0.274*** Top 5 comm.0.0146** 0.0139** 0.0128** 
(0.0259) (0.0255) (0.00645) (0.00642) (0.00641)   
Lithuania -0.286*** -0.289*** Result 0.00961 0.00754 0.00890   
(0.0280) (0.0277) (0.00601) (0.00598) (0.00597)   
Malta 0.203*** 0.146*** Margin -0.00290*** -0.00287*** -0.00288***
(0.0356) (0.0354) (0.0000160) (0.0000159) (0.0000159)   
Denmark 0.643*** 0.616*** Size -0.00304***
(0.0192) (0.0188) (0.000101)   
Ireland 0.392*** 0.659*** Enlargment -0.352***
(0.0196) (0.0194) (0.00748)   
Bulgaria -1.242*** -1.311*** _cons -2.328*** -2.499*** -2.067***
(0.0481) (0.0479) (0.0125) (0.0116) (0.00949)   
Netherlands0.246*** 0.215***
(0.0173) (0.0169) r2
Poland -0.0345** 0.223*** chi2 96177.7 79868.2 64980.6   
(0.0144) (0.0140) F
Czech Rep. 0.739*** 0.795*** N 3207960 3207960 3206924
(0.0160) (0.0154)
Austria -0.123*** -0.250*** Standard errors in parentheses
(0.0239) (0.0236) * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Model 1 is the complete regression with all the independent variables, 
excluding “Size” and “Enlargement” that showed collinearity problems 
with the country dummies. Model 2 excludes the EPG dummies, while 
model 3 excludes the country dummies and includes the 
aforementioned two country-related variables. The three models show 
little difference both in terms of substantial effect of coefficients and of 
statistical significance. Pseudo-R2 of model 1 is, as expected, the 
highest of the three models. 
 
5.5.2. Results discussion 
First of all, it can be noted that, as expected, all EPGs are statistically 
significant at 99% confidence interval, and their substantial effects are 
consistent to the generally acknowledged cohesion of the groups: the 
two euro-sceptic groups have positive coefficients (which means that 
being part of these groups increases the likelihood of a national 
prevailing), while the others have positive coefficients. 
Secondly, country dummies show in the majority of cases negative 
coefficients, which means that a certain member state’s MEPs are less 
incline to vote together with their countrymen at the expenses of their 
EPG. But for some countries the coefficients are positive: from the 
highest to the lowest coefficients, Sweden, Czech Republic, UK, 
Denmark, and to a smaller degree Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Malta. 
These results are consistent with the common perception of euro-
scepticism in EU countries, as shown extensively by Eurobarometer 
surveys. This is a surprising and interesting result, that confirms what 
the basic descriptive statistics of previous paragraph anticipated; 
however, it was  unexpected in terms of the hypotheses associated to 
my theory: more euro-sceptical countries are more likely to show 
national alignments. This result actually contributes to fill a gap in the 
current literature that, as explained beforehand, usually looks at AI 
scores, incurring in methodological problems55. For instance, Hix et al. 
have simply recognized this conundrum – incidentally, in a footnote – 
without deepening the analysis: “Interestingly, one of the most 
                                                
55 For instance and as discussed in chapter 3, if a small country elects MEPs that sit in 
only two politically close EPGs, its national AI is certainly over-estimated. On the 
contrary, a big member state like the UK for the 2004-4009 legislature elected members 
for all groups (except one, UEN) and in addition to that its members sitting in the 
EPP/ED group belong to different national parties and political families, leading to 
different behaviour. So, AI calculated by nationality in this case would be lower than the 
one of the aforementioned small state: but this does not certainly mean that in the UK 
national-based votes are less frequent. 
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‘Eurosceptic’ member-states, the United Kingdom, has the lowest level 
of nation-based voting among its MEPs” (Hix and Noury 2009: 173). 
This is because their analysis was based on AI scores: but if we look at 
national alignments, UK’s position gets completely reversed. UK, from 
a country with low nation-based cohesion (Hix and Noury 2009) 
becomes one of the countries with the highest number of national 
alignments (current analysis). However, it has to be noted that this 
alternative approach to analyse voting behaviour is not free from flaws, 
besides – obviously – hiding variation among individual votes by 
aggregating. Specifically, already whenever only 51% of the MEPs from 
a given party group or national delegation vote together, the vote is 
classified as a party group vote or a national vote; this actually 
disregards a lot of the variation that the Agreement Index does capture. 
However, it represents at least an alternative approach that, 
complementarily with the use of the classical indexes, may shed light 
on meaningful dynamics such as the one presented above, regarding 
British MEPs’ voting behaviour. 
Thirdly, the analysis of the other variables shows noteworthy results. 
“Budget”, in line with my expectations, is statistically significant but 
with negative coefficients, which means that a national prevailing is 
less likely to arise when there is a budgetary vote (even if with a 
substantively small effect). “Legislative”, again as expected, is 
statistically significant, positively correlated with the dependent 
variable and has a consistent substantial effect: when the vote is 
legislative there’s a substantially greater likelihood that an MEP votes 
according to his/her national colleagues and against the line of his/her 
EPG. This confirms my theory according to which it’s in the most 
important votes that such deviant behaviours are more likely to 
emerge. “Rule” and “Top 5 committees” display statistical significance 
with positive coefficient; the former at a 99% confidence interval, the 
latter at 95%. This is consistent to our expectations, even though the 
substantial effect of the variable that controls for the five main 
committees and its statistical significance is actually smaller than 
expected. The reason is the inclusion in the five main committees of 
ECON. This committee, as discussed in chapter 4, showed an actual 
higher cohesion by group than by country: thus, it contributes to keep 
the estimates for “Top 5 committees” low. “Result” is unsurprisingly 
non-significant, not even in the 10% confidence interval: rather, a 
statistical significance would have been difficult to explain. In fact, 
national alignments are not expected to emerge more likely to when 
the motion or legislation under scrutiny gets approved instead of 
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rejected. In some cases countries act unite to block them, in others to 
support them. It depends if the object of the vote endangers or benefits 
a national interest.56. 
The last three variables are all statistically significant at 99% confidence 
interval and negatively correlated with my dependent variable. 
“Margin” is consistent with my expectations: the bigger the margin 
between “Yes” and “No” votes, the less the probability of MEPs voting 
against their EPGs and together with their homeland colleagues. In 
other words, if the margin is thin, the vote is more likely to entail 
controversial issues. And if a vote is controversial, votes that follow 
national majorities instead of EPG lines are more likely to emerge. The 
substantially small coefficient are unsurprising since, as shown in table 
6, this variable has a much different range of values in respect to all the 
other dummy variables. “Size”, included as a control variable, has a 
surprising negative effect: the envisaged concern was that bigger 
countries could be positively biased towards the dependent variable 
since, the more MEPs elected, the higher the chance of voting in that 
way. But actually, it is being part of countries with a smaller 
parliamentary delegation that makes it more likely to vote together 
with the country line and against the party line. Finally, the last 
variable, “enlargement”, has also a counter-intuitive effect that 
partially disconfirms the current literature on eastern Europe countries’ 
voting behaviour: MEPs coming from countries that just joined the EU 
are actually less likely to vote along national lines and against EPG 
lines. 
However, it is still unclear if this depends entirely on the greater 
reliability of my original approach (looking at actual contrasts between 
country and EPG lines instead of the classical AI scores calculated by 
country) or, as Hix et al. state when looking at the first two years of the 
6th EP (2004-2006): “[there is] a tendency among MEPs from the new 
member-states from Central and Eastern Europe to vote slightly more 
along national lines than do the MEPs from the original 15 member-
states. [But] party cohesion may be lower in the first few months of any 
European Parliament, while the MEPs gradually sort themselves into 
political groups and decide how to behave in relation to their political-
group whips and leaders. By the end of the Sixth Parliament, the effect 
of the initial learning period on the average measures of cohesion 
                                                
56 This is comforting, especially considering that when the number of observation is so 
high (more than three million) and the regression type is logistic, variables “tend” to be 
statistically significant.	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should be smaller” (Hix and Noury 2009: 172-173). Not only it became 
smaller: it actually overcame old member states’ MEPs. 
 
5.6. Conclusions 
The previous empirical chapters have shown that, despite being 
generally cohesive, party groups show recurrent and strong deviations, 
and that these exceptions have different patterns in EP’s main 
committees. The suggestion, based on the theoretical framework 
previously defined, indicates that national affiliation may be a stronger 
determinant of vote than how it is generally depicted in the literature, 
albeit hidden in the myriad of votes cast in each voting session. Here, 
we have turned the attention to the actual cases when MEPs decide to 
vote together with their fellow countrymen, despite this implies an 
open contrast with the plurality of the group they belong to. 
After having operationalized the concept of “national alignment”, I 
have firstly performed a simple statistical description of these 
alignments for the sixth European Parliament, finding firstly (and 
trivially) that the two euro-sceptic groups are, as expected, the party 
groups where MEPs are more likely to disregard the party line in order 
to pursue a national line. Among the bigger, generally pro-EU group, 
however, the findings for Socialists and People’s party diverge 
substantially, partially because to the ideological heterogeneity of the 
latter group in the sixth EP due to the presence of the ED conservatives. 
Secondly, I found that countries with a tradition of euro-scepticism 
generally are more likely to show these alignments. However bigger 
countries, electing MEPs that belong to more EPGs do not present – 
contrarily to what one may think – a higher share of these alignments. 
UK, in my analysis, is the “champion” of national alignments, whereas 
the classic literature relying on AI as the only index of voting 
behaviour had failed to identify this behaviour (Hix and Noury 2009). 
Thirdly, my results show that these alignments tend to be concentrated 
in the more important, legislative committees, corroborating what I 
argued in chapter 4, especially for the AGRI committee. However 
AFET committee, in contrast to my expectations but consistently to part 
of the literature (Whitaker 2011), shows surprising results. 
Then, I performed a simple logistic regression to establish if a series of 
variables have a positive influence on the likelihood of national 
alignments emerging in the vote. In this regards, national alignments 
are more likely if: the vote is cast in one of the main five committees 
pinpointed by MEPs’ assistant survey; the vote is legislative (thus, 
more important); the margin between “Yes” and “No” is thinner, 
expectedly indicating a more controversial issues where there is no 
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“grand coalition” between the bigger groups; the vote is not budgetary 
issue. Finally, this regression proved that these alignments are not 
more likely to emerge in bigger country delegation, or in countries 
belonging to the recent eastwards enlargement, partially disconfirming 
the already florid literature that argues that eastern MEPs’ behaviour is 
substantially equivalent to those of the old member states (Hix and 
Noury 2009; Costello et al. 2012; McElroy and Benoit 2012; Bressanelli 
2012). 
Clearly, this does not imply that national affiliation is generally a 
stronger determinant of vote than party group membership: however, 
these findings show that this may be true in a minority of cases in 





From survey to votes: a comparison between MEPs’ 
preferences and behaviour 
 
 
“In casting apparently partisan votes, do individual legislators vote with 
fellow party members ‘in spite of their disagreement’ about the policy in 
question, or do they vote with fellow party members ‘because of their 
agreement’ about the policy in question?” 





The model presented in this chapter is structured as follows. First, I 
have developed an original dataset of virtual votes based on survey 
data – i.e. expressed preferences – and compared the results with real 
votes (RCVs) in the same time span. In this way it is possible to see the 
extent to which these two dimensions coincide, or diverge. Then an 
additional comparison is made between cohesion of these “survey-
based votes” calculated by party group and by member state: this 
sheds light on how political preferences and national affiliation, not 
mediated by (weak?) party discipline, exert an effect on MEPs’ 
behaviour. Many scholars used approaches that involve combinations 
of policy preferences and voting behaviour to investigate the dynamics 
of legislative assemblies such as the European Parliament (among 
others Thomassen et al. 2004, Bressanelli 2012). However, the specific 
rationale behind this model, namely the idea of comparing directly 
MEPs’ survey preferences and their revealed behaviour, comes from 
Gabel et al. (2008). But while these scholars used survey data to build a 
visual representation of MEPs’ preferences, the original idea of this 
study is to transform survey answers into a sort of “virtual votes” and 
use the same Agreement Index57 to compare RCVs and virtual votes. In 
this way it is possible to test through voting cohesiveness if the national 
                                                
57 For a complete definition of the Agreement Index (AI) and the explanation of how it is 
calculated see chapter 3. 
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element is a weak predictor of “vote”, even though this vote is 
dependent upon exogenous preferences and not mediated by party 
discipline. 
 
6.2. Theoretical approach 
Voting in parliaments is one of the crucial activities of the democratic 
process. Votes in parliament determine legislative outcomes, and how 
members of a parliament vote is also relevant to normative and 
positive concerns about representation, as we have discussed in 
chapter 2. “On the normative side, legislative behaviour is central to 
representation and accountability in democracies. Legislative 
behaviour is one of the most prominent activities of elected 
representatives” (Gabel et al. 2004: 8). 
For these reason, parties often attempt to organize and influence 
legislative behaviour, and there are strong theoretical reasons to believe 
that legislative institutions at large (and especially political parties) 
have a powerful influence on legislative outcomes by shaping how 
legislators’ personal preferences over policies translate into revealed 
legislative behaviour and, ultimately, policy outcomes. For example, as 
division-of-labour organisations, legislative parties reduce information 
and transactions costs for individual legislators, but also constrain the 
choices of “backbench” members by restricting the legislative agenda 
(Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005). Yet, estimating the 
impact of legislative parties on legislative behaviour is not a simple 
task. For instance, Krehbiel (1993) points out that if one observes that 
the members of a party vote in a cohesive way, one does not know 
whether this is because the party has enforced disciplined voting or 
because the party members share the same preferences on the issue of 
the vote (Gabel et al. 2004: 2). 
To sum up, the exogenous preferences of each legislator (in our case, 
Members of the European Parliament) appear shaped by both strategic 
and institutional factors (primarily, party discipline) as they define 
legislators’ voting behaviour, as shown in figure 9. As discussed in 
chapter 2, the predominance of MEPs’ (homogenous) preferences or 






Figure 10. MEPs’ preference and behaviour in the legislative process. 
 
Source: Gabel and Hix (2007). 
 
Existing research, as extensively discussed, has found that parties in 
the European Parliament have become increasingly cohesive in their 
recorded voting behaviour. In terms of explaining the source of this 
cohesion, though, scholars disagree, offering several explanations: e.g., 
the strategic behaviour of national parties, growing preference 
homogeneity within the parties, and the control of the European 
parties over the legislative agenda of the European Parliament 
(especially Hix 2002; Hix et al. 2007)58. However, two main explanatory 
factors can be pinpointed: either policy preference homogeneity (Hix 
and Lord 1997, Kreppel 2002) or party discipline enforcement (Noury 
et al. 2002, Hix et al. 2007, 2009). 
All of these studies, on the other hand, lacked observations on the 
relevant counterfactual for testing their explanations for the observed 
cohesion: i.e., they could not observe how the individual MEPs would 
have voted in the absence of national party and European party 
influence (Gabel and Hix 2007: 3). This is exactly what is sought in this 
chapter: isolating MEPs’ ideal voting behaviour by looking at 
preferences allows to look at a sort of “virtual voting behaviour” free of 
institutional and strategic constraints from both MEPs’ principals. 
 
                                                
58 For an extensive dissertation of the literature on intra-party cohesion in the European 
Parliament see chapter 2. 
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6.3. Hypotheses verification 
First of all, as a note of caution it is necessary to underline how the 
model presented in this chapter does not have the presumption to 
explain actual voting behaviour in RCVs. Rather, the intention is to 
show that preferences and behaviour, disaggregated and analysed by 
EPG membership and national affiliation, contribute to give additional 
insights on how these two elements are intertwined. In particular, 
different arguments may be elaborated in case MEPs show a 
substantially different behaviour in virtual votes and actual votes: one 
could argue that MEPs would be less cohesive if they could vote 
according to their preferences, but party discipline forces them to vote 
accordingly to the party line; or, that MEPs’ discrepancy between these 
two votes actually emerges in non-RCVs, where EPGs have no mean of 
controlling their revealed behaviour. Both arguments assume that a 
“whip effect” exists in the EP. In any case, a dubstantial difference in 
these votes would mean, for sure, that EPGs’ policy preference is not 
that homogenous. 
The hypotheses, formulated in chapter 2, that are tested through this 
model are H4 and H6 and their related sub-hypotheses, formulated in 
chapter 2 as follows: 
H4: MEPs tend to vote differently if the vote is secret or a public RCV 
H4a: national affiliation is a stronger determinant of votes in non-
RCVs than in RCVs 
H4b: conversely, EPGs are less cohesive in non-RCVs 
H6: MEPs’ nationality influences how he/she deals with classical political 
issues that refer to the L/R cleavage 
H6a: Major social, economic, cultural or regulatory differences of 
MEPs’ opinion may determine deviations from party group line 
 
6.4. Methodology 
In order to build the dataset of “virtual votes” the data from the 2006 
and 2010 EPRG MEPs’ survey, led by Farrell et al., are used59. The 
choice of two dataset is justified by the opportunity to confront two 
different, yet recent, European Parliament (sixth and seventh), as it is 
done in chapter 3. This allows us to test if the findings for EP6 are 
confirmed in the subsequent EP7, or differences arise. Question 6.4 
                                                
59 Further information on these surveys can be found in chapter 4. 
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(formulated in the exact same way for both 2006 and 2010 survey) is 
chosen, as it captures MEPs’ attitudes towards different issues that can 
help position the legislator’s preferences on a variety of topics that 
cover economic matters, social welfare and taxes, crime, immigration 
and women’s rights. The question was presented as follows: 
“To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements?” 
Then, the following eight statements are proposed: 
1. Greater effort should be made to reduce inequality of income. 
2. Tougher action should be taken against criminals. 
3. Government should play a greater role in managing the economy. 
4. Current welfare spending should be maintained, even if it means 
raising taxes. 
5. The use of marijuana should be decriminalised. 
6. It is more important to reduce inflation than to reduce 
unemployment. 
7. There should be fewer restrictions on immigration. 
8. Women should be free to decide for themselves on abortion. 
For each statement, the respondent is asked to give a grade, using the 
classical 5-point-scale (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, strongly disagree). All the answers to this question then are 
transformed into “virtual” votes, as if there have been a bill proposing 
the content of the statement, for which each MEP can vote yes, no or 
abstain according to his preferences. To create this fictional dataset of 
votes the following rule is used: if a MEP agrees with the statement 
(either strongly or not), a Yea vote is input; if he/she neither agrees nor 
disagrees, an Abstention vote is input; if he/she disagrees or strongly 
disagrees, a Nay vote is input. However, as none of the statements of 
question 6.4 covers issues related to European Integration, another 
question from the survey is included. The question added to the 
dataset is question 6.5 (again, formulated in the exact same way for 
both 2006 and 2010 survey): 
“Where would you place yourself on the question of the European 
Integration?” 
In this case, the answer option in the EPRG survey was operationalized 
differently in 2006 and 2010. In 2006 it was a 10-point-scale, ranging 
from 1 (European Integration has gone too far) to 10 (the EU should 
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become a federal state immediately). In 2010, however, it was recoded 
as a 11-point-scale, ranging from 0 (European Integration has gone too 
far) to 10 (the EU should become a federal state immediately). The 
answers to this question are transformed into virtual votes as follows: 
for 2006 data, the four values from 1 to 4 are considered Nay votes 
(towards further European Integration); values 5 and 6 are considered 
an Abstention vote; finally, the four values from 7 to 10 are considered 
Yea votes. For 2010, values from 0 to 4 are considered Nay votes 
(towards further European Integration); value 5 is considered an 
Abstention vote; finally, values from 6 to 10 are considered Yea votes60. 
For each participating MEP I have created nine virtual votes, one for 
each issue. Virtually, for 2006 it represents a dataset of 270 MEPs voting 
nine times on different issues, resulting in 2430 “virtual votes”; for 
2010, a dataset of 270 MEPs voting nine times, resulting in 2448 votes. 
Before proceeding, a further methodological clarification is needed. 
Since one of the main problems of looking solely at RCVs is the fact 
that this sample is non-representative, and one may argue that the 
proposed method does not produce substantial quantitative 
improvements over the selection bias problem. This may be true, 
however, with a crucial qualitative difference. If the problem of RCVs 
is that there is a correlation between the type of vote and party 
cohesiveness (because RCVs are requested for reasons that are 
correlated to this aspect, thus leading to selection bias), this does not 
hold when it comes to survey data. In other words, one can expect 
MEPs to shift from their ideal vote in order to comply with party line; 
but there is no such correlation when a MEP is expressing his/her 
opinion in an anonymous survey. The original dataset is incomplete, 
but it does not suffer from endogeneity problems. 
Then, I have applied the Agreement Index to the new “virtual votes” 
and compared it to the results available in the literature. In particular, 
as stated in the introduction I have conducted two kinds of 
comparison: 
a. Survey-based EPG cohesion compared to survey-based cohesion by 
national affiliation; 
b. RCV- based EPG cohesion compared to survey-based EPG cohesion.  
                                                
60 Since this is a symmetric scale with a easily acknowledgeable “centre”, the fact that for 
2010 only one possible answer (5) is recoded as an abstention while five possible options 
(0-1-2-3-4 and 6-7-8-9-10) are recoded as yea/nay should not represent a methodological 
problem vis-à-vis the fact that, for 2006, two possible options (5-6) are recoded as 
abstentions, while four possible options (1-2-3-4 and 7-8-9-10) are recoded as yea/nay. 
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Since the dataset was built from the 2006 and 2010 surveys that 
investigated the current, seventh EP legislature elected in 2009 and the 
previous one, elected in 2004 and dismantled in 2009, the RCVs used in 
these cases are the corresponding ones. Thus, for the 2006 survey-to-
votes, all the RCVs cast in the sixth European legislature (EP6) are 
considered, roughly 6200 votes. For the 2010 survey-to-votes, all the 
cast in the first four years of the subsequent European legislature (2009-
2013) are considered, roughly 4000 votes61. 
First, I have compared the degree of absolute cohesion by groups, for 
both RCVs and survey-based data. It would not be reasonable to expect 
cohesion “by preference” to match exactly cohesion “by RCVs”, given 
the direct impact of the aforementioned other factors (strategic voting 
and party discipline, for how weak it can be, above all); however, since 
EPGs are considered by part of the literature, as stated before, 
politically homogenous entities, this variation should not be 
substantial.  
Second, I have calculated the degree of cohesion in these survey-to-
votes by national affiliation and compared it to those of EPGs. If, as the 
mainstream literature states, the ideological dimension of the EP is 
more relevant than the national affiliation of MEPs, I should expect this 
index to be higher for the grouping by EPG than by nationality. It is 
worth stressing again that here preferences are under discussion, while 
the aforementioned scholars refer to actual voting. However, the same 
authors and other scholars also claim that the EP is much more a 
political-oriented than a national-oriented environment. In this respect, 
if preferences by EPG are compared to preferences by nationality, the 
former should be expected to play a more important role, because 
respondents of from the same country come from different parties (and 
often opposed on the left/right continuum), with the only element in 
common of sharing the same country of origin. 
 
6.5. Results discussion 
To sum up, according to the mainstream literature  EPGs are cohesive 
group; this cohesion is expected to be either a primary consequence of 
common preferences while slightly strengthened by weak party 
discipline (Kreppel 2002), or a main consequence of high party 
discipline that “whips” members of the groups (Npury et al. 2002; Hix 
                                                
61 Here, the fact that the RCVs on which the analysis is based is composed of a different 
number of votes cannot result a bias, since the AI used in this chapter is calculated as the 
mean of the votes cast. 
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et al 2003a, 2005, 2006, 2007). In any case, even in these “virtual votes” 
relying only on legislators’ preferences, party groups should not be too 
divided. It is worth noting, again, that the results from this original 
dataset do not necessarily give straightforward information of how 
MEPs vote in non-RCVs. In other words, these results do not have the 
ambition to represent a proxy of the universe of all the non-public and 
recorded votes cast in the EP. 
 
6.5.1. Comparing roll-call votes to survey data 
Nevertheless, the degree of variation between these two dataset shows 
surprising results62, as shown in figure 10, table 15 and table 16 (2006 
survey and EP6) and figure 11, table 17 and table 18 (2010 survey and 
EP7). 
 
Figure 11. Histogram of the comparison between AI cohesion scores of RCVs (EP6, 2004-
2009) and virtual votes obtained transforming survey data (2006 MEPs’ survey). 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Regarding the sixth European legislature, party groups would appear 
much less cohesive, if their members were to vote according to the 
                                                
62 The asterisk marks those groups with few observations (<10). For the 2006 survey, only 







G/EFA! SOC! ALDE! EPP-ED! EUL/NGL! UEN! IND/DEM! na*!
RCVs cohesion! survey-to-votes cohesion!
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preferences revealed in the survey (figure 10). The only exceptions 
appear to be the non-attached MEPs and the group Europe of 
Independence/Democracy, for which the two scores match almost 
perfectly. In fact, for this latter group, roll-call cohesion is actually 
marginally lower than survey-to-votes cohesion (-0.1). In particular, the 
analysis of the three larger groups (EPP-ED, Socialists and Liberals) 
reveals that the scores of the Liberals are those that differ the most. This 
may be a consequence of Liberals’ higher ideological heterogeneity, 
due to its composition of two different transnational parties. People’s 
party and European democrats, by contrast, are less divided (despite 
the presence of the British Conservatives), and the Socialist MEPs 
display more similar individual preferences if compared to the other 
two main groups. Conversely, more left-wing groups (Greens and 
Nordic left) and the conservative group of Union for Europe of Nations 
are the party groups that show a closer preference cohesion to actual, 
revealed, voting behaviour. Table 15 shows these differences. 
 
Table 14. AI cohesion: RCVs, virtual votes and difference (EP6, 2006 MEPs’ survey). 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
EPGs are ordered from the one that shows the greatest discrepancy 
between RCVs cohesion and survey-based cohesion (ALDE) to that that 
actually has a negative variance, the non-attached members, (for which, 
though, we have less interest in explaining their behaviour since they 
do not represent a coherent party group pursuing specific policy goals). 
Surprisingly, the order vaguely remembers (at least for the five bigger, 
generally pro-EU groups) the position of EPGs in a left-right 
continuum. Non-attached members, euro-sceptics and conservatives do 
not follow this trend. Liberals and people’s party members show a 
higher variation; according to this model; vice-versa, left-wing EPGs 
show preferences closer to their actual voting behaviour. These groups 
would still be less cohesive, but by a smaller margin (Socialists, G/EFA 
and EUL/NGL). 
RCVs cohesion survey-to-votes cohesion Difference
ALDE 0.89 0.35 0.54
EPP-ED 0.87 0.44 0.43
SOC 0.91 0.51 0.40
G/EFA 0.91 0.58 0.33
EUL/NGL 0.85 0.62 0.23
UEN 0.73 0.52 0.21
IND/DEM 0.46 0.46 0.00
na* 0.44 0.45 -0.01
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Table 16 shows the disaggregated AI scores for each question of the 
survey: in this way it is possible to pinpoint on which specific issue the 
groups appear less internally coherent, and if these results are 
consistent with their political composition. 
 
Table 15. Party group AI cohesion scores, disaggregated for each question of the survey 
converted into votes (2006 MEPs’ survey) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Firstly, the question “how much the State should regulate the 
economy”, and if “welfare spending should be maintained even if by 
means of raising taxes” show a clearly divided Liberal party group. Its 
values denote very high internal division: 0.07. Low cohesiveness can 
be found also regarding crime, unemployment and immigration. On 
the pro-EU question, however, they are internally cohesive (0.76), 
consistently to their traditional position of further European integration 
(especially on economic matters) as a mean to pursue neoliberal 
economics. EPP-ED, on the other hand, is mostly divided on the first 
question (“reduce inequality of incomes”), unemployment, abortion 
and pro-EU. This may be consequence, again, of the presence of the 
British, more euro-sceptical conservative MEPs. The Socialists are 
highly divided on the drugs question and, surprisingly, about 
immigration and EU integration63. But, consistently to their social-
democratic tradition, are cohesive on the first question about a possible 
redistribution of wealth to reduce inequalities, even it this means 
raising taxes. Without going into details for the other groups, an 
interesting distribution of results of the aforementioned question can 
be highlighted. Again, this question seem to show a clear divide: left-
wing parties (SOC, EUL/NGL, G/EFA) united in reducing inequalities 
                                                
63 Such result is surprising, considering the generally pro-further integration positions of 
this party group. 
Income Crime Ec. Gov. Welfare Drugs Unempl. Immigr. Abort. Pro-EU Mean
ALDE 0.43 0.21 0.46 0.07 0.07 0.21 0.23 0.72 0.76 0.35
EPP-ED 0.18 0.88 0.52 0.50 0.69 0.21 0.50 0.26 0.24 0.44
G/EFA 0.73 0.25 0.32 0.73 0.45 0.45 1.00 1.00 0.32 0.58
EUL/NGL 1.00 0.18 0.86 0.73 0.05 0.86 0.59 1.00 0.32 0.62
IND/DEM 0.36 0.57 0.36 0.14 0.79 0.25 0.57 0.36 0.79 0.46
SOC 0.92 0.45 0.42 0.58 0.08 0.56 0.26 0.95 0.36 0.51
UEN 0.33 0.83 0.17 0.17 1.00 0.33 0.83 0.50 0.50 0.52
na* 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.25 0.75 0.10 0.75 0.25 0.50 0.46
All EPGs 0.49
 93 
(respectively 0.92, 0.73 and 1.00) while centre, conservative and right-
wing parties are more divided. 
Moving on to analyse the results for the following, seventh European 
legislature RCVs compared to 2010 MEPs’ survey, the general picture 
does not change substantially, as it is can be seen in figure 11. 
 
Figure 12. Histogram of the comparison between AI cohesion scores of RCVs (EP7, 2009-
2013) and virtual votes obtained transforming survey data (2010 MEPs’ survey). 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Non-attached and euro-sceptics remain the less discrepant groups in 
terms of preferences and behaviour; Liberals, People’s party and the 
European conservatives and reformists, finally “free” from their 
problematic co-existence with the People’s party, are the groups that 
show the highest difference. EUL/NGL actually increase their 
congruence between preferences and behaviour; greens and socialists 
roughly maintain the same result of 2006/sixth EP. Table 15 shows 
these differences, again with party groups ordered from the most 











G/EFA! S&D! EPP! ALDE! ECR! EUL/NGL*! EFD! na*!
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Table 16. AI cohesion: RCVs, virtual votes and difference (EP7, 2010 MEPs’ survey). 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
Here, the resemblance of this ordering to the right-to-left political 
spectrum is even more evident (still, excluding the euro-sceptic EFD 
group). People’s party, liberals and conservatives show farther 
preferences from their behaviour (between 0.60 and 0.55); Vice-versa, 
left-wing EPGs show closer preferences: these groups would still be 
less cohesive, but by a smaller margin  (G/EFA and S&D: 0.38 and 0.37, 
respectively) or by a practically negligible margin (EUL/NGL: 0.12). 
Table 16 shows the disaggregated AI scores for each question of the 
survey. 
 
Table 17. Party group AI cohesion scores, disaggregated for each question of the survey 
converted into votes (2010 MEPs’ survey) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
The results do not change substantially. The first question still provides 
a clear definition between “right-wing” ALDE, EFD, ECR and EPP 
showing high division (values comprises between 0.10 and 0.23) and 
“left-wing” S&D, greens and EUL/NGL showing low division (0.84, 
RCVs cohesion Survey-to-votes cohesion Difference
EPP 0.93 0.33 0.60
ALDE 0.90 0.32 0.58
ECR 0.88 0.33 0.55
G/EFA 0.96 0.58 0.38
S&D 0.93 0.56 0.37
EUL/NGL* 0.83 0.71 0.12
EFD 0.49 0.38 0.11
na* 0.42 0.33 0.09
Income Crime Ec. Gov. Welfare Drugs Unempl. Immigr. Abort. Pro-EU Mean
ALDE 0.22 0.56 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.04 0.10 0.76 0.88 0.32
ECR 0.14 0.79 0.14 0.36 0.57 0.14 0.57 0.14 0.14 0.33
EFD 0.10 1.00 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.25 0.83 0.10 0.50 0.38
EPP 0.23 0.64 0.03 0.06 0.64 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.90 0.33
G/EFA 0.89 0.14 0.46 0.68 0.36 0.46 0.57 0.79 0.88 0.58
EUL/NGL* 1.00 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.25 1.00 0.25 0.71
S&D 0.84 0.28 0.53 0.72 0.16 0.63 0.22 0.81 0.87 0.56
na* 0.10 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.33
All EPGs 0.44
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0.89 and even 1.00, complete cohesion, for EUL/NGL members64). 
Groups tend to be divided/cohesive on the same issues of the previous 
time span. A noticeable difference that is worth noting, though, is 
behaviour of EPP and S&D on the pro-EU question. Both groups 
substantially increased their score (from 0.36 to 0.87 and from 0.24 to 
0.90, respectively); if for the People’s party this can be explained by the 
absence of the British conservatives, traditionally more euro-sceptics, 
for the S&D group there is no clear-cut explanation65. 
Surprisingly, my findings suggest that despite being part of the same 
parliamentary group, MEPs from different member states show 
different attitudes towards these issues (as defined by their 
preferences). If they were to vote according to these preferences they 
would be members of strongly divided groups. 
 
6.5.2. Comparing survey-to-votes by party group and nationality 
Now, the attention is turned to the calculation of this survey-to-votes 
cohesion by member states, instead of EPGs. One should expect this 
cohesion index calculated by national affiliation to be on average lower 
than the one calculated by EPG: not only there is a lack of a “whip” 
(whether weak or strong), these MEPs also come from different (often 
opposed on the left-right spectrum) political groups. They only element 
they have in common is their national affiliation. However, the data 






                                                
64 Tis value should be taken cautiously, though, because in the 2010 survey only a few 
MEPs from this party group replied to the questionnaire (ten, coming from – at least – six 
different countries: France, Sweden, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany and Cyprus), as 
it can be seen in table a2 of the appendix. Still, even focusing only on the bigger groups 
with a substantive number of observations the results are quite straightforward: left 
groups less discrepant, centre-right groups more discrepant. 
65 It is also worth remembering that these questions were formulated in 2006 and 2010 
using two different scales (10-point and 11-point), thus leading to a different formula for 
recoding them into virtual votes. 
66 The asterisk marks those states for which there are few observations available (<10): the 
double asterisk those with too few observations available (<5), so they were treated as 
missing values. 
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Table 18. AI cohesiveness scores by member state, survey-to-votes (2006 MEPs’ survey) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
As in the previous paragraph, data analysis starts from 2006 survey. 
On average, cohesiveness by member state is not as low as expected. If 
we compare mean score for all EPGs with the one calculated for all 
countries, we see that the two result are almost equal (party groups 
have a 0.49 cohesion, vis-à-vis a 0.47 cohesion by country). A closer 
look at these results with the ones in the previous tables shows how, 
for instance, a discrete number of states (Sweden, France, Austria, 
Belgium, Latvia, Italy, Ireland) display a higher cohesiveness than the 
mean of EPGs. Or, surprisingly, all states except the UK show a higher 
cohesion than the most preference/behaviour discrepant party group, 
namely the Liberals. In absolute terms, cohesiveness by national 
affiliation ranges from 0.29 (UK) and 0.37 (Poland), the lowest values, 
to 0.58 (Latvia), the most cohesive country in the sample67. In the light 
                                                
67 Only four Latvian MEPs coming from EUL/NGL and UEN participated to the survey: 
even though these two groups are not certainly politically homogenous, this high 
 
Income Crime Ec. Gov. Welfare Drugs Unempl. Immigr. Abort. Pro-EU Mean
Austria* 0.40 1.00 0.40 0.40 1.00 0.10 0.63 0.40 0.40 0.53
Belgium 0.83 0.83 0.33 0.06 0.83 0.44 0.25 0.57 0.50 0.52
Cyprus**
Czech Rep. 0.33 0.83 0.33 0.33 0.17 0.50 0.33 0.83 0.00 0.41
Denmark 0.40 0.40 0.25 0.40 0.40 0.70 0.10 1.00 0.40 0.45
Estonia**
Finland 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.70 1.00 0.70 0.50
France 0.84 0.25 0.53 0.45 0.29 0.61 0.17 1.00 0.53 0.52
Germany 0.08 0.6 0.37 0.42 0.65 0.31 0.37 0.25 0.48 0.39
Greece**
Hungary**
Ireland* 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.63 0.25 1.00 0.25 0.25 0.50 0.49
Italy 0.81 0.72 0.40 0.72 0.34 0.25 0.16 0.63 0.38 0.49




Netherlands 0.14 0.79 0.36 0.36 0.79 0.50 0.36 0.79 0.36 0.49
Poland 0.13 0.84 0.33 0.25 0.67 0.21 0.37 0.13 0.40 0.37
Portugal 0.79 0.75 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.57 0.14 0.79 0.50 0.46
Slovakia**
Slovenia**
Spain 0.75 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.50 0.25 1.00 0.40 0.43
Sweden 0.83 0.33 0.25 0.17 1.00 0.06 1.00 1.00 0.33 0.55
UK 0.53 0.57 0.12 0.22 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.53 0.2 0.29
All countries 0.47
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of these results, it can be argued that if votes in the EP were cast 
according to MEPs’ preferences, those based on nationality and on 
ideological terms would be, on average, equally cohesively. Going 
further, it can also be claimed that nationality-based votes, on average, 
would be less cohesive than ideology-based votes cast by party groups 
belonging to the left side of the political spectrum; by contrast, 
nationality-based votes, on average, would be more cohesive than 
ideology-based votes cast by party groups belonging to the centre and 
right side of the political spectrum (with the exception of the United 
Kingdom). 
Closer consideration shows that many northern European countries, 
with consolidated tradition of human rights protection (Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, but also France, Spain and Latvia) score 1 when it 
comes to the question on abortion. This means that all the MEPs from 
these countries would “vote” united68, despite being member of 
different party groups. On the contrary, Poland, where abortion is one 
of the most controversial political issues, is the country where MEPs 
would be mostly divided (0.13). Also Germany and Austria, 
interestingly, are quite divided on the topic (0.25): generally EPP-ED 
members are divided between Nay and Abstention votes, while MEPs 
from other party groups are more in favour. Finally, a note is worth 
being made on the pro-EU question. The three countries where MEPs 
would vote with a high internal division are, as easily expected, three 
of the most euro-sceptic countries: Sweden, UK (again) and Czech 
Republic (respectively 0.33, 0.20 and 0.00, complete division). 
This country-based analysis, performed for the subsequent EP7, does 







                                                                                                       
cohesion may be the effect of the lack of the political heterogeneity of respondents 
coming from more political groups. So, these results should not be overstated. 
68 Clearly, a 1.00 score could be also the result of all MEPs from a certain member state 
virtually voting against (or abstaining) on such topic. But this is not the case: a crosscheck 
of the dataset showed how all these countries’ MEPs would either agree or completely 
agree on the statement about women free to decide for themselves on abortion. 
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Table 19. AI cohesiveness scores by member state, survey-to-votes (2010 MEPs’ survey) 
 
Source: author’s own compilation.  
 
The mean of all states remains exactly the same (0.47); thus, in 
comparison to the corresponding time span votes by party group 
(0.44), “virtual votes” by country actually become (albeit marginally) 
more cohesive. The least cohesive country remains the UK (0.31); the 
most cohesive is Portugal (0.71), but due to the few observations 
available, this result should be considered with caution. 
Two final remark are needed. First, in this dataset two new members 
become available (Bulgaria and Romania, still not EU members during 
the previous 2006 survey wave). They show, on the wave of the recent 
accession to the EU, a high pro-EU score (both 1.00), and on average are 
both over the mean of all countries (0.60 and 0.52 respectively). Second, 
the pro-EU question, on overall, shows substantially higher results for 
all states in 2010 in respect to 2006. This may be a result bias due to the 
aforementioned incongruence of the scale used in the two survey 
waves, leading to a different recoding as Yea/Nay/abstain. 
Income Crime Ec. Gov. Welfare Drugs Unempl. Immigr. Abort. Pro-EU Mean
Austria* 0.63 0.25 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.63 0.38
Belgium 0.70 0.70 1.00 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.10 1.00 1.00 0.60
Bulgaria 0.14 0.79 0.79 0.36 0.79 0.36 0.14 1.00 1.00 0.60
Cyprus
Czech Rep.* 0.10 0.70 0.10 0.40 0.40 0.70 0.10 0.40 0.25 0.35
Denmark 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.14 0.36 1.00 0.79 0.45
Estonia
Finland 1.00 0.40 0.70 0.70 0.10 0.40 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.60
France 0.73 0.59 0.45 0.32 0.05 0.73 0.18 0.86 0.86 0.53
Germany 0.17 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.25 0.17 0.25 0.42 1.00 0.30
Greece**
Hungary**
Ireland 0.79 0.57 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.57 0.14 0.14 1.00 0.48





Netherlands 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.40 0.70 0.40 0.40 0.70 0.25 0.42
Poland 0.13 0.63 0.25 0.13 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.31
Portugal* 1.00 0.63 0.25 0.63 0.25 1.00 1.00 0.63 1.00 0.71
Romania 0.45 0.73 0.18 0.32 0.59 0.18 0.45 0.73 1.00 0.52
Slovakia**
Slovenia**
Spain 0.79 0.36 0.79 0.57 0.14 0.36 0.14 0.57 1.00 0.52
Sweden 0.57 0.14 0.14 0.57 0.79 0.14 0.79 1.00 0.36 0.50




These results seem to define a picture that, again, is pretty distant from 
the mainstream claim that “the European Parliament is surprisingly 
like all other democratic parliaments”, where votes fall along the left-
right political cleavage, and “national affiliation is a weak predictor of 
how MEPs vote” (Hix et al. 2006: 509), at least in terms of individual 
preferences. This gives some information on how MEPs would actually 
vote if they were following their sheer preferences, which in turn can 
be useful to speculate on how MEPs can vote in non-RCVs. In case 
these two elements (preferences – behaviour) coincided, then EPGs 
would be truly politically homogenous entities, consistently to what 
parto of the literature says (Costello et al. 2012, Bressanelli 2012). The 
results, on the contrary, show that this policy preference congruence is 
not that high. Consequently, If EPGs are political entities capable of a 
strong “whip” on their members as part of the literature says, this 
means that MEPs would vote in a significantly different way from their 
colleagues – but party groups constrains them. However if, as 
recognized by other scholars of the literature, EPG party discipline is 
weak (Hix and Lord 1997; Raunio 1999; Kreppel 2002) because 
ultimately the main “principal” of MEPs are national parties (Faas 
2003), then MEPs probably vote more accordingly to their preferences. 
And if this does not emerge in RCVs, as shown, then these dynamics 
are likely to emerge in non-RCVs. 
To sum up, MEPs are representative legislator in regards to the 
European citizens (Bardi 2002), and on overall they share a certain 
policy preference homogeneity with their colleagues (Costello et al. 
2012); this in turn implies a high cohesion, that however can be either 
interpreted more as a consequence of this political homogeneity 
(Kreppel 2002) or more as a product of “Euro-whip” (Hix et a. 2007). 
My results show that this preference homogeneity is not that marked. 
This in turn can help speculating how MEPs vote in secret votes. In 
terms of external validity of this model, it has to be reminded this 
study has no ambition of explaining how MEPs actually vote. 
Nevertheless, since voting behaviour is not observable when vote is not 
held under the roll-call procedure, alternative methods have to be 
defined. In this respect, my main findings are that, surprisingly, 
national affiliation plays a greater role than the one usually attributed 
to it, at least in terms of individual preferences. The EP’s functioning, in 
terms of centrality of party groups and dimensions of politics, may be 
evolving towards the classical model of a democratic parliament, 






Deepening the knowledge of MEPs’ voting behaviour: 
qualitative insights from an original survey 
 
 
“Studying RCVs to draw inferences about MEP legislative voting behaviour 
is like inferring the amount of gang violence at night by observing well-lit 
street corners: the accuracy of observation may be high, but the observed 
behaviour may not be representative”  
(Carrubba and Gabel 1999: 4) 
 
“According to my interviewees, national affiliation plays a more significant 
role than is assumed by previous research. […] It is doubtful whether these 
findings would have become apparent without the use of qualitative 
interviews” 





The results presented in the previous empirical chapters give another 
hint in the direction that national affiliation has been overlooked by the 
mainstream literature. However, the empirical analysis of this 
dissertation is substantially based on roll-call votes (chapter 3), the only 
sample on which scholars of legislative assemblies are able to measure 
directly voting behaviour – even if these votes are critically “filtered” 
by qualitative data excerpted from MEPs’ assistant survey (chapter 4 
and 5) or integrated in an original way with information from MEPs’ 
available EPRG survey (chapter 6). 
The goal of this chapter is to further explore the central research 
question of this work, party group membership vis-à-vis national 
affiliation, and the potential set of problems concerning any voting 
behaviour analysis that focuses on RCVs. A literature review of the 
methodological debate that revolves around roll-call votes has already 
been performed in chapter 3. Here, an in-depth qualitative analysis the 
answers to some of the relevant questions included in the MEPs’ 
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assistant survey is performed. Then, a possible list of case studies of 
national interests versus party group lines is presented and briefly 
analysed, either still untouched by the existing literature or already 
investigated, albeit with no clear-cut conclusion (for instance, the 
Takeover Directive) 
 
7.3. Hypotheses verification 
The deepening of various questions concerning MEPs’ voting 
behaviour does not constitute a proper, empirical hypotheses 
verifications. Rather, it represents an attempt to further reinforce the 
previous tests concerning the following main hypotheses, except for H4 
that has not been addressed directly, but only indirectly through the 
model built in chapter 6: 
H1: Party group discipline in the EP explains most of the votes but when the 
issue concerns a national, direct interest MEPs will protect them 
H3: MEPs’ voting behaviour and consequently group cohesion differs in 
various committees 
H4: MEPs tend to vote differently if the vote is secret or a public RCV 
H5: regional dimensions other than left/right cleavage and anti-/pro-EU do 
exist and exert a significant effect in the EP 
H6: MEPs’ nationality influences how he/she deals with classical political 
issues that refer to the L/R cleavage 
 
7.4. Theoretical and empirical implications 
Firstly, the attention is turned to the question the possible difference in 
voting behaviour concerning public and secret votes. The important 
and controversial legislation (both in terms of relevance to the EU 
citizen’s lives, or in terms of possible undermine of some states’ 
national interests) may be voted in secret votes (non-RCVs). MEPs’ 
assistants did not empirically confirm this specific relationship; 
nevertheless, they agree on the fact that these two different types of 
votes entail different dynamics, as shown in question 19: 
“Do you think that these roll-call votes represent more or less the same 
logics of the secret votes?” 
Roughly ⅔ (65.2%) of the respondents answered no, while only ⅓ 
answered yes. This information, to a certain degree, corroborates the 
literature that stresses the importance of the selection bias of RCVs-
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based studies (Carrubba and Gabel 1999; Carrubba et al. 2003, 2004, 
2008, 2009). However, it is quite general: it does not provide a specific 
relationship between RCVs requests and possible characteristics of the 
vote. What is helpful in this regard is the previous open-end question 
(question 19), which also provides valuable information that reinforces 
these scholars’ point. The question was formulated as follows: 
“In your opinion, why sometimes groups ask for a public and 
registered vote (the so-called “roll-call votes”)?” 
The majority of answers, “filtered” from normative positions referring 
to the general concepts of the necessity of transparent democratic 
processes (certainly noteworthy and agreeable, but out of the scope of 
this research), followed these lines: 
“[for] Several reasons: to discipline the Members of the own group, to be able 
to "name and shame" Members of other groups about controversial decisions” 
(Anonymous Danish EPP member’s assistant – July 18th, 2012) 
“To challenge MEPs to follow their own line” ” (Anonymous Greek EPP 
member’s assistant – July 18th, 2012) 
“To increase cohesion” (Anonymous Swedish S&D member’s assistant – July 
19th, 2012) 
“To ensure cohesion with the party line and to be able to watch members 
votes” (Anonymous Danish ALDE member’s assistant – July 19th, 2012) 
In this sense, it appears more than reasonable that, as Carrubba et al. 
argue, intra-party cohesion is actually correlated to RCVs request, thus 
leading to selection bias problems. 
Moreover, as already noted in chapter 4, all the committees’ works are 
public, but the votes are almost never RCVs. So, RCVs tend to describe 
the “final step” of a piece of legislation, without accounting for the 
previous negotiation, the decision behind the amendments, and in 
general all the informal committees’ work, where power play between 
different interests is more likely to show up. As rightfully noted by 
Kreppel, “the real battles are at the amendment stage, whilst the grand 
coalition [and consequently high cohesiveness] is much more frequent 
in votes on final texts” (2000: 356). This is also empirically confirmed, 
again, by the original survey conducted on MEPs’ assistants. Question 
17 of the survey investigates exactly this aspect. The question is 
formulated as follows: 
“If a piece of legislation is controversial, do you think that the contrasts 
are more likely to come up in the preliminary works of the committees 
or later during the vote in the plenary session?” 
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The majority chose the first option (45.5%); a smaller group chose 
“indifferently in both moments” (37.2%); only a minority of 
respondents (17.4%) chose the second option. 
Secondly, as extensively discussed in chapter 3 these dynamics may 
well emerge in a few RCVs, but through a statistical analysis that relies 
on various agreement indexes such as Hix et al.’s AI they simply get 
“diluted” in the whole universe of votes cast. A similar point can be 
found in Bardi (2002): “roll-call voting behaviour is conditioned inter 
alia by the symbolic – rather than politically concrete – significance of 
most EP decisions, and this can be held to lower the level of internal 
dissent and facilitate quasi-unanimous decisions” (Bardi 2002: 303). For 
instance, let’s consider the hypothetical (and intentionally extreme) 
situation where nine votes out of ten deal with abstract resolutions, 
which have no substantial effect. In these votes EPGs are – clearly – 
able to make their members tow the party line, and all groups are 
completely cohesive. The tenth vote is a directive on drive safety that 
may endanger the big European car manufacturers. Here, the members 
of some of the states that have a consistent part of their national 
economy dependent on that industry, no matter which EPG they 
belong to, act unite to block the legislation, fearing that these 
provisions may depress the economy of their home country, according 
to the theory of “MEPs as member of strongly ideological regional 
parties”. By simply calculating the AI scores for these ten votes a high 
cohesion would certainly emerge. But the reality, as described, is more 
complex. The goal of this deliberately naïve example is not to portrait 
what actually happens in the EP, of course; rather, it represents a 
caveat that shows how, by looking simply at AI scores, some important 
elements of MEPs’ legislative behaviour do not surface. However, as 
noted by some MEPs’ assistants, something similar actually happened 
in the EP: 
“There is at least one famous case where the German automobile industry 
lobbied heavily, resulting in a very closely won vote in Parliament to stop a 
certain kind of legislation that would have "harmed" their business. This was 
around 10 years ago.” (Anonymous Dutch EFD member’s assistant, July 18th, 
2012); 
“[National alignments emerge in legislation about] cars / Co2 emissions - 
Germany and France defending their strong industry” (Anonymous German 
ALDE member’s assistant – July 25th, 2012) 
Question 9 focuses specifically on the possible contrast between 
nationality and EPG. It is formulated as follows: 
“How often do you think that national interests of some MEPs are in 
contrast with the European party group's political line?” 
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67.4% of the respondents chose the option “sometimes”, followed by 
“often” (23.5%), “rarely” (7.6%), and finally with the same trivial 
percentage “almost always” and “almost never” (both 0.8%). This 
information, in itself, is not very telling, but it acquires a greater 
meaning if paired with the following question. Question 10 focuses on 
the outcome of this possible contrast: 
“In case this contrast actually occurs, how do you think that MEPs 
vote?” 
The answers show a straightforward homogeneity of views: 83.2% of 
the respondents picked the option “in defence of their national 
interests”, while only 16.8% chose “Consistently with the political 
group’s line”. This is further explored in the next paragraph. 
 
7.5. Brief case studies of national interests contrasting EPG’s line 
In question 20 it is asked to list some specific legislations where 
national interests of some member states are prominent, and in open 
contrast with the political line of a group: this is an open and optional 
question, with no predefined answer. Still, roughly half of MEPs’ 
assistant replied, creating in this way a vast range of possible case 
studies for this phenomenon. The details of all the replies are available 
in the appendix; here, only four insightful cases are enlisted (the first 
two and the last briefly, the third with more details), in addition to the 
one presented in the previous paragraph (the “tendency” of German 
and French MEPs to protect their automobile industry). 
Firstly, on the recent discussion about the possibility of the creation of 
European-wide government stocks, the so-called “Eurobonds”, 
Germany had a very strict position. The ALDE group, consistently with 
its economic tradition, was strongly in this favour of this possible 
measure to relieve the crisis in Europe. Still, all the German members of 
the Liberal group voted against. 
Secondly, Spain has a strong tradition of radical nationalist parties 
fighting for independency of their “nation” (such as ETA in the Basque 
Country, or Esquerra Republicana and Solidaritat Catalana per la 
Independència in Catalunia). Thus, the question of State-building and 
secessions is a very sensitive issue in Spain. When the EP had to vote in 
favour of the recognition of the newly formed Kosovo, the government 
of Madrid found itself on a slippery slope: a vote in favour would have 
somehow “legitimized” the nationalist tensions, especially of ETA. In 
the end a compromise was found: all the Spanish MEPs abstained from 
the vote. 
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Thirdly, in 2010 the ENVI committee put forward some amendments to 
the proposal by the European Commission to have stricter rules on the 
information contained on food labels. The “Sommer labelling dossier”, 
named after its rapporteur, was voted in the plenary session of June 
2010 in several RCVs (29 total votes on the same dossier) regarding 
different amendments. Here the focus is on a specific amendment 
(“Food information to consumers. Subject: Article 50, before paragraph 
1, amendment 191”) voted on 16/06/2010. The type of vote is a draft 
legislative resolution; the procedure is legislative (ordinary legislative 
procedure, first reading). During the discussion it became clear that 
there was the possibility of a clear undermining the interests of Ferrero 
SPA, the Italian manufacturer of chocolate and other products69. In fact, 
the rejection of the amendment would have prohibited Ferrero and 
other confectionary manufacturers to advertise their products with the 
word “healthy”. The coalitions in this final vote70 were the following: 
1. S&D, Liberals, Greens/EFA and GUE/Nordic Green Left supporting 
the line “against”; 
2. EPP, Conservatives/Reformists and EFD euro-sceptics “for”. 
The result of the vote was a perfect tie, with 309 MEPs voting against 
and 309 MEPs voting for, plus 31 abstentions. Since the majority 
required to pass was 310, the amendment was rejected. By looking at 
the classical AI aggregated score, one may think that this vote shows 
no anomalies: 81% of MEPs voted along EPG lines, a pretty high score. 
But if we look at how Italy at large voted we see a completely different 
picture: AI calculated for Italian MEPs scores 92.74%, way higher than 
the average for EPGs. In fact, of the 62 Italian MEPs present, 59 voted 
cohesively “yea”; only one ALDE member abstained and two other 
MEPS voted “nay” (one from S&D and another ALDE member). Ten 
additional members were absent or did not vote71 (in total Italy has 72 
MEPs). In particular, the Italian S&D delegation is quite numerous, 22 
MEPs; and only one of them, one out of 22, decided to vote along the 
EPG line instead of acting rebel towards it to protect Ferrero’s interests. 
Most importantly, this case shows that the discriminant for this 
rebellious vote was not the “main principal” of MEPs according to the 
mainstream literature (Hix 2002; Noury 2002; Hix et al. 2007; Faas 
                                                
69 One of the greatest industrial entities in Italy, with its €7.7 billion revenue, an operating 
income of €856 million and 22,298 employees (fiscal year 2010-2012). 
70 Vote ID: 742. Available on http://www.votewatch.eu/en/food-information-to-
consumers-draft-legislative-resolution-article-50-before-paragraph-1-amendment-1.html 
71 Seven MEPs from EPP, one from S&D, one from ALDE and one from EFD. 
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2003), namely the national party delegation: rather, the real 
discriminant is nationality at large, consistently to my theory. 
Fourthly and finally, when there is some vote regarding nuclear energy 
or GMOs (genetically modified organism) Austrian MEPs tend to vote 
compact against it. Various answers from MEPs assistants’ survey 
corroborate this argument: 
“Austria is strictly against nuclear power - and therefore does not follow 
EPP's party line. Same with GMOs, Austria” (Anonymous Austrian EPP 
member’s assistant – July 18th, 2012); 
“All Austrian MEPs across all groups consistently vote against nuclear 
energy” (Anonymous Austrian S&D member’s assistant – July 18th, 2012); 
“Nuclear energy and genetically modified food are topics where e.g. Austrian 
EPP members tend to vote with their compatriots and against the group line” 
(Anonymous Austrian EPP member’s assistant – July 23rd, 2012). 
I deliberately picked four examples which are very different between 
each other: in the first case, there is a political position, and to a certain 
degree the will of Germany to shape the whole European monetary 
policy. In the second case, it’s a matter of internal political stability. In 
the third, it is a pure and simple defence of a national economic 
interest. In the last, the issue concerns more a cultural and traditional 
legacy. What is important is that in all cases the contrast of the political 
group is not against the national party line, but the broad national 
affiliation (that comprises all national parties). All these examples 
investigate the central research question in the direction that 
corroborates my argument: when a Raison d'État is at stake, nationality 
prevails over EPG line. This is certainly intuitive, and scholars such as 
Bardi have recognised it already more than 25 years ago (Bardi 1987: 
86). However, the constant focus on intra-party cohesion and inter-
party competition (using RCVs-based analysis), and possibly a 
normative position of scholars about the emergence of a true European 
political system, has somehow diverted the attention from this aspect. 
Finally, one last question has to be asked: is this particular dynamic 
also empirically relevant in the opposite direction? In other words, 
does it happen, sometimes, that MEPs clearly touched by some 
European legislation deliberately decide to follow what their EPG says, 
despite endangering their closest constituency – their country of 
origin? The literature is still very weak in regards. One of such cases, 




7.5.1. The Takeover directive 
The Takeover Directive is probably the only exception (albeit a 
controversial one) of a case study on which some scholars have been 
able to argue that, despite the national interests at stake, the policy 
outcome was nonetheless defined by a left-right confrontation with 
cohesive EPGs. However, other scholars reached the exact opposite 
conclusion, finding that national interests were paramount in the 
legislative process. 
The Takeover Directive is a legislative action passed by the European 
Parliament in late 2003 to create a legal framework for mergers and 
acquisitions. The directive had the goal of making a set of common 
laws applicable across EU members, creating harmonization between 
legal systems, as well as setting clear standards and boundaries for 
companies and individuals working to comply with the law. Drafting 
the Takeover Directive took over a decade72 and included substantial 
political wrangling. EU members intended to create a simple set of 
legal guidelines for takeovers: it was meant to streamline the takeover 
process, making it easier for companies to handle takeovers while also 
protecting the interests of shareholders and employees. But uneven 
and sometimes contradictory laws in individual member nations made 
takeovers challenging, which was viewed as an inhibition to doing 
business in the European Union. In sum, the bill addressed one of the 
central differences between the so-called ”Anglo-Saxon” and 
“Rhenish” models of capitalism (Hix et al. 2007: 200). In 1996 the EP 
received a directive from the EC, the latest of a series of attempts to 
harmonise member states’ takeover rules (Berglöf and Burkart 2003). In 
1997 the bill was assigned as rapporteur a French EPP conservative, 
Nicole Fontaine; the committee responsible for the bill proposed a 
substantive number of amendments, that nevertheless were all 
accepted by the Commission. In 2000 the Council reached a “common 
position” incorporating most of these amendments: a compromise 
looked possible (Hix et al. 2007: 202). However, later the German 
industry started to express concerns about the directive: following the 
aggressive takeover of one of the German telecommunication 
companies by the British Vodafone, it was feared that Volkswagen 
could suffer the same fate by the hands of an American car company. 
The German government started then and intensive lobbying 
campaign in order to block this piece of legislation, an unprecedented 
                                                
72 Only the actual, last draft took more then a decade; actually, the first European-wide 
debate over a EU regulation on this matter dates back to the early ‘70s (Hix et al. 2007: 
201). 
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move considering that it implied to “turn against a position previously 
supported in the Council” (Hix 2007: 204). The result was a tied vote in 
2001: 273 MEPs voting in favour, 273 against and 22 abstentions. This 
meant that the directive was not approved. It was only in November 
2003 then that the Council reached a compromise solution that 
basically was leaving a complete “opt-out”: each member state was free 
to decide whether to apply or not the controversial provisions 
(neutrality article, breakthrough rule) that triggered the previous 
debate. The EP then approved the final legislative act on December 
2003. 
According to Kitschelt et al. (1999) ideological preferences influenced 
MEP behaviour; however, a far more significant determinant of voting 
behaviour is actually the specific model of capitalism in MEPs’ member 
state: specifically, MEPs from liberal market economies (UK, Ireland) 
and nationally coordinated economies (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) 
supported the directive; MEPs from partial or family-oriented 
coordinated market economies (France, Italy, Spain, Greece and 
Portugal) were split and MEPs from sectorally coordinated economies 
(Germany, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg) were 
against. Callaghan and Höpner (2004) and Ringe (2005), despite using 
slightly different variables, similarly claim that it is national interests, 
and particularly different “models of capitalism”, that explain the 
outcome more than EPG position or left-right ideological preferences of 
MEPs. Hix et al. (2007), however, claim that all these existing studies 
focused only on few high-profile vote, thus biasing the analysis. A 
more comprehensive analysis, including the final votes in 2003, show 
that “parties and ideology matters, even when national interests 
interfere” (Hix et al. 2007: 214). They show the different patterns of 
vote, in particular, of 2000, 2001, 2003. Whereas in the first two votes 
national delegations (at large) are extremely cohesive, especially for 
Germany and UK (all MEPs voting in the same way), in the third 
Germany finally splits along EPG lines. UK, by contrast, remains 
highly cohesive as country even in the last vote. From this they derive 
that “When there are high political stakes on a legislative issue before 
the EP, MEPs from one or two member states may vote along national 
lines rather than on party lines […]. But in the final vote of the re-
proposed legislation in 2003 the German Social Democrats and green 
followed the position of the socialist group rather than their 
government, and voted against the directive” (Hix et al. 2007: 215). But 
that is exactly the point: until the question is controversial and salient, 
national affiliation is stronger. When a final compromise is reached on 
a bill that basically leaves a great margin to member states regarding 
applying or not the crucial provisions, practically leaving it as an 
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Since inferences based solely on roll-call votes may be misleading due 
to a selection bias problem, it is helpful to look at qualitative data from 
MEPs’ assistants survey. The analysis of the research question’s 
relevant survey items has revealed a number of interesting findings: 
First of all, logics of vote differ if the vote is secret or public (RCV). In 
particular, RCVs seem to be requested for several reasons, but mainly 
to ensure group cohesion: thus, RCVs-based studies that look at party 
group cohesion may be biased. Secondly, national interests in contrast 
with EU legislation are not a too often occurrence, but when it happens 
MEPs overwhelmingly vote to protect their closest constituency. 
Thirdly, these contrasts tend to emerge in the preliminary committee 
legislative work; therefore, an analysis of votes that accounts only for 
the final texts does not captures this aspect, corroborating Kreppel’s 
argument (2000). 
Finally, a short dissertation of possible case-studies for these contrasts 
has been presented, finding that – in sum – it is actually quite common 
that EPGs get “overridden” by national affiliation. And when this 
happens, it is always because there is a generic Raison d’État (that may 
refer to different domains – from sheer economic calculation to cultural 
traditions). MEPS’ assistant survey revealed many of such situations. 
The opposite is much more difficult to find, and even the existing 
research that tries to prove that sometimes political affiliation is 
stronger than a national interest, such as studies on the Takeover 
Directive, actually rests on shaky foundations (Hix et al. 2007) and is 
counterbalanced by a much more conspicuous literature arguing the 
opposite (Kitschelt 1999; Callaghan and Hopner 2004; Ringe 2005), 








8.1. Summary of main findings 
After an introduction that defines the central research question of this 
dissertation (Chapter 1), in the theoretical part (chapter 2) of this 
dissertation I firstly briefly examined the evolution of the EP party 
system and how it can be observed using the lenses of Katz and Mair’s 
“three faces of party organization”. Then, I analysed party cohesion in 
the EP, showing how different scholars attribute this it to different 
explanatory factors. Later, I moved on to focus on the individual level 
of members of the European Parliament, first by assessing their 
representativeness towards the European electorate, and then by 
analysing their concrete voting behaviour in relation to the principal-
agent theory. Afterwards, I presented my theory of “MEPs as members 
of a strongly ideological regional party” as a combination of these 
different approaches, focusing on the oft-overlooked broader element 
of national affiliation instead of national party membership. 
In chapter 3 I analysed the statistical outliers of party group cohesion 
(using the Agreement Index, AI) for the last two European legislatures 
(2004-2013). In this way I demonstrated, albeit with a simple 
presentation of the presence of statistical outliers and without a proper 
cause-effect argument, that party group cohesion has to be treated 
cautiously. Both for EP6 and EP7, party groups are usually completely 
united in voting, but there are a substantial number of cases when this 
cohesion breaks down. Exceptions to this trend can be found for the 
euro-sceptic groups and the non-attached members, that show lower 
cohesion. in the EP7, for instance, this emerges clearly for the votes 
concerning the CAP reform. Every three and a half votes, on average, 
in the last ten years there’s a vote where EPGs fail to discipline their 
members in voting according to the party lines.  This picture slightly 
contrasts with the oft-repeated claim according to which the “the 
European Parliament is surprisingly like all other democratic 
parliaments” (Hix et al. 2005: 509). The explanation of this phenomenon 
is strictly related to the peculiar institutional arrangement of the EP, 
that lacks the classical government-opposition dynamics of democratic 
politics (Mair and Thomassen 2010: 21), that “allows” such relatively 
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frequent deviations from the party line without the threaten of 
jeopardizing the executive. 
EPGs certainly play a crucial role in EP’s legislative life, and on overall 
they appear extremely cohesive. But this does not mean that their 
members cannot decide, from time to time, to vote along patterns that 
completely break (because a national interest is at stake, such as 
outcomes of CAP reforms) their unity as political groups. And since, as 
scholars acknowledge (Raunio 1999: 193; Westlake 1994a; Kreppel 
2002), EPGs or even more European parties have very little power to 
“whip” them, their election being ultimately in the hand of the national 
parties, no consequences arise from these “rebellious votes”. The 
reason of such understatement, as stated before, is based on a 
perspective that looks only at the mean of EPGs’ cohesiveness over the 
years, but does not deepen the analysis to what really happens if we 
disaggregate these statistical indexes and look at the outliers. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the role of committees, the “legislative 
backbone”(Westlake 1994) of the European Parliament. I argue that, 
consistently to my theory, the national element is more likely to have a 
substantial effect on most important committees that usually work on 
legislative issues, while party groups, vice-versa, are more cohesive 
when there is less at stake. 
This is empirically confirmed by the elaboration of the results from the 
original survey submitted to MEPs’ assistant. The so-called “money 
committees” where substantial decisions are at stake are those where 
nation-oriented votes are more likely to emerge (making EPGs less 
cohesive), and vice-versa: party groups manage to ensure a higher 
unity in less important committees. However, RCVs analysis on votes 
cast in the sixth EP legislature only partially confirms it: a clear-cut 
trend emerges only for the AGRI committee. Dynamics in votes 
concerning this committee are substantially different than the others, 
and national affiliation plays a greater role than the one usually 
envisaged by the mainstream literature (Hix 2002; Hix et al 2003; Hix et 
al 2005; 2006; 2007). These results are especially meaningful if we 
consider the importance of this committee in terms of sheer economic 
numbers. This is not completely new: findings that corroborate my 
argument can be found in the literature, albeit focusing on research 
questions other than the specific relationship between party and 
national affiliation (Bardi 1989) The ideological dimension of the EP is, 
as a whole, more relevant than the national affiliation in defining how 
MEPs vote, but if these votes are “filtered” in a critical way, then 
nationality (not membership of a national party) suddenly becomes 
something different than the “weak predictor of vote“ generally 
depicted by the most diffused literature (Hix et. al. 2006: 509). 
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Chapter 5 focuses on “national alignments”, namely the actual cases 
when MEPs decide to vote together with their fellow countrymen, 
despite this implies an open contrast with the plurality of the group 
they belong to. Again the time span analysed is 2004-2009 due to lack 
of fresher data at the individual level. Simple descriptive statistics 
firstly show that the two euro-sceptic groups are, as expected, the party 
groups where MEPs are more likely to disregard the party line in order 
to pursue a national line. Among the bigger, generally pro-EU group, 
however, the findings for Socialists and People’s party diverge 
substantially, partially because to the ideological heterogeneity of the 
latter group in the sixth EP due to the presence of the ED conservatives. 
Secondly, countries with a tradition of euro-scepticism generally are 
more likely to show these alignments. However bigger countries, 
electing MEPs that belong to more EPGs do not present – contrarily to 
what one may think – a higher share of these alignments. UK is the 
“champion” of national alignments, whereas the classic literature 
relying on the Agreement Index as the only index of voting behaviour 
had failed to identify this behaviour (Hix and Noury 2009). This 
corroborates my argument circa the reliability of an analysis based on 
such index alone. Thirdly, these alignments tend to be concentrated in 
the more important, legislative committees, corroborating what I 
argued in chapter 4, especially for the AGRI committee. However 
AFET committee, in contrast to my expectations but consistently to part 
of the literature (Whitaker 2011), shows surprising results. 
Then, using a simple logistic regression I established the causality of a 
series of variables on the likelihood of national alignments emerging in 
the vote. In this regards, national alignments are more likely if: the vote 
is cast in one of the main five committees pinpointed by MEPs’ 
assistant survey; the vote is legislative; the margin is thinner, 
expectedly indicating a more controversial issues where there is no 
“grand coalition” between the bigger groups; the vote is not budgetary 
issue. Finally, this regression proved that these alignments are not 
more likely to emerge in bigger country delegation, or in countries 
belonging to the recent eastwards enlargement, partially contrasting 
the already florid literature that argues that eastern MEPs’ behaviour is 
substantially equivalent to those of the old member states (Hix and 
Noury 2009; Costello et al. 2012; McElroy and Benoit 2012; Bressanelli 
2012). 
Chapter 6 presents an original and simple methodology that consists in 
transforming survey data into votes, then applying the classical AI 
indexes. This gives some information on how MEPs would actually 
vote if they were following their sheer preferences, which in turn can 
be useful to speculate on how MEPs vote in non-RCVs; the analysis is 
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performed for the last two legislatures, EP6 and EP7. The results firstly 
show that cohesion by party group would be much lower if MEPs were 
voting according to their preference, in respect to what emerges from 
roll-call votes. A second interesting finding is that cohesion by 
preference is much higher than expected if MEPs are grouped by 
member state, demonstrating that nationality can influence how MEPs 
perceive certain issues. 
In terms of external validity of this model, this analysis has no ambition 
of explaining how MEPs actually vote. Nevertheless, since voting 
behaviour is not observable when vote is not held under the roll-call 
procedure, alternative methods have to be defined. Since party groups, 
as recognized by part of the literature, are weak political entities in 
terms of “whip” power towards its members (Hix and Lord 1997; 
Raunio 1999; Kreppel 2002), because ultimately the main “principal” of 
MEPs are national parties (Faas 2003), MEPs probably vote more 
accordingly to their preferences. And if this does not emerge in RCVs, 
as shown, then these dynamics are likely to emerge in non-RCVs. This 
partially contrasts with the same literature that argues that high 
cohesiveness is a sole consequence of political homogeneity (Kreppel 
2002). 
Chapter 7 first extensively discussed the methodological debate over 
the reliability of roll-call analysis. I argue that, if roll-call votes may be 
misleading due to a selection bias problem, then it is helpful to look at 
qualitative data (Rasmussen 2008), in this case from MEPs’ assistants 
original survey. My findings are that logics of vote differ if the vote is 
secret or public (RCV). In particular, RCVs seem to be requested for 
several reasons, but mainly to ensure group cohesion: thus, RCVs-
based studies that look at party group cohesion may be biased. 
Secondly, national interests in contrast with EU legislation are not a too 
often occurrence, but when this happens MEPs overwhelmingly vote to 
protect their closest constituency. Thirdly, these contrasts tend to 
emerge in the preliminary committee legislative work; therefore, an 
analysis of votes that accounts only for the final texts does not captures 
this aspect, corroborating Kreppel’s argument (2000). 
Finally, I shortly discuss some case-studies of such contrasts, showing 
that it is actually quite common that party group lines are disregarded 
by vote decision that depend uniquely on national affiliation. And 
when this happens, it is always because there is a generic Raison d’État 
(that may refer to different domains – from sheer economic calculation 
to cultural traditions) and not only a specific position of the national 
party. The opposite is much more difficult to find, and even the 
existing research that tries to prove that sometimes political affiliation 
is stronger than a national interest, such as studies on the Takeover 
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Directive, actually rests on shaky foundations (Hix et al. 2007) and is 
counterbalanced by a much more conspicuous literature arguing the 
opposite (Kitschelt 1999; Callaghan and Hopner 2004; Ringe 2005), 
namely that the final policy outcome is country-driven. 
 
8.2. Venues for future research 
This dissertation clearly does not have the pretence of setting the final 
word on the logic of voting behaviour in the European Parliament. In 
particular, it analysed the topic from a specific point of view, 
encouraged by the fact that it is still at the centre of a heated debate. In 
this sense, possible further research may go in the direction of a 
broadening of the scope of the analysis, keeping in mind the same 
research question, or refining the methodological tools still focusing on 
the same object of research. 
The former point could be reached by including the other institution, in 
particular the Council on the picture73: specifically, assessing if there is 
a relationship between possible lacks of cohesion of party groups (and 
consequently the surfacing of national alignments) and specific key 
features of Council’s legislative behaviour. The question of the 
relationship between Parliament and Council in the law-making EU 
process, especially after the introduction of the co-decision procedure, 
has been the focus of a solid strand of research. In particular, 
Hagemann and Høyland (2010) have already analysed this topic in 
relation to the cohesion of party groups. However, the presence of 
national alignments (independent of national party positions) in this 
process has not been sufficiently investigated. 
The latter point, instead, could be improved in different ways. Firstly, 
since MEPs’ assistants survey has proved to be so helpful in 
disentangling questions related to this work, a second wave – with 
more specific items – could be prepared and then submitted to the 
newly elected Parliament in Spring 2014. Secondly, most of the analysis 
of this work that needed roll-call votes information at the individual 
level had necessarily to be constrained to the “old” EP legislature, 2004-
2009. As soon as EP7 will be dismissed, this more detailed dataset will 
become available also for the legislature that started in 2009: in this 
sense, part of the work of this dissertation (chapter 4, 5) could be 
“replicated” with fresher data. Thirdly, the analysis of votes in the 
                                                
73 This could be facilitated by the fact that Votewatch, that provided data for most of this 
dissertation’s empirical analysis, recently included the Council’s position in the available 
data. 
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different committees has proved to be particularly meaningful (AGRI) 
but also counter-intuitive, from the theoretical framework used 
(ECON). A more in-depth analysis of all 20 committees could bring 
interesting results; again, similar research exists (Yordanova 2009, 2011, 
2013; Ringe 2009; Kreppel 2002) but has not focused specifically on the 
central research question of this dissertation, namely the contrasts 
between party groups and national delegations at large. Moreover, a 
direct observation of the committees’ work would greatly benefit the 
knowledge of their internal dynamics that, it is worth reminding, is still 
“blurry” (Whitaker 2011). Fourthly, throughout all this work, the 
question of “national interests” has been a constant presence as it is the 
discriminating factor that, in the perspective presented here, influences 
the EPG or national orientation of a vote. This has been extensively 
proved by the qualitative corroboration of chapter 7; however, no 
indicator of such is present in the literature (except, partially, for 
Kardasheva 2009). A meticulous work of analysis and assessment of 
the single votes of a legislature, to include a variable that indicates this 
element and allows to control for it in a RCV analysis, would be 
extremely useful. In other words, a reliable index that measures the real 
salience of votes (in regards to each member state’s interests) would 
allow to unambiguously prove that nationality matters more when 
there is a national issue at stake. Another possible improvement of this 
work could be reached by refining the empirical operationalization of 
the concept of national alignment since, as discussed in chapter 5, it 
leaves out much of the variance that, on the other hand, is captured by 
classical agreement indexes. 
Finally, the possibility (yet remote, due to Socialists and People’s party 
strong opposition74) that the EP reforms its internal rule in order to 
have all votes recorded and publicly available would benefit not only 
this work, but all the academic community. 
 
8.3. Theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions 
The contribution of this work is tripartite. By analysing MEPs’ voting 
behaviour under a combination of methodological strategies, both 
quantitative and qualitative, and testing my central research question  -
the concurrent influence of party group membership and national 
affiliation – I contribute in different ways to the theoretical, empirical 
and methodological debate. 
                                                
74 Such reform has already been proposed a liberal English MEP Andrew Duff, during 
the current seventh EP legislature in the AFCO committee, but to no avail. 
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From the theoretical point of view, my contribution consists in a slight 
theoretical refinement of current theories of the European Parliament’s 
internal representation and behaviour.  Members of the EP, according 
to my conceptual framework, satisfactorily perform their 
representative function as they operate in an institutionalized party 
system (Bardi; 1989; 2002; 2006); they are part of generally cohesive 
party groups – albeit incapable of a strong “whip” (Kreppel 2002; Faas 
2003); however, their theorization as “parliamentary agents with two 
principals” is potentially dangerous (Katz 2013), especially because – I 
add – it does not include the question of nationality at large, limiting 
the analysis of EPG and the national party. In this sense, I contend, 
MEPs are better described as “strongly ideological members of a 
regional party”: they generally share preferences with their party 
colleagues (however not completely homogenous, as demonstrated in 
chapter 6), and despite national affiliation has an effect on how they 
perceive certain issues, they generally act united. However, every time 
they perceive that their closest constituency is touched by the vote, they 
deviate from the line without consequences, facilitated by the peculiar 
EP institutional arrangement (Hix 2007, Mair and Thomassen 2010). In 
this sense, both shared policy preference and “whip” constraints make 
EPGs look cohesive; but when it really matters, neither of these 
elements hold. 
From the empirical point of view, I contribute to the field by 
demonstrating that national-oriented votes are still a paramount 
feature of the EP, even if they surface in a minority of cases; that they 
tend to emerge legislative votes, and in more important committees; 
that national alignments, in sum, emerge whenever a Raison D’État is at 
stake, and they do it regardless of the country size, but more in the 
traditionally euro-sceptic countries and surprisingly more in old 
member states than in the eastern countries belonging to the recent 
enlargement wave. I also demonstrated that the difference between 
nationality and political affiliation, in terms of “pure” exogenous policy 
preferences revealed by survey data (opposed to actual votes where 
constraints do exist) is much smaller in shaping MEPs’ behaviour. 
These empirical findings have also a broader implication in terms of 
how to consider the European polity. From the point of view of 
representation in the European Parliament, these results tell us that 
MEPs are representative both in terms of political affiliation and 
nationality. In other term, a European citizen is well represented by a 
MEP that matches his or her political preferences, no matter the 
country the MEP comes from. But from time to time, when a national 
interest is touched, this type of representation “shrinks” in favour to a 
more concrete, economic-based type of representation that is connected 
to national affiliation. This is not necessary a bad or a good thing for 
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the European Parliament: simply, it is an element that makes the EP 
more complex and multifaceted that a classical Parliament. In terms of 
law-making in the EU, these results indicate that intergovernmental 
elements still survive also in a body of the European Union that should 
be the mostly driven by supranational forces. 
In terms of methodology, the first contribution of this work goes in the 
direction of a further warning against the use of RVCs alone to 
generate causal inferences on MEPs’ voting behaviour. A complete and 
unbiased research, I contend, must necessarily complement a 
quantitative analysis with a more in-depth qualitative refinement. 
Secondly, I contribute to the methodological debate by showing how 
the use of the Agreement Index alone may contribute to draw an 
incomplete part of the bigger picture of voting behviour, especially 
when calculated by member state. A (potentially) more reliable 
approach, as demonstrated by the case of UK, is to look at strictly 
defined and operationalized “national alignments”, despite this 
methodology is not free of criticalities too: in particular, it disregards 
most of the variance captured by the classical indexes. In this sense, I 
advocate a complementary use of both. 
To conclude, it is true indeed that “ideology remained the main 
predictor of voting behaviour, although nationality also played a role” 
(Hix and Noury 2009: 159). The point is exactly that this “role” is a 
paramount feature, which should not be overlooked, of the directly 
elected assembly that represents more than 500 millions of European 
citizens. A peculiar, maybe “paradoxical” parliament (Westlake 2007: 
350) which, on the one hand, is still a political unicum that probably 
cannot be so easily compared to a regular democratic parliament, 
contrarily to what many scholars have recently and repeatedly argued 
(Noury et al. 2002; Hix et al. 2006, 2007, 2009; Hagemann 2009; 
Kaniovski and Mueller 2010); on the other hand, a parliament that can 
be fully understood only if the popular and oft-repeated focus on its 
supranational element is mitigated by a re-evaluation of the older, yet 






MEPs’ assistants survey 
D1, D2 Country of origin and party group membership 
 
 
D3 On overall, how much do you think that the lobbies' work has an influence on the 
legislative output of the European Parliament? 
 
Additional comments 
Country Respondents EPG Respondents
Austria 4 ALDE 31
Belgium 10 ECR 10
Bulgaria 3 EFD 8
Cyprus 2 EPP 40
Czech Republic 2 Greens/EFA 17
Denmark 6 GUE/NGL 4
Estonia 1 NI 9
Finland 6 S&D 63
France 15 No Answer 6
Germany 22



















 - 1. Not at all  - 2.  - 3.  - 4.  - 5. Very much
0 15 61 50 17






Lobbies influence policymakers by providing valuable knowledge and assistance, but 
MEPs and assistants mostly listen to the lobbyists they already share views with, and 
who they trust. Therefore the political "line" is not influenced by lobbyists, but set out by 
the MEP. 
Not so much in the sense that they decide the final direction of the legislation, but very 
important in providing information 
It depends on the MEP how much he/she let influence himself/herself 
Depends strongly on issue area and topic 
It depends a lot on which Committees 
Therefore lobby transparency is of the utmost importance 
iI depends on the MEP and his/her background and on the assistant's attitude 
Financial Service and Insurance legislation is dominated by the interest of the industry 
Very important to have an overall picture of the impact of legislative texts 
I think it depends on the type of lobby - environmental, financial, health, whether the 
lobby is not entirely based on material gains of a company, etc. 
 
D4 How do you judge the lobbies' influence in the European Parliament, in 
comparison to a national Parliament? 
 
Additional comments 
Lobbies in Slovenia do not function in the sense of western practices. They are still quite 
underdeveloped. 
On national level, I believe its easier to lobby directly on governments, thus I rate 
influence on EP greater. 
It is probably also a matter of visibility, because at national level the whole lobbying 
process is less transparent. In some Member States, like France, lobbying even has a 
negative connotation, but this doesn't mean lobbying is absent. This is why the influence 
being greater is probably a perception rather than a reality. 
depending on the country as well 
No experience of national parliament 
Cannot tell, have never worked at a national Parliament 
But different: in EP it is more visible, in national parliaments more through informal 
networks and contacts 
 - Much minor  - Minor - More or less the same  - Greater  - Much greater
0 11 52 66 10






Less personal interconnections on European than on national level 
In a different way; national p is not such an open process i believe as in the EP 
Not so much greater perhaps, but certainly much more visible than in the national 
Parliaments 
With the single market in place, there are lobbies in the EP from all over the Union, 
which makes it more important. Also it is important to differ from lobby and corruption 
of deputies. 
Non sono in grado di valutare non avendo esperienza simile nel Parlamento nazionale 
 




Strategic behaviour of lobbyists makes groups less cohesive 
It depends on the topic, the political group and the national delegations. EPP and S&D 
are much more devided by national topics and the lobbies are part of the reason why 
they might be divided. 
It greatly depends 
Depends on the issue - whether it is one that has very significantly differing impacts on 
different member states (then potentially reducing cohesion), or is rather a matter of 
principle or ideology (then potentially increasing cohesion). 
Differences among national delegations 
But not a lot less cohesive. national interests have bigger effect on loss of cohesion 
Case by case analysis; no trend 
My group tends not to be lobbied by big business groups so I have no real view but I'd 
imagine it makes it less cohesive 
Different countries, different national companies may have different opinion on the 
legislation. Every deputy will strive to protect his own national interests. If there is a 




It makes the groups It makes the groups








D6 How do you judge the lobbies' work in respect to the possibility that MEP of 
different political groups but from the same member state vote together in the same 
way, thus not respecting the group's line? 
 
Additional comments 
Depends, I could imagine that MEPs will be susceptible to arguments to protect jobs in 
"national champions" 
Depends on the issue and who does the lobby work and in what domain 
Uninformed MEPs usually follow the group line, which often is the line of the shadow 
rapporteur, especially in small groups where there are not enough MEPs to do a second 
check. Lobbyists are often good to point out captured positions and provide for a second 
view. 
I work in horizontal committees like BUDG and CONT and the ones who lobby are 
mostly the EC and the Council. 
As above - if the issue is divisive along national lines then lobbying can result in 
nationally aligned voting across political groups 
As in my comment above 
 
D7 Which are the policy areas where you think that the lobbies are more influent at 
the European level? 
Finance and economic 
Industrial policy, health, energy, trade 
Finance, Nuclear, Automobile 
Environment, energy, industry, banking/finance 
Internal Market, Consumer Policy, Agriculture 
Health, transport 
Agriculture, ITRE 
Defence and Security 
Data protection, copyright, food and chemical industries 
Industry (REACH - meaning chemicals etc, food safety, alcohol, transport), regional 
policy (member states), agriculture (massively member states and there massive lobby by 
Agri lobbyists.) 
Industry, energy 
It makes it less likely It makes it more likely 








Energy, industry, health (namely pharmaceuticals), environment 
Economic and monetary affairs, Industrial, energy and internal market policy 
Energy,  finance, industry, environment 
Industry  financials 
Industry, chemestry, nuclear, 
Internal market in general; Work of the following committees: IMCO, ENVI 
Lobbies by member states are much different than by private sector or labour unions. 




Health  Environment  Fisheries  Regional policy 
More influential in foreign affairs, trade and consumer protection issues than in 
budgetary matters. 
Environment, energy, industry 
Corporate legislation, internal market 
Environment, energy, industry, pharmaceutical industry 
Economic and financial affairs, energy, internal market, environment 
Financial Services by far as this is one of the most technical and complex area and 
interests are represented pretty one sided (i.e. there is no "natural" adversary such as an 
environment NGO, although finance watch might fill this gap to some degree), 
environmental policy, technical areas in energy or telecommunication 
Infrastructure 
Everything that concerns ITRE, ENVI, AGRI, TRAN, LIBE to some extent 
Agriculture 
Industrial policies and sector/manufacturing. Environmental issues. 
ECON, IMCO, INTA, AGRI, ENVI 
Human Rights, Animal Welfare 
In all areas that are regulated on European level 
Pharmaceutics, Chemistry 
The legislative policy areas: ENVI, ITRE, IMCO, TRANS... 
(Financial) industry, subsidies, technology/research 
Health, Transport, Environment 
ENVI committee  Ecommerce  Transport (Aviation & Rail) 
Financial Service and Insurance legislation is dominated by the interest of the industry    
Energy, CAP, environment 
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All? Perhaps those that have more means are more effective... 
Most areas 
ITRE, ENVI, CULT 
Economic policy, internal market, environment,...: any European policy in which 
economic interests in any way are involved. 
Transport, environment (matters that are of public interest and will make it to the 
newspaper) 
Economy, Agriculture and Energy 
Energy, environment 
Agriculture, environment, transport 
Economic governance / Energy / Automotive Industries 
Automotive industry, Chemical industry 
ICT 
Technical areas in general 
Agriculture and Fishery, Manufacturing Industry, Finance and Banking, Environment, 
Research, External Aid 
Economic, Industry, Medicines 
Financial services, environmental issues 
ENVI, ITRE, IMCO 
Health 
Consumer Protection  Data Protection  Citizens rights 
Anywhere where profit can be made! 
Trade / transport / energy / internal market 
Internal Market, Energy, Agriculture, Fisheries 
Business 
Industry, Financial services 
Environment, transport, single market, financial and economic affairs, development 
Environment 
Health 
Agriculture and transportation 
All technical policy areas where lobbies can bring additional expertise 
Energy, Maritime policy, Agriculture, Health 
Mercato interno, Agricoltura, Ambiente 
Industria ambiente telecomunicazioni ricerca 
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Credo che le lobbies che operano nel campo dell'agricoltura siano effettivamente molto 
forti. Non posso esprimermi per altri campi perché non ne ho le competenze. 
Industria 
Chimica, industria 





quelle più tecniche e specifiche 
Economia  industria  questioni sociali (tutela dei minori, donne e disabili)  ambiente 
Industria, finanza, affari interni, ambiente e salute pubblica 
Ambiente, industria 
Industria, agricoltura, trasporti 
Ambiente, salute, agricoltura 
Industria, ricerca, ambiente, politiche agricole e alimentari 
agricoltura, industria 
energia, commercio, diritti umani, mercato unico 
politica industriale 
Trasporti  Ambiente 




D8 How much do you think that the following factors influence MEPs' final decision 
on how to vote? 
 
 
1. Not at all 2 3 4 5. Very much
National party leadership 5,3% 17,6% 20,6% 29,8% 26,7%
EPG leadership 1,5% 8,4% 27,5% 46,6% 16,0%
National party delegation of MEPs 4,7% 10,9% 20,2% 38,0% 26,4%
The EP committee leadership 16,4% 34,4% 22,7% 24,2% 2,3%
The European Commission 26,0% 40,5% 26,7% 6,9% 0,0%
The national government 7,6% 27,5% 35,1% 22,9% 6,9%
European interest groups 3,9% 33,3% 40,3% 17,8% 4,7%
National interest groups 3,8% 22,3% 35,4% 32,3% 6,2%
Private citizens 16,0% 40,0% 28,0% 11,2% 4,8%
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D9 How often do you think that national interests of some MEPs are in contrast with 
the European party group's political line? 
 
Additional comments 
Depends of the nationality of MEP (Belgians vote more pro EU than following their 
member state) 
What is a national interest? Different political parties have obviously different views 
about the national interest. I have taken the national governments interest here 
 
D10 In case this contrast actually occurs, how do you think that MEPs vote? 
 
Additional comments 
I think it varies - if the national political party is in government, the MEP will more likely 
follow the national interests, but if not they will more likely follow the group. The 
personal opinion of the MEP is also a serious factor. 
I would both to equal measures depending of the vote 
I think even if MEP personally disagrees, often national interests win. 
According to their personal conviction 
I am not able to give a clear answer on that. If the national interest is in with or closer to 
the common values of the party then I would agree that an MEP is more likely to vote in 
defence of the national interest 
Depending of the nationality 
Depending on the MEP 
Usually MEPs stick to the national line in the important cases while for minor issues they 
tend to vote in group line not to cause too much internal debate 
Mostly with the political groups but not always 
Depends on the issue 
Depends on the issue at hand 
 - Almost never  - Rarely  - Sometimes  - Often  - Almost always
1 10 89 31 1












We take our national parties line rather than the above 
But it really depends case by case 
depends on the MEP 
None of both answers. The correct answer according to me is "consistently with the 
national party's line". 
It depends on the acuteness of the issue 
In bigger groups consistently with the political group’s line. Not in EFD- group. 
According to her own interest. 
This really differs from one political area to the other, fisheries for instance is very 
nationally orientated whereas employment of the FEMM committee are much more 
transversal topics. 
Depending on the importance of the national interest of course 
Credo che votino al 50% 
 




Some policies at EU level are more important than others - because they are in exclusive 
Union competence. 
Budgetary control is feared, to a certain extent, but mostly hated. It is not taken seriously 
enough. 
Depending on the EU supremacy over national law 
AFET has no power at all for instance 
There are committees that deal more with direct European regulation and these are the 
most important as this is what is applied in every country (ENVI, ITRE, TRANS, IMCO) 
(Former) co-decision plays a major role for the importance of the committee 
There are non legislative committees which are therefore factually less important 
 
D12 If yes, can you list the parliamentary committees that you believe are the most 
important? 
ECON  ITRE 








ITRE, IMCO, TRAN, ENVI 
ECON, ITRE 
AGRI, REGIO, ITRE, BUDG... 
ECON, ITRE, IMCO, TRAN 
ECON, AGRI, IMCO, ITRE, ENVI 
ITRE, ENVI, BUDG 
ECON, JURI, IMCO for all topics. Other committees are also important but specifically in 
the fields they relate to, for ex AGRI or PECH 
LIBE 
AFET  ITRE 
ITRE; IMCO; AGRI; REGI; ENVI; TRAN and to some extent LIBE 
ECON - TRAN - ITRE 
AFET, BUDG, ITRE 
AGRI   TRAN  BUDG 
ITRE, IMCO, ENVI, REGI, AGRI, BUDG, ECON 
ECON, ITRE, AGRI, IMCO, ENVI, BUDG, LIBE 
ENVI, ITRE, ECON, AFET, LIBE 
AFET, AFCO, ECON, ITRA, LIBE 
All Committees dealing with the core competence of the European Union which is the 
internal market in general. Those committees are: IMCO, ECON (just for financial 
regulation), ENVI, REGI (just for structural funds) 
Foreign Affairs / Economy / Libe 
ECON, ENVI, ITRE 
IMCO, ENVI, TRAN, AGRI, LIBE 
Budget Control  Economic and Financial  Foreign Affairs  Environment, Public health 
and food Safety  Regional Policy 
Although it is not given the most importance, I think CONT and BUDG are the most 
important. ECON gets more and more to do, and INTA is probably the most important 
one. AFET is overrated. PETI and FEMM are a joke. 
I don't believe some are more important (though some are obviously less important). I 
merely agreed that some could be considered more important. 
All committees that pass legislation. AFET or CULT are for example talk shops and less 
important 
AGRI, ENVI, ITRE 
ECON  ENVI   LIBE  ITRE   IMCO 
Depends on how you define "important". In terms of regulatory influence, ECON, ENVI 
and ITRE are most important, followed by JURI. Especially for the first 3 the issues are 
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often so technical and complex that plenary is less capable of changing things and 
therefore rather inclined to take over the position. In Terms of important in as 
"reputation" foreign affairs, development etc are more important but ultimately have 
much less of a say. 
IMCO, ENVI, BUDG, ECON, (CRIS), ITRE 
Foreign Affairs, Budget, Legal Affairs 
This is a very hard question to answer however I would find ECON, LIBE, BUDG, AGRI 
very important 
ITRE ENVI IMCO JURI AGRI 
Committees with legislative powers 
International Trade Committee 
ITRE, TRAN, ENVI, BUDG 
AFET, ITRE 
ECON, JURI, LIBE 
ITRE, ENVI, TRANS, IMCO 
The legislative committees 
ITRE, TRAN, ENVI, AGRI, INTA, ECON 
JURI, TRAN, ENVI, BUDGET, ITRE, AFCO, IMCO, INTA 
ECON  IMCO  JURI  ENVI 
BUDG, ENVI, AGRI,  IMCO, TRAN, INTA, PECH, ITRE 
All Committees having legislative files... 
Legislative committees, think ITRE ENVI etc 
ECON, ITRE, LIBE, ENVI. 
ITRE, AGRI, ECON 
ECON, ENVI, IMCO, AGRI 
TRAN ITRE ENVI IMCO 
ECON  TRAN  ITRE  ENVI  IMCO 
ECON 
ITRE, LIBE, IMCO 
IMCO, ECON, INTA, ITRE 
AGRI, REGI, ENVI, ITRE, BUDG, CONT, IURI, IMCO 
ECON, BUDG, ENVI, IMCO, INTA, ITRE, LIBE, REGI, AGRI, 
ENVI  ITRE  IMCO 
ECON 
Agri  Pech  Envi 
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EMPL, INTA, AGRI, BUDG 
INTA, LIBE, ECON, BUDG, IMCO, ITRE 
IMCO, ITRE, LIBE 
ECON, AGRI, REGI, BUDG 
LIBE  JURI 
AFET, ECON, LIBE, TRAN 
ECON, Home affairs, INTA, legal affairs, budgets, regional development, AGRI 
IMCO 
Afet, Inta, Econ, Envi, Agri 
ECON  TRAN  JURI  IMCO 
Those which consider legislation as opposed to own initiative reports and resolutions 
IMCO  INTER  ECON  TRAN 
Le commissioni con atti prettamente legislativi 
IMCO, BUDG, ITRE, AGRI, ENVI 
afet, itre 
IMCO, ECON, ENVI, BUDG, INTA, ITRE, TRAN 
ECON, ITRE 
ENVI, ITRE, IMCO, AGRI 
econ - envi 
IMCO, ECON, ITRE, BUDG 
ambiente, agricoltura, trasporti 
ITRE  ECON  JURI  TRAN 
ECON, IMCO, BUDG, JURI 
LIBE /libertà, giustizia  BUDG/ budget  ENVI /ambiente  ITRE /industria 
ITRE, ENVI, LIBE, AGRI, REGI 
Industria e ambiente 
Envi, itre, imco, agri 
Industria, agricoltura 
ITRE, ENVI, AGRI 
Itre, agri, tran 
ITRE, ENVI, ECON, AGRI, IMCO, REGI 
JURI, ECON, ITRE, IMCO, ENVI, AGRI, REGI 
ENVI; AGRI; INTRE; LIBE; ECON 
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Budg, itre, envi, cont, imco, jury 
Industria, ambiente e agricoltura 
 






Because of the size of the committee 
National opposition (Fisheries) / group opposition (employment, ECON) / institutional 
opposition (Budget) 
 
D14 More specifically, do you believe that in some committees the political groups are 
more cohesive while in other committees MEPs vote more often together with their 
countrymen (even if they belong to different groups)? 
 
Additional comments 
It seems likely that so might be the case, but I lack the experience to be able to say yes or 
no 
Cannot tell 
Might be but not 100% sure about this 
But this is also because of the consistency of a lot of committees is dominated by 
nationalities (for example LIBE has about 7 Dutch MEPs) 
I am not sure, I am not an expert on voting patterns in different committees 
 

















in committees which have less legislative power or which stand for more universal issues 
- DROI; AFET; CULT for example 
AFET 
DEVE  DROI  LIBE 
In those which treat more legislative acts, e.g. ECON, IMCO, ITRE 
In AGRI for example there are clear country division in the CAP position. On the other 
side, political groups are more cohesive in committees like LIBE, ITRA, FEMM, 
ENVI, IMCO 
Depends of the ideology of the group (ALDE is strong cohesive in LIBE for instance) 
TRAN, ITRE, BUDG 
Environment, Public health and food Safety, Women's rights 
Sorry, I can't. 
BUDG, CONT 
AFET, DROI 
ENVI and EMPL seem a bit more cohesive though not much but hard to tell for an 
assistant who only follows 2 committees max. 
Budget and budgetary control are often controlled by S&D and EPP like AGRI and REGI 
as well 
No I cannot, I have no final overview 




I cannot identify specific committees, but according to national priorities, some 
committees are more important than others for most member states 
No 
ENVI, AGRI; DEVE, FEMM, LIBE, TRAN 
EMPL  TRAN  CULT 
It really depends on the make up of the MEPs of the group in the particular committee. 
For example if there are 2 MEPs from a group in a committee that are ideologically close 
then they will vote the same on most issues however if there are difference then they will 
vote differently 
LIBE, AFET, DROI, FEMM, SEDE, CULT 
AFCO, AFET 
AFET  EMPL 
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AFET 
Foreign affairs, INTA 
Budg 
JURI 
ECON, employment, FEMM, ENVI: the strongest topics which make the party line and 
hold together. 
Liberta civili diritti della donna diritti dell’uomo 
ENVI 
Afet 
LIBE, AFET, DEVE 
DEVE  JURI  INTA 
FEMM EMPL 






D16 And in which committees MEPs vote more often together with their countrymen? 
(in case you believe it's important, you can list specific nationalities) 
AGRI, PECH (both typical north-south division) 
ITRE 
German maybe 
Sorry, no-one follows by nationality, unless doing a research on it. REGI and AGRI. 
BUDG 
In the committees dealing more with non-binding recommendations that can also be 
targeted to specific countries, e.g. PETI 
AGRI, AFCO 
AFET, LIBE 
Foreign Affairs along the subject and Regional Affairs along the nationality 
Human rights issues, foreign affairs issues 
Agricolture 
AFET, ENVI, AGRI, INTA, IMCO, ECON 




AGRI, PECH, ENVI, ITRE 
AGRI  PECH  CULT  REGI 
You can see that in ECON with the British voting along similar lines but less so for other 
committees where it is only occasionally that there are very important national points at 
stake. 
Budget 
ITRE. Spanish and French often follow their capitals 
No I cannot, I have no final overview 
Where money is to be distributed to the MS 
LIBE 




ECON, EMPL, PECH 
ENVI IMCO ITRE 
No idea of voting patterns across committees 
AGRI, IMCO, TRAN, ECON, ITRE 
AGRI, PECH, REGI 
AGRI 
LIBE 
AGRI, regional development 
AFET 




ITRE, AGRI, TRAN 
ITRE  TRAN  ECON  ENVI 
LIBE  PETI  AGRI  BUDG 
REGI, AGRI, ITRE, ENVI 
Non so 






Agricoltura, pesca e industria 
 
D17 If a piece of legislation is controversial, do you think that the contrasts are more 




The committee work is often of more importance as decisions are discussed and debated 
there and by the time it goes to vote most people know how they will vote 
In advance, during committee work, one tries to settle difference, but if not possible, it’s 
gonna be power play in plenary - that is why I rate plenary. 
 
D18 In your opinion, why sometimes groups ask for a public and registered vote (the 
so-called "roll-call votes")? 
To show something to the general public; to put pressure on certain MEPs 
To make sure that all group members vote in the same direction. 
to ensure that the result of votes in available to public. to be able to justify their 
decision/behaviour in front of the citizens. when the EU level political group is divided 
along national lines. 
Political statement 
1) because they do not trust their colleagues of the same group  2) because they want to 
use the results to either display themselves or to use it in the press against their political 
enemies 
For the record, show of national cohesion etc. 
Group-cohesion 
Cause as a matter of transparency and responsibility it should always be RCVs. But they 
aren’t. So you have to ask at least sometimes to make the lines visible. 
To force others not to vote against group line, and to be able to confront other groups 
MEPs with their voting behaviour 








to map opponents and blame-shame own group for instance or they do it for publicity - 
to showcase, I voted in favour or against. 
Transparency 
To make pressure to the MEPs in following the group line 
To verify cohesion but also to show openly to the press and citizens how they voted so 
that they can use this as a political argument later on, including in electoral battles) 
In order to present their voting behaviour before their national constituencies and for not 
being held accountable for some majority decisions they did not support 
For transparency or political reasons 
To put in evidence which of the MEPs from other groups are not following the group's 
line or to enforce the group discipline among themselves. 
To make the vote transparent. 
As a image thing or to pressure some MEPs to follow the group line 
To encourage group unity 
Perhaps to show to their electorate their position 
To publicly expose the position taken by each MEP on key or controversial issues 
To challenge MEPs to follow their own line 
Transparency 
To show the voters that political opponents vote in favour, or against something and that 
the group that asked for the RCV is the only reliable party deserving a vote at the next 
elections. 
Sometimes to be able to show voters how their group voted. sometimes to see how their 
own group members vote 
To increase cohesion 
to see what (national) political enemies vote for/against 
To show to the public that they vote against a certain point 
It's to show the public who voted which way because websites like votewatch.eu make 
this very transparent nowadays. Also it can give a clear message to the Council if it does 
not only say "a majority voted in favour" but instead you know how strong the majority 
was. While it might increase party cohesion a bit, I have not seen cases where it was 
demanded with the intention to increase party cohesion. Usually it is the greens or left 
who demand this and they are anyway more coherent than other groups. 
For record of making MEPs follow political lines 
To make political use of it 
To force special consideration and discussion of a particular point, and sometimes to be 
able to keep track of voting behaviour of certain groups (to be able to critise the 
substance, not necessarily just to be able to point out lack of group cohesion.) 
It changes the results 
In order to give explanations to their constituents 
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To have a proof of how they votes for concerned citizens and - more importantly - intrest 
groups at home 
To have proofs how themselves AND the others voted and to use that for publicity at 
home 
Public scrutiny 
To underline the importance of this vote.  To make MEPs think twice before they vote.  
To make MEPs accountable for their votes. 
Because of public interest 
To track back decisions and hold MEPs responsible 
To see who goes beyond the Group or National Delegation line 
Transparency  Power issues 
Because visual counting is often wrong 
Because of transparency. And it is ridiculous that we still do not have all votes as RCV 
Populism 
To see how MEPs vote so they can adjust the political strategy for a next vote on the same 
subject. Also lobby groups should more check the RCVs: that way they can pinpoint on 
the MEPs that do not vote according to their lobby interests... 
To check how the individual MEPs vote 
So that they don't lose their face in their constituencies at home 
To know who was in favour 
To be able to identify and to point their finger at those who voted in one way or another 
while their constituents might have expected them to vote otherwise 
To control the cohesion of the group and to pressurize their members in view of the 
public 
To ensure cohesion with the party line and to be able to watch other members votes 
Several reasons: to discipline the Members of the own group, to be able to "name and 
shame" Members of other groups about controversial decisions, ... 
National interest or political dissensions 
Keep the group line 
To check the line taken by other groups or for political point-scoring against other 
MEPs/groups. 
Easier to follow who´s not voting as the group suggested 
To check their own members 
On issues that are important to the electorate. Used often to put the position of political 
opponents on the record. 
Political reasons, for voters back home or EU citizens. 
to put pressure on MEPs who vote 
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Press/Media 
To see how MEPs vote 
In order to try to secure cohesion 
To check on each others’ position and when the vote is sensitive 
When a sensitive amendment is presented by a specific group 
In order to make MEPs accountable for their decisions in front of their electors 
For individual MEPs or delegations to make public which way they voted, or to force 
their group to be more cohesive 
Publicity 
Per esprimere chiaramente la loro posizione 
E un diretto dei cittadini 
Perché, probabilmente, l'esito del voto in questione condizionerà, in modo evidente, le 
politiche di alcuni Stati membri o è stato al centro di un forte dibattito mediatico. 
Per trasparenza e rendicontazione del proprio operato 
Desiderio di far conoscere la propria votazione agli elettori, responsabilizzare i singoli 
deputati e colleghi di gruppo politico 
perché i cittadini sappiano in che modo hanno votato i diversi parlamentari. E' uno 
strumento di pressione sui parlamentari. 
Per una questione di trasparenza e forse di coerenza con gli accordi presi con le lobbies in 
merito di voto 
Per evitare "franchi tiratori" e per rendere palesi gli orientamenti politici dei singoli 
membri 
Per trasparenza 
Risposta molto complessa. Coesione del gruppo, aspetti mediatici. 
Per avere una prova di come si è votato al provvedimento 
Per marcare le differenze e le posizioni 
Per due motivi: o per compattare il gruppo quando il voto è incerto, oppure per cercare 
di dividere un altro gruppo su una votazione in cui non hanno una linea unica forte 
per fare in modo che la visibilità del voto da parte dell'opinione pubblica influenzi il 
comportamento di voto di alcuni MEP. 
Per verificare chi ha votato e come 






D19 Do you think that these roll-call votes represent more or less the same logics of 
the secret votes? 
 
Additional comments 
Yes but vice versa 
Secret votes cannot be sold to the voters 
Secret votes are held in order not to scare off the votes of people who are afraid to be 
exposed. 
MEPs think more carefully what to vote for if it is a roll-call vote 
In principle it is the same logic though for publicity reasons, MEPs who have a strong 
national issue simply change their vote afterwards for the minutes if there was a really 
controversial issue for their constituency. 
Because of the large number of members yes 
That is why you have them. 
More attention will be paid to them as a record is kept and can be used by political 
opponents 
The decision must be much for political 
 
D20 Do you remember some specific legislations where national interests of some 
member states were prominent, and in open contrast with the political line of a group? 
Can you list them (the more details, the better)? 
Rejection of ACTA: Polish delegation within EPP in favour 
Cars / Co2 emissions - Germany and France defending their strong industry 
Deciding on regional policy, agri budget and policies. You can check all on vote watch, 
all votes, preferences are explained and showcased there. 
Energy Efficiency Directive 
Nuclear energy and genetically modified food are topics where e.g. Austrian EPP 
members tend to vote with their compatriots and against the group line 
In trade issues, the greens might vote against as a group, while country delegation of 
greens from Denmark (or the Netherlands) might vote in favour, because they are more 
pro-free trade.  The socialists are splits in many votes concerning fisheries (the southern 
MEPs follow the commission while the centre are more pro-protectionism). The EPP is 
divided between Christian democrats and just conservatives, but not necessary national, 
it is a quite cohesive group. 








Financial regulation (the UK tends to be more reluctant), Agriculture 
The six pack on the economic governance 
ACTA  Financial Transaction Tax 
There is at least one famous case where the German automobile industry lobbied heavily, 
resulting in a very closely won vote in Parliament to stop a certain kind of legislation that 
would have "harmed" their business. This was around 10 years ago. 
Energy generation (nuclear, renewables) 
Eurobonds (ALDE in favour, German delegation against) 
Lately the consultation procedure (i.e. not even EP competence!) on energy taxation 
where Diesel was going to be taxed more. Many German MEPs changed their vote 
against the background of national regional elections.    All the economic governance 
dossiers (6 pack, 2 pack, euro bonds etc.) show clear national lines against the EP groups. 
Schengen: the Netherlands 
Things to do with Automotive Industry and Energy Policy. Industrial Emissions 
Directive. Budget (UK always a pain in the butt no matter which political group). 
Probably CAP/GMOs/other AGRI but I'm not too familiar. 
Everything concerning Nuclear and genetic engineering 
ACTA, PNR, EU-Patent  All Austrian MEPs across all groups consistently vote against 
nuclear energy 
European Patent (Spain & Italy against, all the other groups in favour).  ACTA 
Energy Taxation Directive 
CAP, ACTA 
SWIFT, ACTA, EU-Morocco fisheries protocol. 
No 
Austria is strictly against nuclear power - and therefore does not follow the EPP's party 
line. Same with GMOs, Austria 
Third Energy Package  Emergency Trade Preferences Pakistan 
INTA agreements with Japan - German interests prevailed over group line 
Cars (carbon levels) 
Offshore oil and gas exploration - UK MEPs took a very distinct line.  Working Time 
Directive - Again, some UK MEPs taking a national position.  Common Fisheries Policy 
ACTA 
SURE (Garriga Report) 
SURE report  Mandate for Trilogue 2013 
TDIP follow-up report 
For example concerning the ban of nuclear power - many political groups were against, 
however, all Bulgarian MEPs, despite their group affiliation voted against. 
Spanish delegation in the EPP - recognition of Kosovo's authority 
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Fisheries agreement with Morocco 
Si, televisioni senza frontiere 
Discussione pacchetti PAC in Commissione AGRI. 
Relazione Sommer su etichettatura 
Efficienza energetica 
Brevetto unico Europeo 
La votazione del six-pack sulla governance economica ha visto molti membri nordici 
contrari alla linea del gruppo S&D e più vicini a quella del PPE. Con il voto su ACTA è 
successo il contrario, molti membri del PPE si sono detti a favore della posizione di S&D 
20/20 
Politica di coesione / pac 
Mi sembra significativo il brevetto europeo, per la Spagna. 
 
D21 Do you think that the political culture (in the broad sense of tradition) of a 
member state influences their MEPs' voting behaviour? 
 
Additional comments 
Although I believe that once in the EP, the members develop a kind of a common culture. 
Especially in shadow and trilogues meetings 
Transparency is more popular among MEPs from the Nordic countries than among those 
from the Mediterranean countries and Eastern Europe. 
I think this is the strongest factor. In some countries party cohesion is seen as important 
and therefore very strong 
Parties in Southern countries tend to have a firm grip on their MEPS, whereas Northern 
MEPs tend to be more independent from their national parties 
There are clear differences since some MEPs have more party coherence in their national 
system and it is less common there to question the party leadership. Others have more a 
"free mandate" understanding of their role in the EP. 
Maybe sometimes and depends on the age of the MEP 
I would hope that it continues to do so 
Yes, but it varies and depends on the particular parties. 









D22 Do you believe that, in addition to the left-right cleavage (related to group's 
cohesion) and national affiliation, other dimensions along which the votes fall do exist 




Countries with high debt vs. countries with low debt 
Geographical positions of the countries (for example whether they have borders on the 
seas or inland only) can make a difference for the interest and therefore the vote 
Euro-scepticism 
I think regional dimension plays a great role, also pro-anti EU and I would also say 
religious values - being a fundamentalist or not. 
Pro/anti-EU is a very strong cleavage as well as north/south. Another important factor is 
the size of the member state 
North/south, but often coincides with right/left 
I said yes but I would only partially agree. There are very seldom dossiers on integration 
issues such as the EP voting constituencies, euro bonds, etc. Here sometimes you have 
less left-right cleavage but the left-right is by far dominating. Some groups are more 
integrationist than others which means, it might actually be pro or contra integration but 
appears to be left-right. 
Pro-anti Europe, control vs trust but verify, EPP &SD vs the rest – especially when it 
concerns vested interests like cohesion spending &agriculture 
Much of your 'for instance' egs are actually the kinds of things that lead to / make up 
national differences/affiliations. 
North/south on the issues of public spending and transparency, East/west when it 
comes to Gay rights 
Gender 
See EPP for votes on Economic governance packages (2-pack & 6 pack) north south 
conflict 
Wanting more or less EU-integration (which is not the same as pro/anti), North/South, 
East/West, Strong state/weak state, Centrist state/non-centrist state. Religious/secular 
Yes, but the dominant difference is most definitely Left-Right 
Pro/anti-EU. Not all right wing MEPs represented in the NI are actually against the EU. 
Parliament VS Council or EC 









D23 To conclude, how much do you agree with the following statement? “The 
European Parliament is surprisingly like all other democratic parliaments: the main 
dimension of voting behaviour is the classic left-right dimension of democratic 
politics. In contrast, national interests have very little systematic influence on voting 
in the European Parliament” 
 
Additional comments 
I think just like in every federal system, the representatives will inevitably be influenced 
by the interests of their electorate, be it a national state or a "Länder"/... Yet I agree that 
the European Parliament is probably more detached from national interests than one 
would expect. 
Call for a split vote. Part 1: Agree. Part 2: Disagree. 
This is a very simplistic and honestly not a university level posed statement or 
hypothesis. In comparison to national parliaments, the EP is compromise oriented. Also 
there are 27 Member Stats with national parliaments, in many newer democracies, 
notably in Eastern Europe, the right-left divide is absolutely not to be defined on same 
criteria than in West. Also, big differences in Mediterranean, Scandinavian, Benelux, 
Germanic and Anglo-Saxon cultures. Please do not use this as hypothesis, in a German 
university for example, this would fail even to be a homework hypothesis. 
The left-right division is the most important but not the only factor 
What you leave out in this question is the fact that there are no fixed coalitions in the EP. 
Therefore, it is completely different. On some issues you have a left-left-green-liberal 
coalition on others a right-right-liberal coalition. Everything is in flux and it is not clear 
when a dossier comes up, which way it goes. In a national parliament that supports the 
government, things are pretty clear from the outset of a proposal. 
The main dimension is not the left right. National interest often constitute a role but 
definitely not always. 
National interests do have influence but not as much as one might think. Increasingly 
main dimension is left-right. National interests are not always systematic ´though they 
can be (e.g. German automotive/ industry - French energy policy / farmers - UK CAP 
liberalism, perhaps), sometimes they are just very specific/ad hoc/based on 
citizens/political atmosphere at home/particular circumstances. Perhaps I would lean 
towards 'neither agree nor disagree', but I hope you get my point!. 
Depends. But it has a little bit of the two. 
It’s not democratic. No opposition 
It is significantly different from other parliaments; it does not have right of initiative, the 
"government" does not origin from the Parliament, etc 
National interests are still very strong 
Strongly Neither agree Strongly
disagree Disagree nor disagree Agree agree
12 65 22 14 1






I would also disagree with the word "interest" which sounds like MEPs make their 
national sovereignty prevail on the European project. As mentioned above it can also be 
related to different party constructions and values, different socio-economic realities 
where a piece of legislation may have a positive impact in one country but be devastating 
in an other. 




Competences of the five main EP committees, identified by question 11 
of MEPs’ assistants survey (July 2012): 
ITRE (Industry, Transport and Research) committee deals mainly 
with: the EU’s industrial and research policy, and development of new 
technologies; space policy; measures relating to energy policy in 
general and the security of energy supply and energy efficiency; the 
(former) Euratom Treaty and Supply Agency; nuclear safety, 
decommissioning and waste disposal in the nuclear sector; and finally, 
the information society, information technology and 
telecommunication infrastructures. 
ENVI (Environment, Public Health and Food Safety), as its name 
says, deals with three macro-areas, all of them composed by many 
different domains. The first area is environmental policy and 
environmental protection measures (air, soil and water pollution, waste 
management and recycling, climate change, protection of biodiversity 
and sustainable development). The second is public health 
(programmes in the field of public health and pharmaceutical and 
cosmetic products). The third is food safety issues (the labelling and 
safety of foodstuffs, veterinary legislation and public health checks on 
food production systems). 
ECON (Economic and Monetary Affairs) committee is responsible for 
the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union, and the 
European monetary and financial system (including relations with the 
relevant institutions or organisations); free movements of capital and 
payments; rules on competition and State or public aid; tax provisions, 
and finally the regulation and supervision of financial services. 
IMCO (Internal Market and Consumer Protection) deals mainly with 
the coordination at EU level of national legislation in the sphere of the 
internal market and for the customs union, (especially the free 
movement of goods); measures aiming at the removal of potential 
obstacles to the functioning of the internal market; and finally, the 
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promotion and protection of the economic interests of consumers 
(except for public health and food safety issues, competences of ENVI). 
AGRI (Agriculture and Rural Development) committee is responsible 
mainly for the operation and development of the common agricultural 
policy, and for the rural development, including the activities of the 
relevant financial instruments. 
 
 
Table a1. Descriptive statistics of data from question 11-16, MEPs’ assistant survey 2012 
 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
 
Table a2. Descriptive statistics of OLS regression for the five main committees. 
 












Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Committee importance 25 14 1.779.279 0 57
EPG cohesive 25 3.44 2987195 0 12
Nationality cohesive 25 3.36 4152108 0 17
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
vote_dic 3627087 0.6085978 0.4880641 0 1
epg_yes_share 5818253 0.5893872 0.419668 0 1
country_yes_share 5582846 0.5947832 0.3339888 0 1
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Table a4. Taxonomy of MEPs’ loyalty/rebelliousness to national party 
 





Committee Freq. Percent Cum.
0 676,8 12.50 12.50
AFCO 211,5 3.91 16.41
AFET 414,54 7.66 24.07
AGRI 304,56 5.63 29.69
BUDG 306,44 5.66 35.35
CLIM 15,98 0.30 35.65
CONT 172,96 3.19 38.84
CULT 125,02 2.31 41.15
Conciliation Committee 3,76 0.07 41.22
DEVE 83,66 1.55 42.77
ECON 333,7 6.16 48.93
EMPL 211,5 3.91 52.84
ENVI 664,58 12.28 65.12
FEMM 97,76 1.81 66.92
IMCO 220,9 4.08 71.00
INTA 144,76 2.67 73.68
ITRE 265,08 4.90 78.57
JURI 152,28 2.81 81.39
LIBE 334,64 6.18 87.57
PECH 138,18 2.55 90.12
PETI 24,44 0.45 90.57
Parliament's delegation to the Conciliation Committee 5,64 0.10 90.68
REGI 145,7 2.69 93.37
TRAN 325,24 6.01 99.37









Table a5. Descriptive statistics of independent variables, EP6 
 




Table a6. Respondents of 2006 MEPs’ survey disaggregated by country and EPG. 
 
Source: author’s own compilation on Farrell et al.’s data (2006) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Euro country 5827060 9.706383 7.51162 1 27
Euro group 5827060 2.623404 1.952817 1 8
Budget 5827060 .0527504 .2235349 0 1
Legislative 5827060 .3668334 .4819405 0 1
Rule 5726480 .0842088 .2777007 0 1
Top 5 committees 5150260 .3473262 .4761205 0 1
Result 5818600 .6074313 .4883222 0 1
Margin 5824240 331.9295 190.5754 0 704
Size 5808463 51.69691 30.18965 5 99





DEM SOC UEN na Total
Austria 0 3 1 0 0 2 0 1 7
Belgium 3 5 1 0 0 2 0 2 13
Cyprus 1 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 5
Czech Republic 0 6 0 3 0 2 0 0 11
Denmark 3 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 6
Estonia 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 3
Finland 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 5
France 5 3 2 1 0 12 0 1 24
Germany 2 19 6 3 0 4 0 0 34
Greece 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2
Hungary 1 3 0 0 0 4 0 0 8
Ireland 1 3 0 0 0 1 2 0 7
Italy 6 10 2 3 0 5 1 1 28
Latvia 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 4
Lithuania 4 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
Luxembourg 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Malta 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Netherlands 3 0 0 1 1 4 0 0 9
Poland 3 7 0 0 2 5 4 1 22
Portugal 0 3 0 0 0 6 0 0 9
Slovakia 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 3
Slovenia 0 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 5
Spain 1 5 1 1 0 3 0 0 11
Sweden 2 2 1 0 1 3 0 0 9
UK 6 13 2 0 4 10 0 2 37
Total 44 95 18 15 8 73 11 8 272
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Table a7. Respondents of 2010 MEPs’ survey disaggregated by country and EPG. 
 
Source: author’s own compilation on Farrell et al.’s data (2010) 
  
ALDE ECR EFD EPP-ED G/EFA
EUL/ 
NGL SOC na Total
Austria 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3 5
Belgium 3 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 9
Bulgaria 1 0 0 4 0 0 2 0 7
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 4
Czech Republic 0 3 0 1 0 0 5 0 9
Denmark 2 0 1 0 2 0 3 0 8
Estonia 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2
Finland 2 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 7
France 4 0 1 8 4 2 5 0 24
Germany 3 0 0 11 6 4 9 0 33
Greece 0 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 6
Hungary 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 0 4
Ireland 1 0 0 4 0 1 2 0 8
Italy 5 0 4 16 0 0 7 0 32
Latvia 0 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 3
Lithuania 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 3
Luxembourg 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 3
Malta 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 3
Netherlands 2 0 0 2 2 1 0 0 7
Poland 0 3 0 19 0 0 1 0 23
Portugal 0 0 0 2 0 0 3 1 6
Romania 5 0 0 5 0 0 3 1 14
Slovakia 1 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 6
Slovenia 3 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 6
Spain 1 0 0 5 1 0 6 1 14
Sweden 2 0 0 2 2 1 2 0 9
UK 6 5 3 0 0 0 1 0 15
Total 43 12 10 100 23 10 64 8 270
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